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OBJECTIVES OF THE COMMITTEE 83
The Committee for Economic Development
is an independent research and policy organi-
zation of some 250 business leaders and edu-
cators. CED is nonprofit, nonpartisan, and non-
political. Its purpose is to propose policies that
bring about steady economic growth at high
employment and reasonably stable prices, in-
creased productivity and living standards,
greater and more equal opportunity for every
citizen, and improved quality of life for all.
All CED policy recommendations must
have the approval of trustees on the Research
and Policy Committee. This Committee is
directed under the bylaws which emphasize
that “all research is to be thoroughly objective
in character, and the approach in each instance
is to be from the standpoint of the general
welfare and not from that of any special politi-
cal or economic group.” The Committee is
aided by a Research Advisory Board of lead-
ing social scientists and by a small permanent
professional staff.
The Research and Policy Committee does
not attempt to pass judgment on any pending
specific legislative proposals; its purpose is to
urge careful consideration of the objectives set
forth in this statement and of the best means of
accomplishing those objectives.
Each statement is preceded by extensive
discussions, meetings, and exchange of memo-
randa. The research is undertaken by a sub-
committee, assisted by advisors chosen for their
competence in the field under study.
The full Research and Policy Committee
participates in the drafting of recommenda-
tions. Likewise, the trustees on the drafting
subcommittee vote to approve or disapprove
a policy statement, and they share with the
Research and Policy Committee the privilege
of submitting individual comments for publi-
cation.
Except for the members of the Research and
Policy Committee and the responsible subcommit-
tee, the recommendations presented herein are not
necessarily endorsed by other trustees or by the
advisors, contributors, staff members, or others
associated with CED.
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PURPOSE OF THIS STATEMENT
Major reforms are needed in policies that
affect both private retirement plans and Social
Security if the United States is to avoid a seri-
ous crisis in retirement funding and living
standards in the next century. Our goal in
preparing this report is to show as clearly as
possible the consequences of inadequate
retirement saving for those retiring early in
the next century and thereafter. If policies and
practices are not changed, many twenty-first–
century retirees will experience an unexpected
and substantially reduced standard of living,
due in no small part to a retirement system
that is underfunded, overregulated, and soon
to be strained as never before with the retire-
ment of the baby-boom cohort.
Who Will Pay for Your Retirement? issues a
strong warning, but it also offers comprehen-
sive, specific, and workable recommendations.
These recommendations, if taken together, will
not only allow the nation to avert disaster but
will also:
• Strengthen and streamline the way we fund
and regulate retirement programs.
• Educate workers and employers about
retirement needs, and provide incentives
for people to save adequately for their
own retirement.
• Significantly broaden the scope and cover-
age of private plans.
• Preserve Social Security for generations to
come by improving funding and limiting
the growth of benefits.
We are keenly aware of the enormous
impact that retirement policies have on
national saving and the economy. Decisions
on retirement policies should place top prior-
ity not only on coverage and increased ben-
efits but also on national saving, capital
formation, and economic growth.
The Committee for Economic Development
has a long-standing interest in retirement poli-
cies. In 1981, CED issued Reforming Retirement
Policies, which outlined a strategy for broad-
ening the reach of private pensions, increas-
ing individual saving, and strengthening
Social Security. Although a number of the
recommendations in that report have been
implemented (e.g., a gradual rise in the retire-
ment age), recent changes in federal regula-
tion (many made in the name of deficit reduc-
tion or antidiscrimination policy) have
curtailed new pension formation and sound
funding.
With this policy statement, we call on Con-
gress to reverse government policies that are
strangling private pensions and threatening
their financial soundness. Although  this state-
ment deals primarily with policy for private
pensions, we also say that Social Security
cannot be ignored and that changes are neces-
sary to preserve that system well into the next
century. We call on all Americans to educate
themselves about their retirement needs and
options so that they can make sound and sen-
sible decisions for themselves and their fami-
lies.
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1America’s retirement system is under-
funded, overregulated, and soon to be chal-
lenged by unprecedented growth in the
retirement-age population. Consequently, our
nation will confront a major crisis in financing
the needs of the elderly at the beginning of the
twenty-first century unless policies are
reformed to make retirement saving a top pri-
ority. If steps are taken promptly to imple-
ment the reforms recommended by CED in
this statement, significant sacrifices will be
required, but they will be manageable. If
action is postponed, the nation will face the
very unpleasant choice of a substantial cut in
the economic status of the elderly or an eco-
nomically damaging and unfair tax burden
on future generations of workers.
The economic well-being of future retirees
and, indeed, of workers is seriously at risk
because of the interaction of several demo-
graphic, economic, and fiscal trends:
• Growth in the elderly population in the
United States, which is already quite rapid
because of increasing life expectancy and
declining fertility rates, will accelerate when
the baby-boom generation reaches retire-
ment age in about a decade. A sharp
decline in the ratio of workers to retirees
will result.1
• Private saving for retirement is woefully
inadequate, and national saving has
declined.
• Underfunded pension promises in both
private and public retirement programs are
a growing and often understated problem.
• Rapid growth in government spending for
the elderly threatens to get so far out of
control when the baby-boom generation
retires that it cannot be financed by reason-
able burdens on taxpayers.
Private saving is only a fraction of that
needed to enable future retirees to fulfill their
economic expectations in retirement. One
recent study showed that the baby-boom gen-
eration needs to triple its rate of accumulation
of assets in order to maintain its preretirement
living standard during retirement. Moreover,
this projection assumes that Social Security
benefits will not be cut.2 But it is now clear
that the Social Security system has made prom-
ises to future retirees that cannot be kept with-
out vastly improving prefunding or imposing
a harsh burden on future workers. This situa-
tion has been exacerbated by ill-advised
changes in regulatory and tax policies that
have discouraged private saving for retire-
ment and by federal budget policies that have
generated huge deficits. These deficits con-
tinue to absorb the lion’s share of private sav-
ing needed to ensure the economic prosperity
of future citizens.
Clearly, for the vast majority of those cur-
rently in the labor force, their future economic
circumstances will depend greatly upon their
own saving and participation in retirement
plans. Those who are not making sufficient
preparations for retirement appear to have a
misunderstanding about the impact of under-
saving on their retirement income. CED be-
lieves that this situation calls for a major
education campaign sponsored by both gov-
Chapter 1
Executive Summary and
Policy Recommendations
2ernment and private employers to improve
workers’ understanding about their own re-
sponsibilities and options for retirement.
Although the primary focus of this policy
statement is private retirement programs, we
recognize that private saving is only one com-
ponent of the retirement finance problem.
Therefore, our discussion of retirement sav-
ing would not be complete without a brief
examination of the problem of underfunded
promises with respect to Social Security and
pensions for public employees. Indeed, the
outlook for Social Security makes reform of
private retirement policies all the more
important.
The major thrust of the reforms recom-
mended by CED can be described as follows:
• The federal government should streamline
and simplify regulation and reverse recent
changes in regulatory and tax policies that
act as barriers to private retirement saving
and discourage growth in private pension
coverage.
• Businesses and government sponsors of
retirement programs should fully fund pen-
sion promises made to their workers and
avoid making promises that cannot be kept.
Business and government should also
encourage an increase in the average
retirement age in recognition of the
improved health status of the elderly and
the projected need for skilled workers, and
to compensate for added retirement costs
arising from increases in life expectancy.
• In order to encourage individuals to in-
crease their saving and take greater respon-
sibility for their future, workers must be
better educated about the effects of retire-
ment saving and the choices they make
about retirement ages, saving rates, and
investment strategies on their future eco-
nomic circumstances.
• Government should quickly legislate the
gradual introduction of benefit-trimming
changes in Social Security in order to pre-
serve the long-run financial health of the
system. Social Security retirement benefits
and other benefits for the elderly should
not be promised if they cannot be financed
either by advance funding that adds to
national saving or by an acceptable level of
taxes on active workers.
We believe that the nation must act quickly
to reform retirement policies and practices so
that the future economic security of retirees
and all other citizens will be protected. Post-
poning action would simply raise the cost dra-
matically; in contrast, early action imple-
mented in gradual steps would minimize the
impact on the living standards of both work-
ers and retirees.
THE CHALLENGE POSED BY AN
AGING POPULATION
Growth in the nation’s real income and
wealth has made it possible for the United
States not only to provide for the basic needs
of rapidly growing numbers of elderly but
also to greatly improve their economic
well-being. However, because of the aging of
the baby-boom generation, the retired popu-
lation will begin to rise much more rapidly
and the workforce more slowly during the
first decade of the next century. The ratio of
workers to retirees is expected to plunge from
its current level of about 3.4 to 1 to about 2 to 1
by 2030 (see Figure 1).3 Consequently, provid-
ing for the needs of growing numbers of eld-
erly will become a much greater challenge for
the country. The share of the nation’s total
output consumed by this group will increase,
placing a heavy burden on workers unless
the increased consumption by retirees is
prefinanced by saving, including funded pen-
sions. Unfortunately, federal regulations
enacted since the mid-1980s have been inimi-
cal to funding. Moreover, legislation requir-
ing the delay of a large part of funding until
the later part of workers’ careers, combined
with the aging of the workforce (as the baby-
boomers approach retirement), will raise the
cost of many retirement plans sharply, thereby
discouraging the expansion of retirement ben-
3efits. Delay in funding was required by the
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1987
(OBRA 1987). See Chapter 5 and Figure 25 for
a description of the effect on funding.
The upcoming bulge in the elderly popula-
tion presents a particularly serious problem
for Social Security. Some of the increase in
spending for Social Security benefits can be
financed by drawing down the reserve in the
Social Security trust funds. However, this will
merely delay a tax increase, and probably not
for long. The Social Security Administration’s
intermediate projection indicates that the an-
nual cash flow will turn negative beginning in
2013 and that the reserve fund will be ex-
hausted in 2029. Because earlier projections of
the balance in the Social Security retirement
trust funds have been revised downward per-
sistently and dramatically (see Figure 2), many
believe it is more realistic to assume that the
fund will run out much sooner, perhaps by
2012, as in the Social Security Administration’s
more pessimistic projection. When the reserves
Ratio of Workers to Social Security
Recipients, 1980 to 2050
Ratio
(intermediate projection)
Figure 1
SOURCE: Office of the Actuary, Social Security Administration.
Year
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creditable for Social Security.
SOURCE: Office of the Actuary, Social Security
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4are exhausted, Social Security benefits must
be financed by taxes on current wages (or by
increased debt), placing a uniquely heavy bur-
den on future workers.
The actuarial deficiency in Social Security,
taking into account all prospective revenues
and expenditures for the next seventy-five
years, was estimated at $1.9 trillion at the end
of 1993.4 A rough indication of the potential
future burden of Social Security on active
workers can be seen by comparing the cost of
retirement benefits with the wages of work-
ers. The Social Security Administration’s 1994
intermediate projection indicates that total
expenditures for old age and survivors insur-
ance and disability and hospital insurance ben-
efits, or OASDIHI,5 which are financed by the
payroll tax, will increase by an alarming
12 percent of taxable payroll (from more than
15 percent to nearly 28 percent) during the
1994–2030 period, largely as a consequence of
demographic change (see Figure 3).6 OASDIHI
benefits are also projected to rise sharply as a
share of the gross domestic product (GDP),
from 6.4 percent in 1994 to 10.8 percent in
2030. These figures do not reflect the rapidly
growing cost of supplementary medical
insurance (SMI, or Part B of Medicare) that is
financed primarily out of general tax revenues,
the growth in unfunded retirement benefits
from government jobs that will also be
financed from general revenues, and other
programs for the elderly for which long-term
projections are not available.7 Thus, it is not
surprising that many have concluded that
government-related retirement and health ben-
efits for the elderly must be cut back. In CED’s
view, reliance on extremely high taxes paid
by future workers to finance these benefits
for the elderly would be very inequitable and
have an extremely adverse effect on the living
standard of those workers born after the
baby-boom generation.
The impact of demographic change on
pay-as-you-go retirement financing makes it
imperative that pension policy be reformed to
encourage increased retirement saving and to
reduce unfair shifting of the burden to future
30
25
20
15
10
Percent
Social Security Retirement and Hospital
Insurance Benefits and Revenues,
1980 to 2030
Figure 3
(percent of taxable payroll)
Year
NOTE: Revenues exclude interest on trust funds.
SOURCE: Office of the Actuary, Social Security
Administration.
Revenues
Benefits
1980                  1990                 2000                   2010                  2020                  2030
generations of workers. Senator Robert Kerrey
and former Senator John Danforth, co-chair-
men of the Bipartisan Commission on Entitle-
ment and Tax Reform, have responded to the
Social Security projections by proposing fun-
damental changes in Social Security and the
U.S. retirement system that would bring
future outlays and revenues to near balance.
However, there is substantial political resis-
tance to changes in Social Security at the
present time, although reform is critically
needed and delaying action will only make
the problem worse.8 But given the unavoid-
able impact of the aging population on
pay-as-you-go retirement systems, the most
promising way to protect the economic secu-
rity of future retirees without overburden-
ing workers is to increase private retirement
saving. Many individuals look upon contri-
5Personal and Pension Saving,
1970 to 1991
Percent
Figure 4
butions to their pension funds, which are their
own assets, as much less of a burden than
increased payroll taxes. If policy changes suc-
ceed in encouraging individuals to forgo a
significant amount of consumption before
retiring, and if sponsors of retirement pro-
grams fully fund pension promises, the
income of retirees can be maintained without
an unacceptable sacrifice by workers.
THE UNTIMELY DECLINE IN
RETIREMENT SAVING
Unfortunately, saving for retirement and
other purposes has declined in the United
States at the very time when it should be ris-
ing in anticipation of the retirement of the
baby-boom generation. Private contributions
to pensions as a percent of disposable income
have declined in the last decade, though not
as sharply as total personal saving (see Fig-
ure 4).
(percent of disposable personal income)
SOURCE: Bureau of Economic Analysis; pension saving series
provided by staff at The Brookings Institution.
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Decline in Contributions to Private
Pension Plans, 1975 to 1991
Figure 5
(in 1987 dollars)
SOURCE: The Brookings Institution, Bureau of Labor
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1975       1977       1979        1981        1983       1985        1987       1989       19911970    1972    1974     1976     1978    1980    1982    1984     1986    1988    1990
Year
Total contributions per private
sector worker
1,600
1,400
1,200
1,000
800
600
400
200
0
Employer contributions per private
sector worker
Dollars
PENSION CONTRIBUTIONS
AND FUNDING
Total private pension contributions
declined in constant 1987 dollars from about
$1,470 per worker in 1985 to about $1,140 per
worker in 1991. The employer component
declined in real terms from about $1,039 in
1980 to about $506 per worker in 1991 (see
Figure 5). Defined benefit plans, which are
more commonly sponsored by large firms, suf-
fered a very sharp decrease in contributions
(see Figure 6).9 Overall contributions by
employers to these plans declined largely as
a consequence of three developments: (1)
increased earnings on financial assets, (2) the
enactment in 1987 of lower ceilings on pen-
sion funding eligible for tax deductions, and
(3) a sharp rise in the cost of complying with
increasingly complex regulations that discour-
aged the growth of defined benefit plans, par-
ticularly in small firms (see Figure 7). Total
6Employer Contributions to Defined
Benefit Plans, 1975 to 1991
Figure 6
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eral agency that insures private pensions. It
should be noted that this insurance program
also exposes future taxpayers to a huge poten-
tial liability.11
Information on underfunding of govern-
ment employee pensions is incomplete, but
the magnitude of underfunding appears to be
greater than for private pensions. (Of course,
the government’s taxing authority makes it
difficult to compare the risks.) It has been esti-
mated that the average funding ratio of all
state and local pensions is only 80 percent and
that the actuarial deficiency for federal, civil-
ian, and military pensions at the end of 1992
was $1.5 trillion, taking into account both pro-
spective receipts and outlays.12
ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF DECLINING
RETIREMENT SAVING
The decline in retirement saving not only
jeopardizes the economic security of individual
contributions to defined contribution plans
continue to rise, however, as a consequence of
rapid growth in plan participation.
Underfunding of defined benefit pension
plans is a serious problem. Although most
private pensions meet legal funding require-
ments, CED believes that the funding limits
enacted in the 1980s (described in detail in
Chapter 5) have placed many pension funds
at risk in the event of unexpected changes in
the value of financial assets and in the finan-
cial strength of firms. A decline in interest
rates, for example, would reduce the return
on pension assets and increase the present
value of future benefits, thereby causing some
pensions to become underfunded. Moreover,
the funding status of private pensions has
deteriorated even by current legal funding
standards. Underfunding of private retirement
plans has been increasing rapidly, reaching
$71 billion in 1993, according to the Pension
Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC),10 a fed-
SOURCE: Hay/Huggins Company, Inc.
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7and widespread pension coverage. Unfortu-
nately, recent legislation appears to have been
motivated by other concerns, such as the elimi-
nation of every potential abuse of pensions,
the impact of pension saving on the distribu-
tion of income, and the budget deficit. All
these concerns have merit but frequently can-
not be addressed through pension policies with-
out creating enormously complex and costly
regulation and undermining the primary
objective of retirement policy.
CED believes that the looming crisis in
retirement finance requires the prompt imple-
mentation of three measures: (1) tax incen-
tives and regulatory reform to encourage
individual retirement saving and to achieve
increased funding of, and coverage by, pri-
vate pensions; (2) education programs that
increase worker awareness of the need for
retirement saving and encourage individual
responsibility; and (3) changes in government
priorities to provide full funding of public
employee pensions, increased funding of So-
cial Security, and a reduction in the growth of
spending programs and promises for the eld-
erly financed from current income.
REGULATORY REFORM FOR PRIVATE
RETIREMENT PLANS
The objective of the 1974 Employee Retire-
ment Income Security Act (ERISA), which
remains the basic pension law of the United
States and deals with all facets of private pen-
sions, was quite simple: to protect the pen-
sions of the elderly. However, numerous
amendments have since been enacted that are
extremely complex, in large part because of
their diverse objectives. These changes have
placed many barriers in the way of increased
pension coverage and retirement saving. For
example, complicated discrimination rules and
funding limits enacted in the 1980s have
sharply increased administrative costs,
reduced contributions, and placed pensions
at increased risk. From a national saving per-
spective, the most serious setback was
OBRA87, which limited funding of defined
benefit plans to 150 percent of plan termination
workers but also affects the economic health
of the country, because retirement saving is a
very large and growing component of national
saving. The U.S. national saving rate (the sum
of saving for retirement and all other pur-
poses by individuals, business, and govern-
ment) has fallen to record low levels in recent
years. In fact, the national saving rate has
averaged less than 2 percent of GDP so far in
the 1990s, down from 4 percent in the 1980s
and about 8 percent in previous decades.
Because national saving is the domestic source
of funds for investment, its decline has an
adverse effect on U.S. productivity growth
and international competitiveness. Moreover,
the rate of saving has been low for some time,
and the cumulative effect on the nation’s capi-
tal stock cannot be reversed quickly. Of course,
weak growth in productivity and real wages
does not bode well for the living standard of
future retirees and workers.
POLICY OPTIONS TO TACKLE THE
RETIREMENT FINANCE PROBLEM
There are limited options for alleviating
the burden on future workers arising from the
inevitable increase in the elderly population.
The most important is to make retirement sav-
ing and adequate funding of pensions top pri-
orities for individuals, employers, and gov-
ernment. Retiree spending from retirement
saving (including benefits received from
funded pensions) is merely the recapture of
deferred consumption. Unlike pay-as-you-go
financing, this recapture need not be a burden
on workers because the saving resulting from
deferred consumption contributes to the
growth of the economy and the growth of
workers’ real incomes. Indeed, if the added
saving creates sufficient income to pay for the
rise in benefits to retirees, active workers
would experience no increased burden as the
retiree population grows.
Therefore, the basic objective of retire-
ment policy should be to ensure the eco-
nomic security of retirees by encouraging
retirement saving, full funding of pensions,
8liability. (Termination liability is the liability a
plan would incur if it were to cease at any
given time. 150 percent of termination liabil-
ity is generally lower than 100% of projected
liability, which was the previous funding
limit.) This change forced many firms to dis-
continue further funding of pensions for sev-
eral years.
By discouraging retirement saving, these
regulatory changes have clearly exacerbated
the burden on future workers arising from
demographic change. At the same time, regu-
lators have failed to take adequate action to
preserve existing retirement funds. Reforms
are needed to reduce preretirement with-
drawal of retirement funds for consumption
purposes and to encourage improvements in
the portability of pension funds.
CED believes that pension regulatory and
tax policies must be streamlined and simpli-
fied and subjected to cost-benefit evaluation.
We propose a number of changes in the regu-
lation of private pensions that would greatly
simplify discrimination rules, restore the
full-funding limit to its pre-1987 level of 100
percent of projected plan liability, preserve
pension funds for retirement, permit pension
tax preferences to be based on lifetime income
(as opposed to current-year income only),
encourage accelerated vesting and greater
portability of pension assets, increase the
authority of the PBGC to make sure that spon-
sors of private pensions meet their funding
responsibilities, and increase the limit on pen-
sion benefits and contributions (see “Summary
of Policy Recommendations”). All our recom-
mendations are designed to encourage saving
and greater support for private retirement pro-
grams.
RETIREMENT INFORMATION AND
INDIVIDUAL RESPONSIBILITY
Although reform of pension regulation is
critical, CED believes that it is incumbent
upon individuals to take greater responsi-
bility for financing their retirement. Individu-
als ultimately pay for their own retirement by
saving, participating in retirement plans, and
paying taxes. We recognize, however, that
workers are not well informed about retire-
ment needs and benefits.13 Indeed, financial
literacy is low in the United States, and many
workers do not have adequate information
about retirement income and retirement
options to plan intelligently for their old age.
The fact that private retirement saving per
worker may be only about one-third of what
will be needed to maintain accustomed living
standards during retirement does not appear
to be widely understood by workers. There-
fore, CED recommends that government and
business regularly provide all workers with
information on accrued and prospective
retirement benefits. The Social Security
Administration is planning to begin the distri-
bution of such information soon. This is
a positive development. It is critically
important, however, that the information on
Social Security be as realistic as possible,
including the possibility that benefits may be
cut in order to preserve the system. In this
way, individuals can make informed plans for
their retirement.
REFORMING GOVERNMENT
EMPLOYEE PENSIONS AND THE
SOCIAL SECURITY PROGRAM
It is also important to reform the funding
of government employee pensions. Indeed,
CED strongly endorses the view that pen-
sion promises made by both private and pub-
lic employers should be fully funded and
that no promises should be made that cannot
be funded.
The specific character of required reforms
in Social Security retirement programs is a
complex issue beyond the scope of this state-
ment. It is clear, however, that merely passing
the burden to future generations is both ineq-
uitable and bad economics. The increase in
total benefit payments that will occur
because of the baby-boom bulge should be
prefinanced, and/or benefits should be cut
to limit the burden on future workers. We
also believe that the rise in life expectancy
warrants a further increase in the normal
9of preparations for retirement and the poten-
tial burden on workers, reduced benefits and
delayed retirement are not likely to be matters
of choice. However, the burden on future
retirees can be minimized by giving them
adequate warning. CED believes that neces-
sary reductions in future Social Security ben-
efits should be enacted well before they take
effect in order to give workers an opportu-
nity to make compensating adjustments in
their saving behavior.
Such reforms would permit a larger
buildup in Social Security trust fund reserves
and reduce the potential burden on future
workers by making it possible to hold down
payroll tax rates when the baby-boom genera-
tion retires. However, the effect on the payroll
tax may be a misleading indicator of the
future burden if the increased reserves do not
add to national saving. No additional resources
are created to pay for the rise in benefits
unless the reserves add to national saving,
productive capital, and economic growth.
Unfortunately, it appears that the recent posi-
tive cash flow in the Social Security program
has been used to pay for current government
services rather than to add to saving. CED
believes it is imperative that the positive cash
flow in the Social Security program be used,
not to support government consumption, but
to add to national saving.
retirement age beyond the increase already
legislated and that the earnings limit for
recipients of Social Security should be raised
substantially in order to reduce the disincen-
tive for the elderly to continue working. Of
course, a politically realistic resolution of the
Social Security financing problem is likely to
involve both cuts in benefits, especially for
higher-income individuals, and some addi-
tional taxes to increase prefunding of the
retirement of the baby boomers. CED has pre-
viously endorsed a proposal for full taxing
of Social Security benefits in excess of the
beneficiary’s contributions. (Because low-
income retirees do not pay federal income
taxes, the taxation of all benefits would have
an effect somewhat similar to means testing of
benefits.) Other reforms, such as a gradual
phase-in of a lower ratio of initial benefits to
income and/or limits on the indexing of ben-
efits (above the minimum subsistence level),
should be considered.
The economic status of retirees has
improved sharply in recent decades, a devel-
opment that has probably raised workers’
expectations relating to retirement income. To
the degree that workers regard promised
Social Security benefits as a right, similar to a
property right, that should not be repealed,
there may be strong resistance to these
options. Nevertheless, given the present state
The economic well-being of future retirees
and their dependents is in jeopardy because
of the continuing failure of our society to make
adequate preparation for an inevitable sharp
rise in the retirement-age population. This situ-
ation is reflected in the low priority many
individuals give to retirement saving, changes
in regulations that have discouraged or lim-
ited contributions to retirement plans,
underfunded pensions sponsored by both pub-
lic and private employers, and a looming cri-
sis in the Social Security retirement system,
which has promised future benefits that can-
not be provided without imposing a harsh
burden on future generations of workers.
Unfortunately, the regulation of private pen-
sions has become incredibly complex and
aimed at various social objectives that often
conflict with the goal of encouraging retire-
ment saving. CED believes that policy mak-
ers should focus much greater attention on
the basic goal of retirement policy, which is
to ensure the economic security of the eld-
erly by encouraging saving for retirement.
The adverse effects of government policies
on retirement saving and work effort have led
SUMMARY OF POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
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us to the conclusion that current pension laws,
regulations, and practices must be streamlined,
simplified and designed to achieve six basic
objectives:
• Provide retirement plans for the largest
possible number of workers.
• Ensure that pension plans meet appropri-
ate fiduciary standards and are funded to
fulfill pension promises.
• Encourage individual saving by making
retirement saving opportunities available
to all workers through deferred taxes on
contributions and earnings and by pro-
viding all workers with realistic informa-
tion on their retirement saving needs,
resources, and options.
• Place simple and reasonable limits on tax
preferences received by any individual
(i.e., a single overall limit on eligible con-
tributions indexed to inflation and a limit
on benefits received from a qualified
defined benefit plan).
• Preserve retirement saving and pension
rights by discouraging preretirement
withdrawals and by improving the port-
ability of pension assets.
• Compensate for the rise in life expect-
ancy by encouraging retirement at a later
age and by reducing work disincentives
for the elderly who receive retirement ben-
efits.
Both business and government should
encourage later retirement in order to com-
pensate for the rise in life expectancy, and
government should raise the earnings limits
applicable to retirees receiving Social Secu-
rity benefits. Although government tax and
regulatory policies should encourage private
pension saving, we believe that tax incen-
tives should be carefully designed to ensure
that they raise national saving as well. Pen-
sion saving for retirement represent a large
and increasingly important component of
national saving. Other legitimate fiscal policy
concerns, such as the budget deficit, should
not be addressed in a manner that serves to
exacerbate our private saving deficiency. In
addition, other important retirement policy
issues should not be addressed in a way that
defeats the basic saving objective of pension
policy.
The inadequacy of present-day retirement
saving may be due in part to confusion about
who is responsible for meeting the income
goals of retirees. Apparently, some individu-
als mistakenly believe that their income in
retirement is entirely or principally the
responsibility of government and business. In
fact, the responsibility for the income of
retirees is divided among government,
employers, and individuals. However, each
individual must bear the ultimate responsi-
bility for his or her living standard in retire-
ment. Social Security, which is only loosely
linked to income, should continue to provide
a minimum level of retirement income for all
working members of society and their depen-
dents. Businesses and other employers should be
encouraged to voluntarily facilitate and assist
saving for retirement to the degree affordable.
Company-sponsored pensions are often use-
ful as a means of attracting and retaining a
competent workforce. Employer plans, com-
bined with Social Security, are generally
intended to provide retirees with a reasonable
minimum standard of living, though with less
income than received by active workers.
Finally, saving by individual workers should be
encouraged so that they can achieve their
desired living standard in retirement. For
many workers, their savings are a critical
source of retirement income.
CED continues to favor strong action to
reduce the federal deficit as the most certain
way to increase national saving needed to
improve the growth and competitiveness of
the U.S. economy. Some of the recommenda-
tions presented in this statement would
reduce the federal deficit; others would raise
it. We believe that any net increase in the
federal deficit resulting from reform of retire-
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ment policies should be offset by reductions
in real spending. However, the purpose of
reducing the deficit is to increase national sav-
ing; therefore, attempts to lower the deficit by
taxing private saving are counterproductive
and should be avoided.
With these goals and responsibilities in
mind, CED makes the following recommen-
dations:
1. Retirement plan nondiscrimination rules
governing coverage and contributions should
be streamlined and simplified in a manner
that reduces administrative costs and in-
creases saving for retirement and coverage.
Nondiscrimination rules in general, includ-
ing coverage rules and nondiscrimination tests
relating to contributions under Sections 401(k)
and 401(m) of the Internal Revenue Code,
are complex and extremely costly to adminis-
ter. These tests reduce pension saving by
middle-income earners as well as more highly
compensated employees. With appropriate
grandfathering of rules where necessary, these
tests should be replaced by a vastly more
simple and administratively inexpensive safe-
guard against discrimination:
• All employees who meet nondiscrimina-
tory age and service eligibility require-
ments should (a) be covered and (b)
receive the same ratio of employer contri-
butions to wages. (In the case of defined
benefit plans, the same benefit formula
should be applied.)
If such a radical reform cannot be adopted
in its entirety, simplification should proceed
along the following lines:
• Employers who voluntarily comply with
the two nondiscrimination standards
specified in the preceding bullet would
be given safe harbor from all further non-
discrimination tests, such as those under
Sections 401(k) and 401(m) of the Internal
Revenue Code.
• Employers who do not comply with both
the coverage and the uniform contribu-
tion standards mentioned above should,
at a minimum, adopt the coverage rule.
• Top-heavy rules, which are already largely
redundant in view of the nondiscrimina-
tion rules in place for all pension plans,
should be eliminated.
• Restrictions on the employer’s ability to
integrate private pension benefits with
Social Security should be eliminated in
cases where the employer contribution for
all employees equals or exceeds an
appropriate threshold.
2. Federal regulation should encourage full
funding of private pensions.
One of the most important causes of
declining business contributions to pensions
is OBRA87, which capped funding for defined
benefit plans at 150 percent of termination
liability. As a consequence of this legislation
and rising asset values, many firms were
unable to make eligible contributions for sev-
eral years. Firms can only ensure the viability
of their defined benefit plans if they are per-
mitted reasonable flexibility to spread the costs
of funding plans over time in a manner that
realistically reflects both expected plan liabili-
ties and the firms’ ability to make contribu-
tions. The full-funding limit based on termi-
nation liability denies such flexibility and
places a disproportionate burden on the firm
in the later years of workers’ careers.
• The full-funding limit should be restored
to its pre-1987 level of 100 percent of pro-
jected plan liability. Projected plan liabil-
ity in the case of flat-dollar defined ben-
efit plans should be calculated to include
anticipated increases in the dollar benefit
level that are negotiated over time.
3. Business and government should provide
workers with adequate and realistic
information about their pensions and Social
Security benefits.
Many individuals reportedly undersave
because they are not adequately informed
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about accumulated benefits, retirement needs,
and the rate of saving required to meet those
needs. Individuals can prepare intelligently
for their retirement only if they have sufficient
information about their retirement needs and
resources as well as their saving and invest-
ment options. Some employers are reported
to be reluctant to provide information on pro-
spective growth of funds because they fear
that they could be liable for the outcome.
• Workers should be given realistic infor-
mation about retirement needs, accumu-
lated and projected benefits, the effect of
different investment choices on their
retirement income (if they have control
over such choices), and the funded status
of their plan (if it is a defined benefit
plan).
• The Department of Labor should provide
guidance designed to encourage employ-
ers to provide information on retirement
saving and investment to their employ-
ees and to protect plan sponsors against
unreasonable lawsuits. For example,
information provided by employers about
past market performance should not make
employers legally liable if future perfor-
mance is inconsistent with experience.
4. Regulation should encourage both the pres-
ervation of retirement funds until the worker
retires and the portability of pension assets.
Preretirement withdrawals from pension
funds are placing the economic security of
future retirees in jeopardy. Although some of
these withdrawals are used for investment
purposes such as education and housing, a
large proportion is simply used for current
consumption. CED recommends:
• In-service preretirement withdrawal and
borrowing of employer contributions to
pension plans should be prohibited.
Access to voluntary employee contribu-
tions should not be prohibited, but exist-
ing penalties should be retained.
• Regulators should investigate options for
accelerating vesting and for improving the
portability of vested benefits from defined
benefit plans. Individuals who change
employers should be strongly encouraged
to roll over preretirement lump-sum
distributions into alternative retirement
saving instruments such as individual
retirement accounts (IRAs) and defined
contribution plans maintained by their
new employers.
5. In order to increase saving for retirement
and to encourage small-business owners and
managers to provide pension plans for all
employees, Congress should raise the
annual limit on allowable plan contributions
and benefits to more reasonable levels.
Regulations limiting both contributions and
benefits are often redundant and tend to
reduce pension contributions and saving, lead-
ing to the abandonment of some plans and
discouraging the formation of new ones. Lim-
its on benefits also discourage higher-risk in-
vestments. The following reforms should be
made:
• Retirement saving tax preferences should
be based on accumulated lifetime income
rather than current-year income only. This
would be a stimulus to saving and far
more equitable, particularly for those who
must postpone contributing because of
unusual expenses (such as medical expen-
ditures) or because of a temporary
absence from the workforce (such as
parents caring for children).
• With respect to the redundancy of restric-
tions on benefits and contributions, lim-
its on tax preferences for contributions
are generally preferable to restrictions on
benefits. Therefore, the excise tax on
annuitized pension distributions above a
stated threshold (now $148,500 for a single
employee) should be eliminated, and the
limit on benefits from a qualified defined
benefit plan (now $118,800) should be
raised.
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• Given the proposed elimination of excise
taxes on distributions, a limit on total con-
tributions and on considered compensa-
tion should be retained. However, the con-
sidered compensation limit (now $150,000)
should be raised at least to its pre-OBRA93
level14 (and indexed); to prevent contribu-
tions for lower-income workers from
declining, the limit on considered com-
pensation should apply only to those
whose incomes actually equal or exceed
that limit, not to those whose projected
incomes equal or exceed it. The dollar
limit on total contributions should also
be increased.
• Congress should discontinue the recent
practice of reducing considered compen-
sation for more highly compensated
employees as a means of raising federal
revenue. This is necessary because of its
adverse effect on pension saving, through
its impact on contributions for lower-
income employees and on the willing-
ness and ability of sponsors to create and
maintain qualified plans.
• Individual contributions to 401(k) plans
that are primary pension plans should be
subject to the same limit that applies to
other defined contribution plans, such that
the combined employee and employer
contributions do not exceed that limit.
This will give workers in smaller firms
an opportunity to expand their retirement
savings and provide a greater incentive
for managers of small firms to offer these
plans to their workers.
6. The Pension Benefit Guaranty Corpora-
tion reforms should improve both the sol-
vency of the PBGC itself and the funded
status of the pension plans it insures. Thus,
the PBGC premium structure and benefit
guarantee should be aligned more closely
with the actual risk posed by a pension plan
and the PBGC should have stronger compli-
ance authority to insure adequate funding
levels. Amortization periods for unfunded
liabilities should be simplified and short-
ened.
The PBGC’s poor financial position has
three underlying causes: (a) Premiums for risky
plans are set too low. (b) Premiums are struc-
tured in a way that creates an adverse-selection
problem in the insurance pool. (c) The PBGC’s
compliance authority is weak and there is
insufficient incentive for companies with
underfunded pension plans to increase their
funding. Minimum-funding rules also allow
amortization of some kinds of unfunded pen-
sion liabilities over an excessively long period.
• The PBGC insurance premium should be
restructured so that it more closely
resembles what would be offered in the
private market. Such a redesign should
include a stronger link between the pre-
mium level and the actual risk that a pen-
sion plan poses to the PBGC. For example,
the premium calculation could take into
account the financial strength of the plan
sponsor, the marketability of plan assets,
and the proportion of assets tied up in the
firm’s own equities.
• The PBGC should be given more power to
influence the behavior of sponsors of
underfunded plans, including the author-
ity to prevent plans operating below a par-
ticular funded ratio from granting benefit
increases to employees.
• The amortization schedules for unfunded
liabilities should be simplified by reduc-
ing the number of categories, and the
amortization periods should be shortened
to accelerate the funding of liabilities.
• The PBGC’s benefit guarantee structure
should be revised to correlate more closely
with the minimum-funding requirements
attributable to specific benefits, such as
shutdown benefits (see Chapter 5).
• The status of the PBGC’s claims in bank-
ruptcy should be reviewed and enhanced,
as appropriate.
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7. Changes are required to place the
Social Security program on a sound finan-
cial footing and avoid an unfair burden on
future generations of workers.
Based on already-legislated benefits, pro-
jected demographic changes, and other fac-
tors, the Social Security Administration’s
long-run projections indicate that the pro-
gram’s assets will be depleted rapidly when
the baby-boom generation retires unless ben-
efits are cut and/or payroll taxes are increased
sharply. This policy statement focuses on the
regulation of private pensions and does not
set out a detailed program for Social Security
reform. However, the fiscal principles
espoused by CED lead us to call for the fol-
lowing changes:
• All Social Security benefits that exceed
past contributions should be subject to
income tax. We also believe that the age
requirements for receiving normal
retirement benefits should be raised
beyond the increase already legislated and
that the limits on earnings of retirees
receiving benefits should be raised sub-
stantially. Congress should consider other
limitations on Social Security benefits,
such as reduced cost-of-living adjustments
for benefits above a basic floor, and/or a
gradual phase-in of a lower ratio of initial
benefits to income.
• Steps should be taken to make sure that
the building Social Security reserve funds
do not serve to mask the non-Social Secu-
rity federal budget deficit and that they
result in an increase in real national sav-
ings.
8. Defined benefit plans sponsored by fed-
eral, state, and local governments should be
subject to minimum disclosure and funding
standards. Plans should be fully funded, and
pension promises that cannot be funded
should be avoided.
The magnitude of underfunding of public
employee pensions appears to exceed under-
funding of private pensions. A substantial
number of state and local government
employee pension plans are underfunded.
Federal pensions are also greatly under-
funded. To maintain the solvency of under-
funded plans, it will be necessary to
increase taxes on future workers and/or cut
benefits.
9. Pension funds should not be required to
make investments to achieve social objec-
tives other than the objective of protecting
the economic security of the elderly.
Many state and local pension funds and
even private funds are under pressure to
invest in infrastructure and to make various
other social investments. CED does not
oppose arrangements that permit individuals
to choose such investments, but we strongly
oppose any mandated use of pension invest-
ment funds. Unless the individual chooses oth-
erwise, pension investments should be based
on sound economics (e.g., risk and return),
not on social considerations.*
*See memorandum by JAMES Q. RIORDAN, (page 82).
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Chapter 2
Retirement Saving and
Economic Security
In coming years, America will face the
major challenge of providing for the economic
security of its elderly population without plac-
ing unreasonable tax burdens on future gen-
erations. Retirement systems are already bur-
dened by the rising life expectancy and a trend
toward earlier retirement. More importantly,
the United States, like many advanced indus-
trial countries, will experience a very sharp
rise in its retired population and the retiree-
worker ratio when the baby-boom generation
begins to retire.1 Unlike citizens in many other
countries, however, Americans are not setting
aside resources adequate for their retirement
needs. Indeed, overall saving rates in the
United States have fallen to record low levels
well below those of other industrial nations.
Not only has the private saving rate declined
precisely at a time when greater efforts should
be made to prepare for the aging of the popu-
lation, but the federal budget deficit is also
absorbing the lion’s share of those savings,
thereby further reducing the amount avail-
able for investment needed to spur economic
growth.
Saving for retirement must become a higher
priority of individuals and government policy
makers if future American retirees and tax-
payers are to avoid unexpected hardships. But
building adequate savings, like turning a large
ship, is a slow process; it will take many years
of higher saving to boost investment to the
levels necessary to generate sufficient income
to meet the expectations of future retirees.
Thus, it is urgent that saving and retirement
income policies be changed promptly. In this
statement, CED argues that the reform of gov-
ernment tax and regulatory policies affecting
private pension saving must play a critical
role in this change.
THE ECONOMIC SECURITY OF
FUTURE RETIREES
The retired elderly in the United States
receive income from a variety of sources, (see
“Sources of Funds for Retirement,” page 17).
The three primary components of the U.S.
retirement system are: (1) the huge Social
Security retirement program, which provides
most retirees with benefits at least sufficient
to meet their basic needs for subsistence; (2)
the large and diverse private retirement sys-
tem that grew rapidly with the encourage-
ment of government tax incentives during the
post–World War II period and now covers
about 49 million workers;2 and (3) the retire-
ment programs sponsored by federal, state,
and local governments for their own employ-
ees, which have grown in importance largely
because of increasing employment in the state
and local sectors.3
These three components, together with
gains in personal wealth (especially invest-
ment in homes), have dramatically improved
the well-being of present-day retirees relative
to past generations of retirees. Some studies
suggest that the overall economic welfare of
today’s younger retirees is comparable to that
of present-day full-time workers. However,
there are now serious concerns about whether
the economic well-being of future retirees can
be maintained at the level enjoyed by current
retirees, let alone be improved, as many have
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come to expect. The reasons for these con-
cerns (discussed in detail in Chapter 3) can be
summarized as follows:
• Individuals are living longer and retiring
earlier. Greatly compounding this trend is
the fact that the ratio of workers to retirees
will decline sharply in the next several
decades because of the retirement of the
baby-boom generation. Consequently, the
cost to each future active worker of sup-
porting retiree benefits will rise sharply.
Benefits financed on a pay-as-you-go basis
may have to be cut back significantly in
order to prevent taxes paid by future work-
ers from becoming too burdensome.
• At present, saving for retirement is not suf-
ficient in the United States to meet the
income requirements of future retirees. This
can be seen in the overall decline in contri-
butions to retirement plans, the under-
funding of many private and public plans,
and record-low saving rates.
• There has been a gradual shift in coverage,
especially among small employers, from
employer-funded retirement plans to more
discretionary saving vehicles such as 401(k)
plans. The impact of this trend on the eco-
nomic security of future retirees is not yet
known with certainty.
Prompt changes in retirement policies can
improve the prospects of future retirees. To
compensate for the rise in life expectancy,
both business and government should
encourage workers to take retirement at a
later age. Policies should also be instituted
that encourage saving and full funding of
pension promises. Recent changes in federal
tax and regulatory policies governing private
pensions have often moved policy in the wrong
direction. (For a detailed discussion, see Chap-
ter 5.) Changes in pension regulation have
discouraged retirement saving and contrib-
uted to the underfunding of many pensions.
The American taxpayer has more than one
reason to be concerned about the impact of
insufficient saving for retirement. Future
retirees who have inadequate incomes may
demand increased retirement benefits from
Social Security (or at least resist any cutback
in benefits). Those with inadequate savings
are more likely to become a burden on the
government in other areas, such as long-term
health care. Inadequate saving for retirement
also affects the economic health of the nation
more broadly.
THE ECONOMY AND RETIREMENT
SAVING
Although this statement focuses primarily
on the economic security of future retirees, we
cannot overlook the adverse effect of pension
policy on the economy and, in turn, the im-
pact of a weakened economy on the well-being
of future retirees. The decline in saving for
retirement and other purposes has serious ad-
verse implications for the future economic
prosperity of the nation; a weak economy with
little or no growth in productivity and real
wages will, in turn, struggle to provide ad-
equate support for rising numbers of retirees
and to address other social problems. The So-
cial Security Administration’s underfunded
liability for baby-boomer retirement benefits
is a case of too many claims on too little out-
put. One way to think about the impact of the
burden of rising benefits for baby boomers is
to ask: How much output will be left for work-
ers? The implication of the Social Security
Administration’s intermediate projection is
that nearly a quarter of the assumed 1.2 per-
cent annual gain in labor productivity (real
GDP per worker) between 2010 and 2030 will
be absorbed by rising benefits paid by Social
Security retirement, disability and hospital
insurance benefits alone. However, the Social
Security Administration’s history of overopti-
mistic projections and the record-low national
saving rates experienced in recent years raise
the question of whether Social Security’s pro-
ductivity assumption is again too optimistic.
If so, these programs will absorb an even
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SOURCES OF FUNDS FOR RETIREMENT
There are six primary sources of retirement
income, the funding of which will determine
whether retirees’ incomes meet expectations.
To the degree that funding falls short, either
retirees’ entitlements and aspirations will have
to be curtailed (by delay of retirement or by
reduced living standards during retirement
years), or the intergenerational transfer of pur-
chasing power from the working generation to
the retired generation must be increased, prima-
rily through higher payroll taxes.
1. Social Security. About 90 percent of all work-
ers participate in the Social Security system,
whose role is to guarantee at least a minimum
level of retirement income for every eligible
retiree. This government program has greatly
reduced poverty in America, although 12 per-
cent of older people are still below the poverty
level. In 1994, the median benefit for an indi-
vidual was about $9,972. The maximum annual
benefit for a couple is now $20,646.
2. Defined Benefit Plans. The largest accumula-
tion of retirement funds is in defined benefit
plans, which promise specific benefits and are
typically sponsored by large employers.
Approximately 15 percent of workers are
enrolled in such plans, though there has been
a tendency for small employers to discontinue
the plans because of excessive regulatory bur-
dens and costs. These plans, in combination
with Social Security, generally replace about 60
percent of preretirement earnings for those who
have worked at least thirty years. But workers
who change jobs frequently or work part-time
often fail to qualify or accumulate adequate
vested benefits from these plans. (Those who do
become vested may receive benefits from more
than one plan.) Government workers are gener-
ally covered by defined benefit plans, many of
which are underfunded and frequently have
made overly generous promises.
3. Defined Contribution Plans. These plans
promise no specific retirement benefit; instead,
employers make specific contributions (often
according to a formula related to income or
profits) to an employee’s retirement account.
Such plans are often favored by smaller firms
because they are less regulated and have lower
administrative costs and more certain contribu-
tion requirements. An important advantage of
defined contribution plans is that there is no
public liability for inadequate funding. How-
ever, these plans often produce a lesser final
benefit than a defined benefit plan. There are
five times as many defined contribution plans
in the United States as defined benefit plans, but
many are small, and only about 26 percent of
U.S. workers are currently active participants in
a defined contribution plan that is their primary
retirement plan.
4. Personal Savings. For retirees, the median
cash income from assets was $2,356 in 1990. But
personal saving has declined sharply in recent
years, perhaps reflecting misinformation about
the adequacy of provisions for retirement. The
Social Security Administration will soon launch
a program to provide workers with more infor-
mation; this information, together with better
information from employers, is necessary if
workers are to understand the need for in-
creased saving.
5. Postretirement Employment. For many, jobs
(usually part-time) provide meaningful oppor-
tunities and often a necessary retirement
supplement. About 22 percent of retirees had
income from earnings in 1990. Under present
Social Security rules, for those under 65 benefits
are reduced by $1 for every $2 of annual earn-
ings in excess of $8,040; and for those 65 to 69
years old benefits are reduced by $1 for every
$3 of earnings in excess of $11,160. Social
Security benefits are not reduced for workers
who are 70 or older.
6. Private Intergenerational Transfers. The
transfer of savings from deceased parents to
children is an important source of income that
for many could serve as a partial offset to short-
falls in their own retirement funding.
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higher share of productivity gains. Moreover,
when other transfers are taken into account,
the gain in productivity available to active
workers may decline sharply (see Figure 8).
Beginning in the mid-1970s, the growth in
labor productivity in the United States slowed
dramatically, from nearly 3 percent to about 1
percent a year, producing a long period of
near stagnation of real wages. The prospects
for restoring rapid productivity growth are
largely dependent on increases in the rate of
investment in physical and human capital and
advances in technology. But increased saving
is required to provide the funds for such
investments, and unfortunately the nation has
chosen to use a growing share of its income to
finance current consumption rather than sav-
ing and investment. Indeed, the U.S. national
saving rate — the sum of net saving by indi-
viduals, business, and government divided
by GDP — has declined precipitously in
recent years to record-low levels. Individuals,
business, and government have all contrib-
uted to this decline. So far in this decade, net
national saving has averaged less than 2 per-
cent of GDP, down from 4 percent during the
1980s and about 8 percent in previous de-
cades (see Figure 9). This decline in saving
does not bode well for the future growth of
the U.S. economy because national saving is
the only source of domestic funds for invest-
ments that are needed to boost productivity.
In fact, there is concern that the extremely low
domestic saving rates experienced in recent
years are not sufficient to prevent productiv-
ity growth from falling further.4
The national saving and investment rates
in the United States have also fallen below
those of most other advanced industrial
nations (see Figure 10). This is bad news for
the international competitiveness of the United
States, which hinges on relative rates of pro-
ductivity growth. Admittedly, investment
rates in the United States have not been as
SOURCE: Tabulated from intermediate projections contained in the 1994 OASDI Trustees report.
Five-Year Period Ending
Less real Social Security retirement benefits
Real GDP per worker
Annual Average Percent Growth
A Large Share of Worker Productivity Growth Will Go to the Elderly
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weak as national saving rates because foreign
capital inflows have financed a substantial
amount of domestic spending for investment.
But reliance on foreign capital inflows has
serious disadvantages. These capital inflows
increase foreign claims on future U.S. output,
a particular concern when the inflows result
from a decline in domestic saving rather than
from rising investment opportunities in the
United States. Foreign capital inflows have
brought about a dramatic shift (now approach-
ing $1 trillion) in the U.S. net foreign invest-
ment position. Once the largest creditor
nation in the world, the United States has
become the largest debtor, and the rising debt
to foreigners represents a future burden for
the nation.5
Why has saving fallen in the United States?
Huge federal budget deficits made the largest
contribution to the decline in net national sav-
ing (see Figure 11, page 20). In recent years,
these deficits have absorbed about 70 percent
of private savings. The private sector has also
contributed to the decline. The corporate sav-
ing rate (retained earnings) declined sharply
in the 1980s, though it now appears to be
rising as profits recover. But the personal sav-
ing rate, which fell from about 8 percent
of disposable income in the first half of the
1980s, remains very depressed at about 4 per-
cent of disposable income.6 Retirement saving,
which is a very large (and growing) compo-
nent of personal saving, declined from nearly
4 percent of disposable income in 1980 to less
than 3 percent in recent years (see Figure 12,
page 20). Clearly, any serious effort to increase
private saving will require a change in current
retirement policies.
In a 1992 policy statement, Restoring Pros-
perity: Budget Choices for Economic Growth,
CED said that reversing the collapse in
national saving should become an explicit
goal of U.S. policy. It recommended that gov-
ernment policies should aim to restore the
rate of national saving to the 8 percent norm
that existed prior to the 1980s.7 Two of the
most potent policy instruments available for
U.S. National Saving, Selected Periods
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achieving that goal are federal budget policies
to decrease the budget deficit and retirement
policies to encourage private retirement sav-
ing.
With regard to the federal budget, CED
recommended that the deficit be reduced by
about $50 billion annually, with the eventual
goal of achieving a surplus. From fiscal 1991
to 1993, the federal budget deficit averaged
about $272 billion, or about 4.6 percent of GDP.
The 1993 budget act and economic expansion
have put the deficit on a lower path; it is
expected to fall from 3.9 percent of GDP in
fiscal 1993 to 2.3 percent of GDP in fiscal 1995.8
This decline in the budget deficit will make a
significant contribution to national saving,
though policy makers have a long way to go
to get entitlement spending under control and
to achieve the target recommended by CED
for the federal budget. Moreover, the long-term
budget forecast is not so sanguine; later in the
decade, the deficit is expected to begin rising
Federal Deficits and National Saving,
Selected Periods
Percent
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again as a percent of GDP.9 CED continues to
recommend implementation of policies that
will gradually move the federal budget to-
ward balance as a means of increasing na-
tional saving and investment.
With respect to retirement policies, it is
clear that measures that succeed in increasing
private retirement saving by expanding pen-
sion coverage and increasing contributions of
current participants have the potential for sub-
stantially increasing household saving. How-
ever, it may be very difficult to restore pen-
sion saving rates to earlier levels. Changing
individual priorities would be critical because
many individuals are not saving anything for
their own retirement.10 Some of the blame for
the decline in retirement saving must be
attributed to ill-advised changes in public poli-
cies that discourage business contributions to
pensions. (We examine this issue in detail in
Chapter 5.) These policies should be reversed.11
It should also be noted that the public sector
has contributed more directly to the problem
of inadequate saving by underfunding both
public employee retirement programs and
Social Security retirement promises (see Chap-
ter 3).
The recent weakness in private pension sav-
ing is an important component of the national
saving and investment problem. Clearly, the
United States needs to employ pension poli-
cies to encourage saving not only to improve
the economic security of individual retirees
but also to boost national economic growth
and competitiveness. More rapid growth of
the economy, in turn, will make it easier for
this country to support its rising elderly popu-
lation.
PRIVATE- AND PUBLIC-SECTOR
RESPONSIBILITIES FOR PENSIONS
We have seen that both the nation and
individual citizens have a strong interest in
retirement savings accumulated for the
baby-boom generation. But precisely whose
responsibility is it to provide for their pen-
sions? Observers report that some present-
day workers have the mistaken belief that gov-
ernment and business will provide for all  their
retirement needs. Such beliefs may arise be-
cause workers do not have adequate informa-
tion about the benefits they will be entitled to
in retirement.
Although CED believes that each family
should take primary responsibility for its own
economic welfare, we agree that all sectors of
society, including business, have a stake in a
healthy private pension system and in the
welfare of retirees. We believe that a reason-
able arrangement would have Social Security
and voluntary business-sponsored pensions
providing a reasonable minimum level of re-
tirement income for workers, with the indi-
vidual being responsible for improvements
beyond that minimum. Given pension arrange-
ments already in place, including the Social
Security system, the following division of re-
sponsibilities is recommended:
• Social Security should provide a mini-
mum level of retirement income for all
working members of society and their
dependents.
• Business, nonprofit employers, and gov-
ernments should be encouraged to pro-
vide supplemental retirement assistance.
Employers often provide retirement ben-
efits to attract and retain competent work-
ers. The combination of Social Security
and employer-sponsored plans is gener-
ally intended to provide retirees with a
reasonable minimum standard of living,
though with less income than that received
by active workers.
• Individual workers should have ultimate
responsibility for achieving retirement
income above that provided by Social
Security and employer retirement plans,
according to their desired standard of liv-
ing.
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ACTIONS REQUIRED TO MEET
THESE RESPONSIBILITIES
It is important that each group — govern-
ment, private employers, and individuals —
meet their responsibilities without placing an
unfair burden on future generations. As a prac-
tical matter, this means that retirement sav-
ings must be sufficient to fund promised
benefits and the average retirement age must
be raised to reflect longer life spans. CED
urges both business and government to
review retirement programs to ensure that
they do not provide ongoing disincentives
for productive employment by the elderly,
without reducing the ability of firms to
restructure as needed.
Social Security. With respect to programs
financed largely on a pay-as-you-go basis, such
as Social Security, government must be care-
ful to resist pressures to promise generous
unfunded retirement benefits beyond those
necessary to provide a basic floor of retire-
ment income. Thus far, our political leaders
have not been willing to face the demographic
challenge and the long-term underfunding of
promised Social Security benefits. Longer
retirement spans have greatly increased the
cost of retirement benefits since the inception
of Social Security, and the Social Security
Administration’s long-term projections indi-
cate that the system’s assets will be depleted
rapidly when the baby-boom generation
retires unless benefits are cut and/or payroll
taxes are increased sharply (see Chapter 3).
An increase in the normal retirement age from
65 to 67 years is scheduled to be phased in
during the years 2003 through 2025, but this
increase does not fully compensate for the
increase in life expectancy.12 At the same time,
earnings limitations applied to those receiv-
ing Social Security benefits have reduced the
supply of productive workers and exacerbated
the decline in the worker/retiree ratio.13
Because the primary concern of this policy
statement is private retirement saving, we do
not investigate the merits of alternative pro-
posals for “fixing” Social Security. However,
as a matter of equity and sound fiscal policy,
CED has long favored the taxation of all
Social Security benefits that exceed past con-
tributions. This change would be a form of
means test that would also improve equity in
taxation by treating income of workers and
retirees in the same way.14 CED also recom-
mends that Congress consider other limita-
tions on Social Security benefits, such as an
increase in the normal and early retirement
ages beyond that already legislated, reduced
cost-of-living adjustments for benefits above
a basic floor, and a gradual phase-in of lower
replacement ratios (i.e., the ratio of retire-
ment benefit to income received during years
of employment). To reduce the disincentive
for the elderly to continue to work, the limit
on earnings of recipients of Social Security
benefits should be raised substantially. Such
changes could place the Social Security pro-
gram on a sound footing and avoid an unfair
burden on future generations.
Private employers. Fully funded private and
public employee retirement programs are criti-
cal for many retirees and also have great
social value, because they add to national sav-
ing. We believe all employers should be
encouraged to provide retirement plans or at
least to give employees the opportunity
to accumulate retirement savings with
tax-sheltered contributions from their own
incomes. Public and private employers have
an obligation to adequately fund the pension
promises they make to their workers and to
maintain high standards of fund management.
Individuals are also more likely to achieve
their retirement-saving objectives if retirement
benefits can be preserved when a worker
moves from one employer to another. CED
believes that employers should place a high
priority on improving vesting and the port-
ability of retirement assets.
Individual responsibility and the education of
workers. Individuals, on the other hand, can
tailor their retirement-saving decisions to their
particular circumstances. When deciding on
an income-replacement ratio that meets their
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needs, individuals would, in theory, have the
option of choosing the age at which they will
retire, whether they will continue to work
after retirement, and the rate at which they
will draw from existing assets, including
equity in a home. However, in a world where
job security is uncertain, workers may not
always have such employment choices, and
many workers will have few assets other than
pensions. Most workers will need to set aside
substantial savings in addition to pensions to
achieve their lifestyle expectations.
However, American workers are not well
informed about retirement saving and, indeed,
about personal finance.15 To prepare intelli-
gently for their retirement, individual work-
ers require information about prospective ben-
efits from Social Security and private pensions.
In those instances in which workers have some
control over the amounts they elect to contrib-
ute to pension plans and the distribution of
those contributions over different kinds of
investments, they also need information on
how their choices could affect their retirement
income. Unfortunately, workers frequently do
not have such information, though it may be
readily available (see Chapter 3) and can be
provided at low cost. There is also evidence
that Americans have a poor level of financial
literacy and that this deficiency is a strong
factor in poor saving decisions.16 CED believes
that business and government have the ad-
ditional responsibility of providing workers
with adequate and realistic information
about their pensions, including retirement
needs, accumulated benefits, and the fund-
ing status of their plan. We also believe that
the Department of Labor should provide
guidance designed to encourage employers
to provide information on retirement saving
and investment to their employees and to
protect plan sponsors against unreasonable
lawsuits. For example, information provided
by employers about past market performance
should not make employers legally liable if
future performance is inconsistent with ex-
perience. Given the long-term funding prob-
lems of Social Security, it is important to in-
form workers that circumstances may
necessitate the enactment of measures that re-
duce the growth of future benefits.
Employer-provided pension benefits are
future payments for current work: that is,
deferred compensation. As such, pension ben-
efits, like wages generally, are primarily a
private-sector issue. However, the U.S. expe-
rience with some private pensions before the
enactment of ERISA suggests that government
also has a responsibility to provide reasonable
and stable regulation of private pensions in
order to make sure that pensions meet appro-
priate fiduciary standards and that pension
promises are kept. The contribution of private
pensions to the economic security of retirees
and to the strength of the national economy
indicates that the private pension system has
an important social value that extends beyond
the specific benefit to individual retirees. In
CED’s view, the social benefits of private
pensions justify some government oversight
(provided that it is responsible, low cost, and
stable) and appropriate tax preferences to
encourage retirement saving. (These issues
are discussed in detail in Chapters 4 and 5.)
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about 12 percent currently to about 20 percent
by 2030, when aged persons will number more
than 68 million. The number of beneficiaries
of the Social Security retirement and disability
program (OASDI) is projected to rise from
41.8 million in 1993 to 80.3 million in 2030.1
The social implications of such an accelera-
tion in the growth of the aged population are
quite profound. Even with a gradual increase
in the elderly population, the growth in gov-
ernment spending for the elderly has been
phenomenal. In the last three decades, spend-
ing for Social Security, Medicare, and other
related retirement and disability programs rose
Percentage of U.S. Population Age 65
and Over, 1950 to 2050
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Chapter 3
The Basic Facts on Our Aging
Population and Retirement Saving
AN AGING POPULATION
One of the most significant social develop-
ments in the United States during the twenti-
eth century has been the phenomenal growth
of the elderly population. During the first
ninety years of this century, the number of
people age 65 years or older in the United
States rose by nearly 29 million, from 4.6 per-
cent of the total population to 12.3 percent.
This rapid growth reflected the combined
influence of three factors: (1) a spectacular
increase in life expectancy (from 47 years in
1900 to 75 years in 1990), (2) a sharp decline in
the birthrate, and (3) a reduction in immigra-
tion.
All these factors may contribute to the rela-
tive growth of the elderly population in the
future, though the precise contribution of each
is uncertain. However, the future growth of
the retired population will also be greatly
influenced by an additional factor about which
there is no doubt: The baby-boom generation
will begin to reach retirement age in about a
decade. This group, which includes about 76
million individuals born between 1946 and
1964, comprises an unusually large segment
of the U.S. population because the birthrate
rose during that period and declined there-
after. Because of the baby-boom bulge in the
age distribution, the growth of the elderly
population during the first half of the
twenty-first century is expected to accelerate
(see Figure 13), substantially exceeding the
very rapid growth in this century. The Social
Security Administration’s intermediate pro-
jection indicates that the proportion of the
population age 65 and older will rise from
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from 16.5 percent to 36.5 percent of total fed-
eral expenditures. In 1993, 55.5 percent of
total federal expenditures for purposes other
than defense and interest on the national debt
went to the elderly. If government programs
for the elderly are not changed, the retirement
of the baby boomers will cause the cost of
these programs to rise to unsustainable levels.
The potential burden on workers to sup-
port Social Security retirement benefits can be
seen by examining the ratio of workers to
retirees. This ratio has remained fairly stable
since 1975 in a range of 3.2 to 3.4; but with the
retirement of the baby boomers it will decline
sharply. The Social Security Administration’s
intermediate projection shows the ratio of cov-
ered workers (those who have earnings credit-
able for Social Security benefits) to beneficia-
ries declining from 3.4 in 1990 to 2.0 in 2030
and below 2.0 by midcentury (see Figure 14).
This projection is based on highly uncertain
assumptions about immigration, fertility, and
death rates that some believe are unrealistic.
Under the Social Security Administration’s
more pessimistic assumptions, the ratio of cov-
ered workers to beneficiaries would fall to 1.5
by 2050.2  Obviously, the financing of prom-
ised Social Security retirement and disability
benefits on a pay-as-you-go basis would re-
quire a large increase in the payroll tax bur-
den falling on future workers and employers.
The current intermediate projection suggests
that the tax increase from 1994 to 2030 for
promised retirement benefits (OASDI) alone
would probably be in the range of 3 to 7 per-
centage points, depending on how long the
increase is delayed and a number of other
unknown factors.3 Furthermore, any such in-
crease in payroll taxes would be in addition to
tax increases to finance the rising cost of health
care for the aged, whether through Medicare
or other public or private programs.
Of course, the ratio of covered workers to
beneficiaries by itself does not present a com-
plete picture of the overall economic burden
on future workers. The total dependency
ratio, which takes into account the number of
Ratio of Workers to Social Security
Recipients, 1980 to 2050
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young people as well as the number of eld-
erly, is not expected to rise as much as the
aged dependency ratio (see Table 1, page 26).4
However, the total dependency ratio substan-
tially understates the burden on workers
because the cost of supporting the elderly
greatly exceeds the cost of supporting the
young, particularly when health care costs are
included,5 and because the dependency ratio
does not take into account the fact that many
workers retire before the age of 65. Therefore,
the projected decline in the ratio of covered
workers to beneficiaries represents a reason-
able measure of the likely impact of the com-
ing demographic changes on workers and
employers.
It is often asserted that policy makers could
exert a mitigating effect on these demographic
trends by carefully controlling immigration
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so as to boost the number of young workers
and reduce the decline in the ratio of covered
workers to retirees. But given the magnitude
of the shortfall in workers, it is not likely that
immigration could make a significant dent in
the problem. The number of additional work-
ers required to stabilize the ratio at its 1990
level (3.4) is about 13 million in the year 2000
(see Table 2). The shortfall would rise to 110
million by 2030 and 128 million in 2050, about
36 percent of the projected population in that
year. The number of additional immigrants
necessary to offset this shortfall of workers
would be much larger than these figures
because many of the immigrants would be
retired by 2030.6 (The baseline projection
already includes an assumption that about 8.5
million immigrants, about 4 percent of whom
will already be over the age of 65, come to the
 Table 1
Dependency Ratios
Year Aged(a) Total(b)
l990 0.209 0.700
2000 0.210 0.691
2010 0.216 0.652
2020 0.279 0.701
2030 0.360 0.791
(a) Population 65 and over divided by population age 20 –64.
(b) Population 65 and over plus population under age 20
divided by population age 20–64.
SOURCE: Board of Trustees. Federal Old Age and Survivors
Insurance and Disability Trust Fund, 1994 Annual Report
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1994),
p. 144.
Number of Workers
Needed to Hold
Worker/Beneficiary
Ratio to 1990 LevelSocial Security Projection
NOTE: Workers refers to covered workers.
SOURCE: Social Security Administration intermediate projection.
 Table 2
Number of Workers Required to Hold the Worker-Beneficiary Ratio
at Its 1990 Value of 3.4 to 1 (millions)
Baseline Social Ratio of Percent of
Population Security Workers to Additional Projected
Projection Beneficiaries Workers Beneficiaries Workers Baseline Pop.
1990 259 39 133 3.4 0 0%
2000 285 47 147 3.1 13 5%
2010 306 55 157 2.9 28 9%
2020 325  68 161 2.4 70 22%
2030 340 80 163 2.0 110 32%
2040 349 84 166 2.0 121 35%
2050 354 87 168 1.9 128 36%
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United States between 1990 and 2000.) Recent
research indicates that massive immigration
would be required to have any significant
effect.7
The coming bulge in the elderly popula-
tion is the inevitable consequence of the aging
of the baby boomers. No reasonable public
policy would change these demographic
trends sufficiently to halt the decline in the
ratio of workers to retirees. From this circum-
stance, we conclude that it is critically impor-
tant to increase retirement saving in anticipa-
tion of the rise in the aged population.
PRIVATE SECTOR PREPARATION
FOR RETIREMENT OF THE BABY
BOOMERS
Total retirement income from all sources,
including Social Security and private pensions,
now exceeds half a trillion dollars annually in
the United States, roughly 10 percent of per-
sonal income. In 1992, Social Security
accounted for half of total retirement pay-
ments; government pensions and private pen-
sions accounted for about 19 and 31 percent,
respectively (see Figure 15). Total private pen-
sion payments grew very rapidly until the
mid-1980s. Consequently, the Social Security
retirement share of benefit payments declined
(from 62.1 percent in 1970 to 48.1 percent in
1986); since the mid-1980s, it has remained
about the same. For most individual retirees,
Social Security is the most important source of
income; benefits were received by about
92 percent of the aged in 1992. In that year,
about 66 percent of the elderly had income
from assets, and 44 percent received retire-
ment benefits other than Social Security. About
29 percent of private sector retirees receive a
private pension. In 1994, the median annual
Social Security payment was $9,972, which
was roughly 80 percent higher than the
median private pension annuity payment, and
3 times the median cash income from assets.
For retirees who receive private pensions
after thirty years of service from medium-size
and large private establishments, the combined
Social Security 62.0% Social Security 49.9%
Private
pensions 31.4%
Government
pensions 22.0%
Private
pensions 16.0%
1970 1992
Government
pensions 18.7%
SOURCE: Employee Benefit Research Institute.
Figure 15
Retirement Benefit Payments, by Source, 1970 and 1992
(percent of total payments)
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private pension and primary Social Security
benefit replaced 59 percent of wages in 1990.
Figures 15 (see page 27) and 16 show retire-
ment income from all sources, including gov-
ernment.8
PRIVATE PENSION CONTRIBUTIONS
In recent decades, private pension assets in
the United States have grown rapidly in dol-
lar terms and as a share of national wealth
(see Figure 17). However, much of the increase
reflects an appreciation in the market value of
these assets rather than saving out of current
income.9 This is seen in Figure 18, which shows
that total contributions to private pensions in
real terms have declined during the last
decade despite the rapid growth of the labor
force. Real contributions per worker have
fallen sharply.
New funding limits enacted in the 1980s
(see Chapter 5), together with a rise in asset
values, caused the employer component of
Figure 16
Percentage of the Aged with Income from Various Sources, 1992
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Employer Contributions to Private
Pension Plans, 1975 to 1991
Figure 19
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sion, and coverage has become almost univer-
sal for the largest employers. However, total
pension coverage has not increased signifi-
cantly since the early 1970s. But although over-
all pension coverage appears to have stabi-
lized, coverage for male workers has declined,
and participation of younger workers in pen-
sion plans is significantly lower than that of
middle-aged and older workers (see Figure
20, page 30).12
Despite the weakness in private pension
contributions and coverage, the proportion of
households that will receive a pension may
rise because of shorter vesting times and the
increased participation of women in the labor
force. On average, however, women’s pen-
sions are significantly smaller than men’s
because they have had shorter working lives
and lower earnings. Moreover, higher-income
households are still much more likely to have
private pension coverage of some type than
lower-income households, even though non-
discrimination rules were intended to broaden
the coverage provided by individual pension
plans. In 1993, nearly 80 percent of workers
pension contributions to decline. As shown in
Figure 19, total employer contributions per
worker fell sharply in real terms. The change
in funding limits forced many firms to halt or
delay contributions in recent years, a particu-
larly unfortunate development from a national
saving perspective. Such required reductions
in contributions, especially when triggered by
short-term increases in interest rates, are also
very shortsighted (for an explanation, see
“Estimating Liabilities and Funding for
Defined Benefit Plans,” pages 52 and 53); if
there is a reversal of these rates, many compa-
nies would quickly find that they need to make
extremely large contributions so that their pen-
sions will not become underfunded.10 A situa-
tion that requires very large future contribu-
tions may discourage growth in pension
coverage.
PRIVATE PENSION COVERAGE11
Private pension coverage rose sharply in
the early postwar period. By 1970, about 52
percent of full-time private-sector workers
were covered by some type of private pen-
1975      1977       1979       1981       1983       1985       1987       1989      1991
SOURCE: National income and product accounts.
Total dollars
Total employer
contributions
SOURCE: Brookings Institution.
30
Year
SOURCE: Adapted from Department of Labor and Employee
Benefit Research Institute tabulations of Current Population
Survey data.
Private Pension Plan Participation, by
Type of Plan, 1979 to 1993
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with annual incomes of $50,000 or more par-
ticipated in a pension plan, whereas only about
9 percent of those with incomes of $10,000 or
less participated (see Figure 21).
DECLINE IN DEFINED BENEFIT PLANS
The type of pension coverage available to
workers is undergoing a dramatic shift. There
has been a sharp decline in the private sector
in the number of defined benefit plans.13 These
plans, which provide specified retirement ben-
efits, are the type of pension most often pro-
vided by older and larger companies. In con-
trast, the number of defined contribution plans,
particularly 401(k) plans, has grown rapidly,
thereby preventing a drop in total coverage
(see Figure 22). But the assets of defined con-
tribution plans are still only 40 percent of total
pension assets (see Figure 23). This is because
defined contribution pension plans are most
frequently used as primary pensions by small
firms, the self-employed, and individuals, and
as supplementary (frequently voluntary) pen-
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Pension Participation, by Age
Group, 1993
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sion saving by firms whose primary retire-
ment program is a defined benefit plan.
Employees of large firms are still much more
likely to be covered by a pension than
employees of small firms (see Figure 24).
Many smaller firms do not offer their employ-
ees a pension plan. Evidently, economic fac-
tors such as the uncertainty of future income
have much to do with this. Smaller firms also
tend to have a greater percentage of employ-
ees who are young, part-time, and/or not
likely to stay in their job for a long period.14
Formation of new plans has declined in recent
years, and most of the pensions that have been
introduced by small firms are of the defined
contribution type.15
The decline in defined benefit plans, which
is at least partly the result of government regu-
lations (see Chapter 5), has also raised fears
about the economic security of future retirees.
Critics of defined contribution plans believe
that these plans will not provide retirees with
adequate income. This is not a settled issue,
and some researchers have reached the con-
clusion that defined contribution plans
actually provide greater economic security,
in part because of their portability.16 But it is
possible to improve vesting and portability of
defined benefit plans. As we noted in Chapter
2, CED regards improved portability of pen-
sion assets as a worthy objective and urges
regulators to investigate the various options
for achieving this goal.
PRERETIREMENT WITHDRAWALS
OF PENSION FUNDS
Pension contributions and coverage rates do
not tell the whole story about the adequacy of
ongoing preparations for the retirement of the
baby-boom generation. Many plans (includ-
ing both defined benefit and defined contri-
bution plans) permit borrowing from pension
assets and lump-sum distributions at retire-
ment or when changing jobs. The increasing
number of preretirement distributions received
when changing jobs appears to be a serious
threat to retirement saving. Although the tax
code strongly encourages the rollover of
Private Pension Plan Assets, by Type
of Plan, 1975 to 1991
Figure 23
Billions of Dollars
Pension Plan Participation, by Size
of Firm, 1993
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lump-sum distributions into IRAs or other
qualified retirement instruments, one survey
suggests that only a small fraction of recipi-
ents do so; 40 percent of recipients use some
of the funds for consumption.17 Preretire-
ment lump-sum distributions not rolled over
amounted to about $42 billion in 1990.18
Many observers have become concerned
that lump-sum withdrawals and borrowing
from pension assets, which are now quite com-
mon, will undermine saving for pensions and
the adequacy of retirement income. On the
other hand, a substantial proportion of funds
not invested in qualified instruments is placed
in other forms of investment, such as housing
and education, and these investments may
improve living standards in retirement.
Although the net impact on the well-being of
future retirees of preretirement lump-sum
withdrawals and borrowing from pension
funds is not certain, there certainly appears to
be a risk that such practices will undermine
the adequacy of future retirement income.
Moreover, the depletion of retirement funds
may ultimately put pressure on policy makers
to raise Social Security benefits. (CED’s rec-
ommendations pertaining to preretirement
withdrawal of pension assets are described in
Chapter 5).
THE STATUS OF PENSION FUNDS
PRIVATE PENSION FUNDS
There is also evidence of inadequate pen-
sion saving in the deterioration of pension
funding for some defined benefit plans. This
deterioration jeopardizes not only the eco-
nomic security of future retirees but also the
future financial strength of the economy and
the employers that have promised pensions.
Pensions are a major source of national saving
and capital for productive investment. Pen-
sion plans own about one-fourth of all corpo-
rate equities and one-third of the fixed obliga-
tions of business; and of course, pensions are
a major holder of government obligations.19
Federal regulatory and tax policies pertain-
ing to funding have been schizophrenic. They
require minimum-funding levels to protect
benefit promises but limit maximum funding
so stringently that the health of even well-
funded plans is threatened. Ironically, the
maximum-funding requirements, which were
enacted to limit federal revenue losses, actu-
ally heighten the exposure of taxpayers to the
possibility of increased Treasury expenditures
to bail out the Pension Benefit Guaranty Cor-
poration (PBGC), the federal government
agency that insures defined benefit plans.20
The PBGC guarantees that a specific por-
tion of the promised benefit will be paid
regardless of the financial condition of the
sponsor. Because of termination of under-
funded plans, the PBGC has taken over plans
with billions of dollars of promised benefits.
The PBGC’s financial condition has raised
questions about its viability and the security
of pensions it guarantees, and this has led
to proposals for reform. (Further discussion of
the operation of the PBGC is provided in
Chapter 5.)
The 66,000 defined benefit plans insured
by the PBGC have promised about $900 bil-
lion in benefits. The PBGC believes that most
of these pensions are well funded, but it notes
a continuing deterioration in coverage and
funding. According to the PBGC, overfunding
has declined, and there has been a substantial
rise in underfunding. The decline in funding
status reflects the combined effects of falling
interest rates (which increase the present value
of plan liabilities) and funding limits enacted
by Congress in 1987 in an attempt to raise
federal revenues.
The total underfunding of all plans insured
by the PBGC amounted to $71 billion at the
end of 1993, an increase of $18 billion from
the previous year. A relatively small number
of firms account for a large share of the
underfunding; in 1993, just fifty companies
accounted for 56 percent of the underfunding
in single-employer plans. The typical under-
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cent or less for higher-income workers. Social
Security is credited with having sharply
reduced poverty among the elderly and,
together with Medicare and private pensions,
with boosting the income of many retirees
nearly to the level enjoyed by workers (see
“The Economic Status of the Elderly and
Nonelderly Compared,” page 34).
Because they had paid so little in taxes, the
early recipients of Social Security retirement
benefits received a very high return on their
contributions. In fact, for almost all individu-
als who currently receive benefits, the annuity
value of their benefits exceeds their contribu-
tions paid (plus interest). The return on con-
tributions is generally higher for low-income
recipients, though in absolute terms the
excess of benefits over contributions has gen-
erally favored higher-income recipients. How-
ever, the return for all new retirees is fall-
ing rapidly and will become negative for
higher-income single individuals (particularly
men) later in this decade. Single individuals
retiring early in the next century face deeply
negative returns.24 This situation has led many
to question the long-term political viability of
the Social Security program if reform is not
forthcoming.
Social Security retirement and disability
benefits are financed primarily on a pay-
as-you-go basis. At present, a 6.2 percent pay-
roll tax is paid by both employers and
employees (a total of 12.4 percent) on earn-
ings up to $60,000.25 The system currently has
a temporary positive cash flow. However,
long-term projections of program expenditures
and revenues show that on a net-present-value
basis, Social Security is massively underfunded.
At present, receipts in excess of benefit pay-
ments and other expenses accumulate in the
OASDI trust fund, which had an estimated
balance of $427 billion at the end of 1994,
about 130 percent of one year’s expenditures.
One of the problems with a retirement sys-
tem financed on a pay-as-you-go basis is that
the tax burden on workers increases as the
funded plans, according to the PBGC, are
“collectively-bargained flat benefit plans that
do not anticipate future salary and wage
increases in their funding operations.”21 Many
believe that the PBGC figures understate the
funding problem because of the measures of
funding adequacy that the PBGC is required
to use.22
PUBLIC SECTOR FUNDING
OF PENSIONS
The primary concern of this statement is
private retirement policies. However, a dis-
cussion of the status of retirement saving
would not be complete without some mention
of the underfunding of pensions sponsored
by government, which is a very serious prob-
lem.
Social Security Funding.23 The Social Se-
curity retirement system was designed to be
a universal retirement program that provides
a basic retirement income through a transfer
from workers to retirees, including some re-
distribution to lower-income retirees, financed
largely on a pay-as-you-go basis by payroll
taxes. In effect, it is a compact between gen-
erations whereby current workers agree to
support retirees in return for similar consider-
ation in their retirement from future workers.
Social Security is the most important source of
income for the elderly and is received by
92 percent of retirees. The maximum annual
retirement benefit for a worker who retired at
age 65 in 1994 was $13,797. It is estimated that
the average worker qualified for about $9,972,
which replaced about 43 percent of earnings.
Recent budget legislation raised the tax on
Social Security benefits received by higher-
income retirees (see Chapter 2).
Social Security is particularly important for
low-income retirees because it replaces a
higher share of their income. In 1994, the
replacement ratio (Social Security benefits as
a share of preretirement income) averaged
about 58 percent for workers whose income
was below average, compared with 24 per-
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THE ECONOMIC STATUS OF THE ELDERLY AND NONELDERLY COMPARED
ments also reduced benefits for future retirees
by gradually raising the age requirement for
full retirement benefits from 65 to 67 years.
These changes were projected to generate a
large annual positive cash flow that would
boost the OASDI trust funds to nearly $21
trillion by 2045. The 1983 projections indicated
that if tax rates and benefits were not changed,
the trust fund would maintain a positive bal-
ance until 2063 (under intermediate assump-
ratio of retirees to workers increases. This
effect can be minimized by building trust fund
balances that are later spent down during a
bulge in the retirement-age population. The
1983 Social Security Amendments raised pay-
roll tax rates not only to ensure the current
solvency of Social Security retirement funds
but also to prefund the bulge in benefit pay-
ments that will be required by the retirement
of the baby-boom generation. The amend-
The income of the elderly has clearly grown
more rapidly than the income of the non-
elderly in the postwar period. Nevertheless,
it is not easy to develop meaningful compari-
sons of the current economic status of the
elderly and nonelderly. On a before-tax cash
income basis, the median family unit income
of the elderly was about 70 percent of all non-
elderly in 1990 and about 50 percent of the
income of 45- to 55-year-olds, the age group
with the highest earnings. But such figures
may give a misleading picture of the eco-
nomic status of the elderly.a To begin with, the
distribution of incomes of the elderly appears
to be quite variable; the more senior elderly,
for example, generally have much lower
incomes than younger elderly. However, com-
pared with the nonelderly, the elderly often
face lower tax rates, have more wealth, and
receive significantly more noncash income.
Indeed, some studies have found that the real
median income of the elderly is comparable to
the median income for all nonelderly if such
factors are taken into account.b Such findings
are controversial, in part, because the value of
Medicare and other noncash income is difficult
to determine.
Poverty rates among the elderly have declined
sharply; government tabulations show a de-
cline from 27.9 percent in 1967 to 12.2 percent
in 1990.c In 1990, the poverty rate for the eld-
erly would have been 36 percent higher if no
Social Security benefits had been received.d
It has been widely reported that by 1990, the
poverty rate for the elderly was actually below
the rate for all nonelderly (13.7 percent). How-
ever, the overall nonelderly rate was boosted
by very high poverty rates for children. Pov-
erty rates for the elderly are still above the
poverty rates for nonelderly adults. Moreover,
these poverty measures do not take into con-
sideration wealth and other factors that influ-
ence economic well-being. Compared with
younger people, for example, the elderly face
a much greater risk that their economic status
will be adversely affected by large medical
bills.
a. For income data by age group, see Daniel B. Radner, An Assessment of the Economic Status of the Aged (Washington, D.C.:
Social Security Administration, Office of Research and Statistics, May 1993), p. 32.
b. Michael D. Hurd, “The Adequacy of Retirement Resources and the Role of Pensions” (October 1993). Hurd adjusted
cash incomes for such things as family size, tax liabilities, noncash income from assets (e.g., imputed rent on owner-
occupied homes), and Medicare benefits and concluded that the real income of the elderly was 101 percent of the median
for nonelderly.
c. Radner, An Assessment of the Economic Status of the Aged, p. 43.
d. U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Social Security Administration, Office of Research and Statistics,
Income of the Aged Chartbook, 1990, Supplement 1992 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1992), p . 10.
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tions), sufficient to finance the bulge in retire-
ment benefits caused by the baby-boom gen-
eration. However, actuarial projections of the
solvency of the Social Security trust funds have
continued to deteriorate since 1983 and were
revised down sharply again in 1994. Benefit
outflows are now projected to exceed tax in-
come beginning in 2013; and the OASDI bal-
ance is expected to be exhausted in 2029,
thirty-four years earlier than envisioned in
1983.26 Another way to look at the financial
status of the Social Security program is to com-
pare the present value of benefits expected to
accrue to all past, present, and future workers
over a specific time horizon with the present
value of the assets (including future contribu-
tions) expected to accrue over the same time
period. This provides a measure of the system’s
actuarial deficiency. The actuarial deficiency
of the Social Security program by this mea-
sure is estimated by the Office of Manage-
ment and Budget to be about $1.9 trillion.
The frequent revisions in the projections of
Social Security funding highlight the great
uncertainty about the future status of the
Social Security trust funds. Nevertheless, if
Social Security benefits and taxes are not
changed, the most likely outcome is that the
annual positive cash flow will end early in the
next century and the trust funds will be quickly
exhausted. If action is taken promptly, the
measures necessary to fix Social Security will
be less severe. Congress has already
enacted a gradual increase in the normal
retirement age, and there are several propos-
als to reduce Social Security benefits and raise
tax rates. Senator Robert Kerrey and former
Senator John Danforth, cochairmen of the Bi-
partisan Commission on Entitlement and Tax
Reform, proposed fundamental changes in the
Social Security retirement system that would
bring future outlays and revenues to near bal-
ance. However, there is substantial political
resistance to change in Social Security at the
present time, and it now appears that no
change will be implemented for some years.27
It should also be noted that a controversy
has arisen concerning Social Security funding
because the temporary positive cash flow that
is now being realized (about $69 billion for
OASDI in fiscal 1995) is used to purchase debt
issues of the U.S. Treasury, which appear to
merely finance government consumption. Of
course, the total government deficit measures
the impact of the government budget balance
on national saving; thus, the impact of the
positive cash flow in Social Security depends
on how it affects decisions on non–Social
Security spending and taxing. Social Security
adds to national saving only if the annual
excess of revenues over expenditures reduces
the overall budget deficit. Many argue that
the Social Security surpluses finance spend-
ing and therefore are merely an accounting
device with little significance because they do
not add to saving or encourage growth in the
nation’s capital stock.28 In any case, the Trea-
sury will have to increase taxes, borrow fur-
ther, or cut spending in order to redeem these
funds when expenditures begin to exceed
revenues.
Funding for Government Employee Pen-
sions. Nearly 10 percent of U.S. workers are
public employees covered by federal, state, or
local pension programs, mostly of the defined
benefit variety. Unlike private employers, the
public employer has no tax incentive to make
pension contributions, and public pensions are
not subject to the funding requirements of
ERISA or backed by the PBGC. Years ago,
many public employee retirement benefits,
like other current expenditures, were paid
from general funds. But such pay-as-you-go
funding raised serious questions about
intergenerational equity and the true cost to
taxpayers of growing employment in the pub-
lic sector. Today, prefinancing of public
employee retirement benefits is generally a
requirement, though regulatory details regard-
ing public pensions differ substantially from
state to state.
Government expenditures for pension
funding compete with other public-sector
needs and are therefore subject to budgetary
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report found that 75 of 184 pension plans stud-
ied contributed less than the actuarially
required amount in 1988. Others have esti-
mated an average funding ratio of 80 percent
across all state and local pension plans. Unfor-
tunately, data problems make it difficult to be
more precise about this issue. Nevertheless, it
is clear that underfunding is a serious prob-
lem for many government pensions and that
future tax burdens will rise sharply to over-
come this situation if funding is not increased
(or benefits cut). CED recommends that
defined benefit plans sponsored by state and
local governments be subject to minimum
disclosure and funding standards. Plans
should be fully funded, and promises that
cannot be funded should be avoided.
politics. There are many recent examples in
state and local governments of politicians
attempting to address a budget problem by
skipping the annual pension contribution or
by altering the actuarial assumptions under-
lying the funding. State and local pension fund-
ing has also been adversely affected by pres-
sures to use pension funds for some special
interest, such as the financing of public infra-
structure or environmental programs. Often,
it seems that concern about the credit rating of
the government’s debt is the only real con-
straint on abuses of public pensions.
Although there seems to be great variabil-
ity, a substantial number of state and local
pensions are reported to be underfunded. A
recent General Accounting Office (GAO)
 Table 3
Comparison of Initial Retirement Benefits and Contributions Made by Public-
and Private-Sector Employees for Defined Benefit Plans and Social Security
Public Sector
Without With
Private Social Social
Item Sector Security Security
Combined Social Security and pension
benefits as a percent of final earnings
Final earnings, $35,000 66.4% 65.4% 87.0%
Final earnings, $65,000 57.6% 65.4% 73.3%
Total contributions to Social Security and
pensions as percent of final earnings
Final earnings, $35,000 6.2% 7.6% 11.3%
Final earnings, $65,000 5.5% 7.6% 10.6%
Ratio of initial benefit to contribution
in final year
Final earnings, $35,000 11 to 1% 9 to 1% 8 to 1%
Final earnings, $65,000 10 to 1% 9 to 1% 7 to 1%
SOURCE: William J. Wiatrowski, “On the Disparity Between Private and Public Pensions,” Monthly Labor Review (April 1994): 3–9.
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Federal employee pension programs
underwent substantial reform in the 1980s,
providing less generous defined benefit pack-
ages that are expected to limit the growth of
future liabilities. Moreover, stability in fed-
eral civilian employment and downsizing by
the military should reduce the growth in
pension benefits. New federal employees and
previously hired workers who joined the new
Federal Employee Retirement System are now
covered by Social Security, a reduced defined
benefit plan, and a defined contribution plan.
Given present levels of employee and
employer contributions as well as statutory
funding by agencies, these civilian and mili-
tary retirement programs are expected to main-
tain solvency. But a substantial unfunded
liability exists for earlier service under the
older Civil Service Retirement System. Indeed,
the actuarial deficiency for civilian and mili-
tary pensions combined is estimated to be $1.5
trillion. (The actuarial deficiency at the end of
1992 was $881 billion for the civilian and $619
billion for the military retirement systems.)
Moreover, federal pension trust funds are in-
vested in U.S. Treasury debt. Therefore, as
with Social Security, at some future point the
Treasury will be required to tax or borrow to
redeem these pension funds.29
It is often pointed out that where there is a
“problem” public employee pension program,
it may be the case not only that there is
underfunding but also that too much has been
promised. When strapped for cash, some gov-
ernments have substituted pension increases
for pay raises in order to satisfy the demands
of workers, thereby magnifying funding prob-
lems and passing on the burden to future tax-
payers.30 But as a general rule, public sector
pensions do not appear to be more generous
in the initial years than private sector pensions
when individual contributions are taken into
account (see Table 3).31 However, the fact that
public sector pensions are more likely to be
fully indexed for inflation makes such pen-
sions more attractive over a longer period.32
Of course, indexing for inflation also raises
the cost of such plans substantially compared
with the cost of plans that are not indexed.33
EXPECTATIONS OF THE BABY
BOOMERS FOR RETIREMENT
INCOME
Past experience has encouraged each gen-
eration of Americans to anticipate an improve-
ment in its living standards. The experience of
the elderly population in the United States is
no different. In fact, their economic status has
improved both in absolute terms and relative
to that of younger workers (see Table 4). The
median real income of the nonelderly is esti-
mated to have risen 31.8 percent between 1967
and 1990, whereas the income of the elderly
(adjusted for family size) is estimated to have
risen 82.8 percent. The rapid rise in the in-
come of the elderly relative to that of the
nonelderly was largely due to increases in
Social Security benefits, increased coverage
by private pensions, and growing income from
assets.34 The question remains: How have the
gains of current retirees affected the expecta-
tions of workers? Polls seem to present con-
tradictory answers. Many younger workers
report that they do not expect to benefit from
Social Security, but they generally strongly
oppose its elimination.
The recent experience with declining sav-
ing rates and rising female participation in the
SOURCE: Daniel B. Radner, An Assessment of the Economic
Status of the Aged, p. 38.
 Table 4
Annual Percent Change in Real Median
Family Unit Income Adjusted for Size
Under 65 or
Years Age 65 Over
1967–1972 3.1% 4.9%
1972–1979 1.1% 1.9%
1979–1984 -0.3% 3.4%
1984–1990 1.0% 0.9%
Average change, 1967–1990 1.2% 2.6%
Total change, 1967–1990 31.8% 82.8%
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labor force suggests that families will go to
great lengths to maintain and improve living
standards. In the past, retirees have used po-
litical power to enhance their living standards,
and there is no reason to assume that this will
not happen in the future. Because of the
intergenerational compact involved in Social
Security, many workers view their entitlement
to future Social Security benefits as inviolable,
like a property right.
If future retirees expect their living stan-
dards to improve as much as those of earlier
generations of elderly, they may be in for a
rude awakening unless pension saving is
sharply increased. However, as we indicated
in Chapter 2, there is evidence that many work-
ers do not have adequate information about
pension saving and that, consequently, their
expectations about their economic circum-
stances in retirement may be unrealistic.
HOW MUCH SHOULD WORKERS
SAVE FOR RETIREMENT?
Information on the savings needed to pur-
chase a specific retirement annuity is avail-
able. Given assumptions about investment
income, wage growth, age at retirement, and
other factors, one can also estimate the
required share of income that must be saved
to achieve a specific retirement annuity. For
example, the data in Table 5 indicate that an
individual’s annual private pension saving
would have to be 13 percent of wages over a
thirty-five–year period in order to receive at
age 65 a fully indexed private pension that
paid 50 percent of final pay. As Table 5 dem-
onstrates, early retirement and a reduction in
the number of contributory years have a large
impact on the required saving percentage.
Another crucial factor affecting required sav-
ing is the assumed rate of return on the
invested funds. The example in Table 5 is based
on a real return of 4 percent. By employing a
more aggressive investment strategy (e.g., a
portfolio allocation that places a higher per-
centage of savings in equities and a lower
percentage in money market funds), it may be
possible to exceed this rate of return and
achieve the same replacement ratio with lower
contributions (see “Retirement Benefits and
Saving Requirements”).35 Thus, it is important
that participants understand the relation be-
tween risk and return.36
Available data on pension saving suggest
that very few workers have an annual private
pension saving rate anywhere near that re-
quired to generate a pension of 50 percent of
final pay.  In 1991, the combined total contri-
bution to private pensions by employers and
employees appeared to be about 2.9 percent
of disposable personal income, down signifi-
cantly from about 3.9 percent in 1980. Part of
the decline after the mid-1980s was due to
newly enacted full-funding limits. The aver-
age business contribution to pension and sav-
ing plans is about 3.6 percent of payroll for all
Retirement Age
SOURCE: These estimates were provided by Don Ezra,
managing director of Frank Russell Company. The underly-
ing assumptions are as follows: (1) The investment return is
4 percent greater than the rate of inflation. (2) Salary
escalation throughout the working career is 1 percent higher
than the rate of inflation. (3) Pensions are paid monthly so
long as either the retiree or the spouse of identical age is
alive. (4) Mortality after retirement is expected to follow the
1983 Group Annuity Mortality Table.
Percent of Earnings that Must Be
Saved to Finance a Fully Indexed
Pension of 50 Percent of Final Pay
55% 60% 65% 70
%
20 34% 31% 28% 25%
25 25% 23% 21% 18%
30 19% 18% 16% 14%
35 15% 14% 13% 11%
40 —% 11% 10% 9%
Table 5
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industries and probably about 5.5 percent for
all industries that have pensions.37 Of course,
these figures do not include contributions to
Social Security, which are quite large; but for
most retirees, Social Security will not provide
adequate income in retirement.
Unfortunately, the need for additional pri-
vate saving does not appear to be well under-
stood, though some pension plans (especially
defined contribution plans) provide workers
with adequate information. Many workers are
unaware of the size of their employer-provided
pensions and the additional retirement saving
required to achieve their objectives for retire-
ment income.
UNDERSAVING BY BABY BOOMERS
How much are the baby boomers under-
saving on average? The answer depends in
part on how much income they expect in
retirement. Perhaps some baby boomers are
willing to accept a very modest standard of
retirement income. A recent study by the
Congressional Budget Office (CBO) used the
following standard to judge the adequacy of
ongoing preparation for retirement: Will the
baby boomers’ real income and wealth in re-
tirement exceed that of their parents? The
study answered this question in the affirma-
tive for several reasons: (1) The preretirement
real income of the baby boomers is expected
to exceed that of their parents, thereby auto-
matically triggering higher Social Security or
pension benefits. (2) Higher workforce par-
ticipation rates by women of the baby-boom
generation will increase their eligibility for
pensions. (3) Changes in pension regulations
pertaining to vesting and participation make
it more likely that the baby boomers will
receive a pension. (4) The baby boomers are
likely to inherit more wealth.38
Most retirees will require more income than
provided by Social Security. Individuals fre-
quently ask: How much retirement saving is
necessary? Fortunately, a reasonably accurate
answer can be provided, given a number of
assumptions. Once an individual has decided
on a desirable level of retirement saving, the
share of earnings that should be set aside for
retirement by the individual and/or an
employer depends on such factors as whether
the retirement benefits are adjusted for infla-
tion, the number of years that pension contri-
butions are made, the return on investments in
the retirement fund, and the expected age of
retirement. In the example shown here, the
required saving rate is lower than in the ex-
ample presented in Table 5 even when the
retirement income target (50 percent of final
pay, indexed for inflation) is identical. The
principal reason is that a higher investment
return (6 percent after inflation until retire-
                                           Years to Retirement
10 15 20 25 30 35
30% 36% 21% 13% 9% 6% 4%
40 48 27 18 12 8 6%
50 60 34 22 15 10 7%
60 72 41 26 18 12 9%
70 84 48 31 21 14 10
ment and 5 percent after inflation thereafter) is
assumed in this example, reflecting a portfolio
allocation that takes on a higher degree of risk.
Required Saving as a Percent of Income
RETIREMENT BENEFITS AND SAVING REQUIREMENTS
SOURCE: T. Rowe Price Associates. The underlying assumptions are as follows: (1) A 9 percent annual investment return
prior to retirement and 8 percent after retirement, (2) an inflation rate of 3 percent, (3) retirement income lasts thirty years.
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nomic well-being as they enter retirement.
Given the rise in expectations brought about
by the prosperity of current retirees, this
decline in living standards may be widely
viewed as unacceptable.
How much saving would be necessary for the
baby boomers to maintain their preretirement liv-
ing standard in retirement? An analysis that
addresses this question was prepared by Pro-
fessor B. Douglas Bernheim; it indicates that
the baby boomers are very poorly prepared
for their future retirement.42 Employing a
model of life-cycle behavior with currently
prescribed Social Security benefits, and using
survey data on household assets and consump-
tion, Bernheim estimated that households with
a head age 35 to 44 were accumulating assets
at only 34 percent of the required rate. Thus,
the baby-boom generation needs to triple rates of
asset accumulation. He also found that saving
adequacy is lower for single individuals and
tends to decline as income rises, reflecting the
progressivity of Social Security benefits and
inadequate private pension saving. Moreover,
if future Social Security benefits are cut even
moderately, the required increase in saving
will rise substantially.
The Bernheim study did not take into
account the fact that many retirees have sub-
stantial equity in their homes. The increase in
saving needed to maintain preretirement liv-
ing standards could be less if the baby boomers
were willing to cash in on their equity in hous-
ing when they retire. Home equity is esti-
mated to account for about 70 percent of the
total wealth of the elderly; therefore, home
equity conversion, by sale or reverse mort-
gage, is a possible means of significantly
increasing consumption by retirees. But as we
noted earlier, recent projections indicate that
the baby-boom generation is not likely to ben-
efit from a rise in the real value of housing.
Moreover, studies show that the housing turn-
over rate among the elderly is very low, even
though many retirees are fully aware of the
potential for equity conversion.43 Some eld-
However, in keeping with the CBO’s prac-
tice of not forecasting Congressional actions,
the evaluation of the future well-being of baby
boomers employed current-policy fiscal as-
sumptions. The study assumed no change in
promised Social Security benefits, even though
current Social Security benefits cannot be main-
tained without a very sharp rise in Social
Security taxes, given demographic trends. A
realistic projection needs to address the tax
burden on workers and the political and eco-
nomic pressures to reduce benefits. In this
respect, the CBO policy assumption begs the
question of whether the retirement income of
baby boomers will be satisfactory.
A recent study based on generational
accounts, which takes into consideration the
financing of government-projected liabilities
for retirement and other programs, concludes
that the majority of baby boomers will actu-
ally have a lower standard of living in retire-
ment, in absolute terms, than their parents
now enjoy. This is because currently legis-
lated government policies (e.g., for retirement
and health care) have passed forward a mas-
sive burden to future generations. Conse-
quently, a sustainable fiscal policy will require
substantial spending cuts and tax increases.39
It has also been pointed out that current
retirees have enjoyed fortunate circumstances
that are not expected to benefit baby boomers.
For example, many current retirees had large
windfalls from the rise in housing prices and
the decline in the real value of liabilities (mort-
gages) resulting from inflation. In contrast,
recent economic research suggests that the
baby boomers will experience a decline in the
real value of their investment in housing,
which represents a very large portion of their
wealth.40 The widespread use of adjustable-rate
mortgages also makes it less likely that they
will benefit as their parents did from increased
inflation.41
Recognizing the great uncertainty about
long-term economic trends, it seems that the
most likely outcome is that the baby boomers
will experience a very large decline in eco-
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erly become emotionally attached to their
homes and familiar surroundings. Others wish
to retain home equity as a reserve for meeting
catastrophic medical expenses. Therefore,
although housing equity should be taken into
consideration when measuring the well-being
of retirees, the existence of home equity may
not greatly affect retirees’ perceptions about
the adequacy of their income.
These facts on demographic trends, pri-
vate retirement saving, the funding of
private and public pensions, and projected
retirement income strongly support the con-
clusions that retirement saving is inadequate
and that increased emphasis on private sav-
ing is necessary both to ensure the economic
security of future retirees and to avoid
unreasonable burdens on future workers.
Although precise estimates of individual sav-
ing needs are inherently controversial, in part
because of the difficulty of identifying rea-
sonable retirement needs, CED believes that
a massive increase in private retirement sav-
ing over the next decade is necessary if we
are to avoid a crisis in retirement finance in
the future. Clearly, Congress needs to take
steps to remove current disincentives for
retirement saving (see Chapter 5).
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Government tax policy is the major tool for
encouraging retirement saving. For many
years, federal income tax laws have included
provisions to encourage business and indi-
viduals to make contributions to retirement
funds. However, the deferral of taxes on pen-
sion saving is very controversial and has
changed radically over time. Recent changes
that have sharply limited tax benefits for pen-
sions were motivated by rising political pres-
sures to reduce the huge federal budget defi-
cits and by the belief that tax incentives are a
windfall because they have little effect on sav-
ing.
THE TAX BASE CONTROVERSY
The treatment of pensions in the federal
income tax system is central to the long-
standing debate about the economic impact
and equity of a system that includes saving in
the tax base. Some favor a consumption-based
system that exempts saving from taxation
either because of its desirable economic
effects (i.e., because it encourages saving and
long-term economic growth) or because they
believe that the exemption will improve tax
equity. Proponents of the basic philosophy
underlying an income tax system generally
espouse the traditional view that all incre-
ments to available resources should be taxed
(i.e., that taxable income is the sum of con-
sumption plus the change in net worth).
Although this approach holds that all income,
including saving, should be taxable, in prac-
tice, capital gains are generally not taxed until
realized; and numerous tax deductions,
exemptions, and credits have been added to
the present income tax system in order to
achieve particular objectives. Thus, for
example, interest payments on mortgages are
deductible in order to encourage home own-
ership, and pension contributions are deduct-
ible in order to encourage saving. Some of
these practices have changed the character of
the income tax, moving it in the direction of a
consumption tax. Of course, if the income tax
were replaced by a consumption tax, special
tax provisions for pension saving would not
be needed because the exclusion of saving
would be the normal tax treatment.
The debate concerning the appropriate
tax base has again entered the political
arena because of growing support for the
consumed-income tax, which would exempt
saving from taxation. The issue is whether the
United States should place greater reliance on
taxing consumed income, rather than com-
prehensive accrual income that includes all
consumption and increases in net worth. There
is no consensus among scholars or in the busi-
ness community on this issue.
We do not propose to address the debate
about the tax base in this policy statement.1
This statement is deliberately focused on
retirement saving. Of course, we recognize
that the general debate is relevant to the dis-
cussion of retirement saving and fiscal policy
more generally. With respect to retirement sav-
ing, tax preferences are seen as a subsidy or
incentive by those who view income as the
appropriate tax base, whereas the absence of
tax-qualified retirement savings is seen as a
penalty or disincentive by those who view
consumed income as the proper tax base.2 The
Chapter 4
Designing Tax Incentives
to Raise Saving
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policy position that we take on retirement tax
preferences in this statement is that with the
existing income tax, the case is compelling for
broadening and simplifying the rules relating
to tax-qualified retirement savings. Even if
this constitutes a subsidy or incentive, we
nevertheless endorse it as being in the public
interest.
Without taking a position on the tax base
controversy, we assume in this report that the
federal government will continue to rely on
the present income tax system.
TAX INCENTIVES AND SAVING
A critical question about the current prac-
tice of employing income tax preferences to
encourage pension saving is: How effective
are these incentives? The impact of tax incen-
tives on pension saving is part of the broader
issue of the determinants of saving, which has
confounded scholars for generations. Econo-
mists have approached the issue by asking:
What is the effect of changes in the after-tax
rate of return on private saving? Theory alone
does not provide the answer. An increase in
the rate of after-tax return lowers the price of
future consumption, thereby increasing the
incentive to save. But an increase in the return
on saving also reduces the amount of saving
necessary to achieve a given level of future
consumption, thereby reducing the saving
incentive for target savers.3 Empirical studies
intended to determine which effect predomi-
nates tend to support the view that net saving
does increase when the after-tax return rises;
however, this finding is not unanimous and
nearly all studies find that the effect is quite
modest.
The recent experience with IRAs, which
grew rapidly when introduced but much less
so after eligibility for a tax deduction was
restricted to lower-income households, has
presented researchers with an opportunity
to study the effect of targeted tax incentives
on saving. Before its implementation, most
economists expected that the tax advantages
would generate a sharp rise in IRA balances
(as happened), but many feared that IRAs
would not produce a significant increase in
total personal saving. This is because the tax
benefit could be received by households that
merely shift existing savings into IRAs and by
households that borrowed to finance IRA con-
tributions. In either case, taxpayers would
receive a windfall in the form of lower taxes
with no net increase in aggregate household
saving. Many empirical studies have been un-
dertaken in an attempt to determine how much
of IRA saving was new saving. Several, though
not all, of these studies have concluded that
IRAs and other tax incentives were powerful
incentives for the creation of personal saving.4
A far more demanding and relevant test of
the success of tax-preferred saving incentives
such as IRAs is their effect on national saving.
National saving is the sum of private saving
(by individuals and business) and government
saving (or dissaving). The impact on national
saving is important because, together with
inflows of foreign capital, national saving
provides the funds for investment. Whether a
tax incentive generates an increase in national
saving depends on the amount of additional
private saving, the amount of revenue lost by
the government, and whether government
spending is affected by the loss in revenues. If
the new private saving does not exceed the
government’s revenue loss, national saving
will not increase and might actually fall, pro-
viding that the deficit rises by the amount of
the revenue loss. Of course, unlike the response
of private saving to tax incentives, the use of
federal revenues (for spending or for deficit
reduction) is a politically determined issue
that depends on the current priorities.
Putting aside the political issue concerning
the government’s use of revenues, the impact
of tax preferences on national saving depends
on the taxpayers’ marginal tax rate and on the
fraction of contributions to IRAs and other
incentives that is new saving (i.e., that does
not represent a shift into IRAs of other
non-tax-deferred saving). If, for example, 50
percent of the contribution to pension funds is
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Therefore, it is reasonable to conclude that
certain existing tax incentives for retirement
saving, as well as employer contributions to
pension plans, are likely to increase national
saving.
DESIGN OF TAX-PREFERRED SAVING
INCENTIVES
It is important that future saving incentives be
carefully designed to maximize their net ben-
efit. The shifting of funds from existing saving
to qualified saving and borrowing to finance
contributions should be discouraged as much
as possible. Some have suggested, for example,
that tax-preferred saving incentives could be
made more effective by making deductions
available only for increases in saving or only
for saving above a threshold that rises with
income.7 The idea is that a tax incentive should
reward greater efforts to save.
It is also important that the tax incentive be
designed so that those who have discretion to
increase saving qualify for the incentive.
Using data on educational attainment (which
is correlated with income), one study found
that college graduates and those who already
have pensions respond positively to saving
incentives, whereas those without college
degrees may reduce saving in response to
tax incentives. Apparently, lower-income
individuals are much more likely to behave as
target savers. The study concluded that “a
policy that provides tax incentives for saving
exclusively for lower-income households
excludes those households that are most likely
to increase saving in response to this policy;
indeed, it is conceivable that such policies
could actually reduce aggregate personal sav-
ing.”8 Of course, if an incentive does not gen-
erate a significant increase in personal saving,
there is little hope that national saving will
rise. Thus, pension-related tax incentives
that decline as income levels rise may be
self-defeating if the goal is to encourage
aggregate pension saving.
In some instances, the motive for tax
changes that have reduced the tax benefits
new saving generated by the tax incentive
and the relevant effective marginal tax rate is
30 percent of income, a $100 contribution to
the pension fund could cause national saving
to rise by $20 because the tax incentive would
generate more dollars of new private saving
than the government’s revenue loss.
Because it is difficult to determine what
proportion of contributions is new saving, it is
not surprising that the results of empirical
studies on the net impact of IRAs and other
saving incentives on national saving are not
unanimous. However, it is significant that a
recent study by Poterba, Venti, and Wise, based
on the U.S. experience with 401(k) plans, con-
cluded that these tax-deferred saving incen-
tives succeeded in generating substantial new
saving sufficient to significantly increase not
only personal saving but also national sav-
ing.5 Moreover, researchers who have found
that tax incentives created little or no new
saving, because of the induced shift from
existing assets, generally agree that national
saving should rise in the long run. For
example, recent model simulations of long-
term outcomes by Engen, Gale, and Scholz
strongly support the finding that over time,
the impact on national saving will be posi-
tive.6
Thus far, we have discussed the effects of
tax incentives, such as IRAs, that are designed
to encourage retirement saving by individu-
als. However, tax deductions for employer
contributions made from current-year earn-
ings may have a larger positive impact on
national saving. A high proportion of
employer contributions to retirement plans are
likely to be new savings, that exceed the
government’s revenue loss, given the usual
assumption that wages would be higher in
the absence of retirement benefits. Employees
are not likely to change their saving behavior
in response to a change in employer contribu-
tions because they frequently have very little
information about those contributions;
employees are more concerned about the size
of the benefit than about how it is financed.
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available for high-wage individuals is to com-
pensate for the fact that in any given year,
pension tax policies provide considerably
fewer benefits for low-wage workers. Indeed,
some have cited the distribution of pension
tax benefits as reason to increase taxes on pen-
sion saving.9 However, in a given year, many
of those who do not benefit are younger work-
ers who are not yet covered by a pension but
who will ultimately be covered and benefit
from the tax treatment of pensions. Measured
in terms of lifetime earnings, rather than earn-
ings at a specific time, pension tax benefits
appear to be more evenly distributed.10
We conclude that pension tax policy is
not a good instrument for redistributing
income. Proposals for reducing pension tax
benefits for high-wage workers are clearly not
desirable from the viewpoint of increasing
national saving and may not be effective even
from the viewpoint of distributional policy.
Moreover, if society finds the distributional
implication of pension policies worrisome, this
can be fixed by other changes in taxes (e.g.,
rates or exemptions).
On the issue of the design of tax-deferred
incentives, CED concludes that private pen-
sion participation and saving should be
encouraged, but in a manner that is most
likely to raise national saving as well. Other
legitimate concerns, such as income distri-
bution, cannot easily be addressed with pri-
vate pension policies without defeating a
basic objective of retirement policies: to
increase saving.
PROPOSALS FOR COMPULSORY
SAVING PROGRAMS
It has frequently been observed that some
households are savers and others, including
some middle-income households, do little or
no saving. Moreover, it appears that the be-
havior of these nonsaving households changes
little, if at all, in response to incentives to save.
Consequently, some scholars have proposed
a mandatory qualified saving program — a
requirement for a minimum rate of saving,
such as 2 percent of disposable income, for all
workers — in order to make sure that most
households contribute to national saving and
make preparations for the future. It is argued
that this approach would be very effective in
raising national saving because those who do
not save would be forced to save and would
have little opportunity to shift funds from
existing accounts to qualified accounts. Those
who already save the required minimum
would not be affected by the proposal.11
A mandatory saving program probably
would be integrated with Social Security,
either as a private supplement to Social Secu-
rity or as a substitute for the part of Social
Security that provides benefits above basic
needs. Either approach would increase fund-
ing for retirement, though the former is likely
to make a greater contribution to saving. Pro-
ponents of mandatory saving plans also argue
that the fact that individuals would own and
control the funds would make mandatory con-
tributions more attractive than mandatory
taxes paid to Social Security.
We do not dispute the idea that mandatory
saving programs could be more effective in
increasing private saving than other currently
available options. But policies that force indi-
viduals to take certain actions often have great
costs to society relative to policies that merely
encourage certain behavior. For example, a
requirement for annual contributions could
cause considerable inconvenience for families
experiencing temporary economic hardships.
Moreover, the American public instinctively
resists any compulsion; therefore, it is doubt-
ful that proponents of compulsory saving pro-
grams could garner widespread political sup-
port unless large net social benefits are clearly
demonstrable. Thus, although CED believes
that proposals for mandatory saving pro-
grams merit further study, we do not
endorse the idea at the present time. The
nation should consider a mandatory program
only if other options for increasing saving,
such as improved availability of pension
information and tax incentives, prove to be
ineffective.
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In its efforts to reduce the budget deficit dur-
ing the last decade, Congress often sought to
raise revenues by reducing tax expenditures in
the budget. Tax expenditures were defined by
the Congressional Budget and Impoundment
Control Act of 1974 as “those revenue losses
attributable to provisions of the federal tax
laws which allow special exclusions, exemp-
tions or deductions from gross income, or
which provide a special credit, a preferential
rate of tax or a deferral of tax liability.” The
Joint Tax Committee, which has responsibility
for estimating the magnitude of tax expendi-
tures, reports that the annual revenue loss as
the result of the preferred tax treatment of
pensions amounted to $56 billion in fiscal
1993, making pension contributions the larg-
est tax expenditure in the budget. The Joint
Tax Committee’s estimate of tax expenditures
for retirement plans is the annual aggregate of
revenue losses measured on a cash-flow basis.
In principle, legislation designed to reduce tax
loopholes may improve economic efficiency if
the added revenues are used to lower statu-
tory tax rates. However, it is clear that the
method of measuring tax expenditures is mis-
leading when applied to pension saving. A
proper measure would balance taxes paid on
future benefits against the immediate revenue
loss; that is, it would use a life-cycle approach
rather than the annual cash flow. This is be-
cause the calculation of annual cash flow is
affected by changes in pension funding levels,
trends in coverage and benefits, and the aging
of the population, factors that have recently
biased estimates upward. It is also important to
realize that currently reported tax expenditures
are not a true measure of forgone revenue (the
amount of revenue that would be realized if
the tax preference were ended) because the tax
expenditure calculation does not take into
account any taxpayer response to the increases
in effective tax rates. If the preferential tax
treatment of pensions were eliminated, such
responses would surely lower the revenue gain
implied by the tax expenditure estimate.
More important than these measurement
issues, however, is the fact that the economic
consequences of pension tax expenditures are
different from those of other tax expenditures.
Retirement saving has very positive social
effects as well as important benefits for future
retirees. Moreover, as explained earlier in this
chapter, the preferential tax treatment of pen-
sion savings also makes an important con-
tribution to national saving, which in turn
improves the growth and competitiveness of
the U.S. economy. This cannot be said about
many other tax expenditures that encourage
consumption rather than growth.
deficit-reducing tax increases. (See “Tax
Expenditures and Pension Tax Preferences,”
below.) We also believe that the government’s
measure of the subsidy is exaggerated because
the present value of future revenue gains is
not taken into account.
CED has long advocated a change in spend-
ing and tax priorities in order to eliminate the
federal budget deficit.13 We have said that
among major policy alternatives, a reduction
in the budget deficit is the most certain and
effective means of increasing national saving.
In taking this position, however, CED has
argued that the purpose of reducing budget
TAX EXPENDITURES AND PENSION TAX PREFERENCES
THE BUDGET DEFICIT
As we mentioned earlier in this chapter, a
number of tax changes were enacted during
the last decade that have discouraged pension
saving. The primary purpose of these tax
changes has been to increase government rev-
enues in order to reduce the federal budget
deficit.12 In seeking additional revenues, policy
makers have often turned to the federal
government’s list of tax expenditures, which
includes tax preferences for pension saving.
However, in our view, pension tax expendi-
tures are not an appropriate target for
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deficits is to increase national saving, which
is needed to boost investment spending and
to stimulate more rapid growth in productiv-
ity. Therefore, how the deficit is reduced is
important. Deficit-reduction policies should
give first priority to cuts in real spending.
Although taxing private pension saving would
reduce the budget deficit, such taxes are not
an effective method of raising national saving
because they reduce private saving. In con-
trast, taxes on consumption reduce the deficit
without discouraging private saving and are
therefore a more effective tax tool for increas-
ing national saving.
CED agrees that further reductions in the
budget deficit should be a high national pri-
ority. We believe that there is room for more
spending cuts in the budget, certainly suffi-
cient to offset any net increase in the budget
deficit resulting from reforms of retirement
law recommended here. This statement pro-
poses legislative changes that both reduce cur-
rent budget deficits (e.g., in Social Security)
and increase current budget deficits (e.g., full
funding of pensions). The short-term net defi-
cit effect of these changes is unknown, but it is
probably quite small. More important, the
reforms recommended here will increase
national saving and investment and thereby
achieve the objectives sought by a reduction
in the budget deficit.
CED has noted elsewhere that any serious
program of long-term spending restraint must
substantially reduce the growth of entitlement
and transfer programs, which have been the
major source of budget growth.14 As a practi-
cal political matter, it may also be necessary to
raise taxes in order to enact further deficit-
reducing measures. However, we believe that
the desire to reduce current-year deficits
should not lead to a political decision to
increase taxes on retirement saving. Such a
policy would lose sight of the economic ratio-
nale for reducing the deficit: to increase
national saving in order to improve the growth
and competitiveness of the economy.
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Government policy toward private retire-
ment saving has traditionally consisted of two
broad features: First, under the Internal Rev-
enue Code, savings for retirement have been
accorded favorable tax treatment: deferral of
income taxes on contributions and on the in-
vestment earnings derived from them. The
second general feature has been regulation of
plan design and conduct under the Internal
Revenue Code and federal labor law.1
FAVORABLE TAX TREATMENT
Since the 1920s, employer and (under vari-
ous arrangements) employee contributions
to pensions have been deductible from
current-year income up to certain limits. How-
ever, taxes are merely deferred; taxes on con-
tributions and invested earnings become pay-
able upon distribution of retirement benefits
to the employee. The Internal Revenue Code
requires compliance with participation, vest-
ing, and funding rules in order to qualify a
plan for tax benefits. This favorable tax treat-
ment of income set aside for pensions is a
recognition of the importance of retirement
income to the economic security of retirees
and the contribution of retirement saving to
the national economy as a source of invest-
ment funds.
FEDERAL REGULATION
Labor law sets out mandatory requirements
for all private pension plans, whether quali-
fied or not. These requirements, which cover
participation, vesting, funding, reporting, and
fiduciary responsibility, came about largely in
response to rapid growth in the number of
pension plans, from 400 in 1925 to more than
370,000 by 19742 (when there was a major over-
haul of regulation), and the heightened con-
cern about potential abuses of pension tax
preferences. The principal factors that moti-
vated federal involvement were:
• Pension promises made by firms to
employees could be (and occasionally were)
revoked.
• Plans eligible for preferential tax treatment
could be established solely for the benefit
of certain key company employees, thereby
raising issues of tax equity.
• Employees could be excluded from partici-
pation through restrictions on age and
length of service combined with timely ter-
minations.
• Pension benefits distributed to key employ-
ees were sometimes viewed as excessive in
relation to perceived retirement needs.
• Plans were often underfunded relative to
their future liabilities.
• Plans were overfunded in some cases for
the purpose of tax avoidance.
CED agrees that some government inter-
vention in the private pension system is called
for. However, the pension regulations that
have been enacted place excessive limits on
the ability of individual plans to be tailored to
individual needs, are much too complex, have
been far too unstable, and seek to achieve too
many goals, some of which are of little or
no benefit to society. Indeed, many regula-
tions currently on the books conflict with the
goals of pension policy as CED sees them.
Chapter 5
The Regulatory Tangle:
Proposals for Simplification
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We believe that the basic goal of pension
policy is to ensure the economic security of
the elderly by encouraging saving. In our
evaluation of present pension regulations and
in our recommendations for reform, CED takes
the view that pension regulation must be
streamlined, simplified, and designed to
achieve six basic objectives:
1. Provide retirement plans for the largest-
possible number of workers.
2. Ensure that pension plans meet appropri-
ate fiduciary standards and are funded to
fulfill pension promises.
3. Encourage individual saving by making
retirement saving opportunities available
to all workers through deferred taxes on
contributions and earnings and by pro-
viding all workers with realistic informa-
tion on their retirement saving needs,
resources, and options.
4. Place simple and reasonable limits on tax
preferences received by any individual
(i.e., a single overall limit on eligible con-
tributions indexed to inflation) and a limit
on benefits received from a qualified
defined benefit plan.3
5. Preserve retirement saving and pension
rights by discouraging preretirement
withdrawals and by improving the port-
ability of pension assets.
6. Compensate for the rise in life expect-
ancy by encouraging retirement at a later
age and by reducing work disincentives
for the elderly who receive retirement ben-
efits.
Simplifying pension regulation to achieve
these objectives will also result in much lower
administrative costs than under the current
regulations.
ERISA AND SUBSEQUENT
LEGISLATION
Beginning in the 1930s, Congress moved
gradually to regulate pensions. Nondiscrimi-
nation rules and limits on funding of defined
benefit plans were already in place by the
time the Employee Retirement Income Secu-
rity Act of 1974 (ERISA) was passed. This
extremely complicated legislation was a
major overhaul of pension law and, together
with numerous amendments, remains the
basic pension law today. (The Appendix pre-
sents the chronology of pension legislation in
greater detail.) ERISA addressed all aspects of
retirement plan design and funding; its pri-
mary goal was to broaden pension participa-
tion and ensure the deliverability of pension
promises.
To achieve these goals, ERISA established
age and service rules designed to make retire-
ment plans available to a greater number of
rank-and-file employees and vesting rules to
increase the probability that benefits were
actually received. It established fiduciary stan-
dards for all plans, minimum-funding rules
for defined benefit plans, and insurance to
protect participants against the loss of pen-
sions. ERISA required that this insurance
be funded by employer premiums and cre-
ated a new government insurance agency, the
Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC),
to administer it. ERISA also gave workers
whose employers did not offer a retirement
plan a chance to enjoy tax-favored retirement
saving by creating IRAs. ERISA was followed
by legislation in 1978 and 1981 creating new
retirement-saving vehicles, including 401(k)
plans, and broadening access to others (per-
mitting IRAs for all workers).
At the same time, other provisions of ERISA
and subsequent legislation have discouraged
the growth of retirement savings. ERISA
placed limits on contributions to all pension
plans and penalized excessive individual ben-
efits from defined benefit plans. Nevertheless,
until 1982, it could be argued that the inherent
tension between limiting immediate federal
revenue losses and encouraging retirement
saving had resolved itself in favor of the lat-
ter. However, the Tax Equity and Fiscal
Responsibility Act of 1982 (TEFRA) marked
the beginning of a change in priority. TEFRA
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and most subsequent important changes to
pension regulations were legislated in an
environment of large federal budget deficits
and focused primarily on limiting immediate
federal revenue losses. Consequently, TEFRA
and successive laws passed almost annually
during the last decade have concentrated on
increasing the stringency of contribution and
benefit limits and erecting ever more elabo-
rate rules to safeguard against discrimination.
These funding and benefit restrictions are
backed by tax penalties for noncompliance: a
10 percent excise tax on excess contributions
and a 15 percent tax on excess distributions
(annual benefits in excess of $148,500 in 1994).
Some parts of ERISA and subsequent legis-
lation have had beneficial effects. But pension
regulation has also had detrimental conse-
quences:
• It has sharply raised the cost of administer-
ing retirement plans, with a disproportion-
ate impact on smaller defined benefit plans.
This trend has coincided with a steep
increase in the number of terminations of
defined benefit plans.
• It has significantly limited pension contri-
butions, undermining the ability of some
plans, even those that are currently healthy,
to make good on their pension promises in
the future. This has contributed to the grow-
ing underfunding problem.
The complexity of private pension regula-
tion in the United States cannot be exagger-
ated. For example, the nondiscrimination rules,
which are over 600 pages long, require com-
plex numerical calculations for every employee
each year. To ensure compliance with these
and other provisions of pension regulation,
plan administrators must hire an army of law-
yers, actuaries, and accountants, who often
seem to be the major beneficiaries of the legis-
lation. As an industry publication noted:
“There are currently penalties for putting too
much or too little into a plan, taking too much
or too little out of a plan, and receiving ben-
efits from a plan too early or too late.”4 Some
legal experts have suggested that regulations
are now so complex that it may be impossible
for individual pension plans to be in compli-
ance with all of ERISA’s provisions.
REGULATIONS LIMITING PRIVATE
PENSION CONTRIBUTIONS AND
BENEFITS
Regulations enacted in the last decade or
so reduced pension saving in several ways,
including lowering the funding limits on
defined benefit plans, limiting annual contri-
butions and benefits for any individual, and
introducing complicated new discrimination
tests that sharply raised the administrative
cost of delivering pensions, thereby discour-
aging their use. We deal here with only the
most pernicious of these regulations. (Esti-
mates of the cost of these regulations are
included in the last section of this chapter,
“Rising Regulatory Costs Discourage Pension
Saving,” beginning on page 64.)
There are two broad classes of pensions:
defined benefit plans and defined contribution
plans. The essential difference is that the obli-
gation for a defined benefit plan is
expressed in terms of a benefit (the contribu-
tions being variable), whereas the obligation
for a defined contribution plan is expressed in
terms of contributions to the pension fund
(the benefit being indeterminate). Conse-
quently, problems of underfunded pension
promises (discussed in Chapter 3) arise only
in the case of defined benefit plans.
The primary pension plan for larger and
older firms is generally of the defined benefit
variety. The design and funding of these plans
(see “Estimating Liabilities and Funding for
Defined Benefit Plans,” pages 52-53) are quite
complicated, in part because they are heavily
regulated and their benefits are partially guar-
anteed by the PBGC. Many employees prefer
this type of plan because the risk and respon-
sibility for providing the benefits fall on the
employer and because the amount of the pen-
sion, usually based on years of service multi-
plied by a percentage of compensation or a
flat dollar amount, is known with greater cer-
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tainty. Employers often prefer defined benefit
plans because they allow greater discretion in
the timing of contributions than many defined
contribution plans and in the use of deferred
contributions (in lieu of wages) to attract work-
ers. Managers also hope to reduce the cost of
pension benefits by pursuing more aggressive
investments than may be included in the port-
folio of defined contribution plans. However,
the administrative costs of complying with
regulations pertaining to defined benefit plans
significantly exceed those for defined contri-
bution plans of comparable size.
Contributions to a defined contribution
plan are made to an individual account estab-
lished for each employee. The final benefit
paid is based on the sum of these contribu-
tions plus return on investment and some-
times forfeitures that have been allocated to
that account.5 Defined contribution plans are
attractive to employers because they are less
complicated to administer than defined ben-
efit plans and because funding costs are pre-
dictable, since contributions are based on a
predetermined formula. These plans are also
attractive to some employees because they are
generally portable (i.e., they can be carried
from employer to employer) and because it is
easy to keep track of the current value of their
benefit. Moreover, it is usually possible for
employees to receive their benefits in a lump
sum upon terminating employment with the
sponsoring employer. Because they are used
by small firms and individuals, the number of
defined contribution plans is rising rapidly.
Successive legislation has generated a large
number of types of qualified defined contri-
bution plans, sometimes making the choice
quite complex. (See “Defined Contribution
Plans,” pages 54-55 for a summary of plan
types.) The most rapid growth has occurred in
401(k) plans, which are often supplements to
primary defined benefit retirement plans.
FUNDING LIMIT FOR DEFINED
BENEFIT PLANS
From a national saving perspective, the
most serious attack on retirement saving was
contained in the Omnibus Budget Reconcilia-
tion Act of 1987 (OBRA87). This law limited
funding of defined benefit plans to 150 per-
cent of plan termination liability (benefits
accrued to date). Before OBRA87, firms could
fund up to 100 percent of their projected liabil-
ity, which is based on actuarial calculations
of the benefits plan participants will accrue
over their working lives. The new limit estab-
lished by OBRA87 caused delay in funding of
many plans until the later years of a worker’s
career. For many firms future pension costs
will rise sharply because backloaded funding
costs will rise just as the baby-boom genera-
tion approaches retirement.
Table 6 (see page 56) reproduces a numeri-
cal example of how the funding patterns for
individuals of various ages were disrupted by
the new rule. The plan in the example pays a
benefit of 1 percent of final-average salary for
each year of service; it assumes a 5.5 percent
annual rate of salary increase and a return on
assets of 8 percent. The third column shows
how the plan would be funded prior to
OBRA87 using the projected unit credit
method. Contributions rise slowly as a per-
cent of compensation throughout the worker’s
career. The present value of contributions dur-
ing the first half of the worker’s career is ex-
actly equal to the present value of contribu-
tions during the second half. However, for the
25-year-old worker whose pension is funded
exclusively under the OBRA87 rule, contribu-
tions as a proportion of salary begin at a much
lower level and rise very steeply during the
worker’s forties and early fifties (see Figure
25, page 56). On a dollar-present-value basis,
75 percent of this employee’s funding is
pushed back to the second half of his or her
working life. For the 35- and 45-year-old
employees in this example who had already
received benefit credits when OBRA87 took
effect, contributions had to be temporarily halted
(for nine and six years, respectively) while
accrued benefits caught up with the amount
that had already been funded under the
pre-OBRA87 rules.
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A typical defined benefit plan credits an
employee with a unit of benefit for every year
of participation in the plan, usually expressed
as a percentage of compensation, though some-
times as a flat dollar amount. In the former
case, compensation is usually based on career-
average, or final-average, earnings for a speci-
fied number of years (often three to five)
immediately prior to retirement. A simple
example of the final-average case is an
employee who works for thirty years until
retirement at age 65, averages $50,000 in salary
for his last five years of employment, and par-
ticipates in a plan that credits him with 1.5
percent of final-average compensation for each
year of service; he would be entitled to a pen-
sion of 45 percent of $50,000 ($22,500) for each
year that he lives in retirement. In many cases,
the pension benefit is in addition to Social
Security benefits.a
Because accrual and payment of benefits occur
over a period of many years, it is necessary for
the plan sponsor, for purposes of funding, to
first determine the present value of the pen-
sion. This involves several steps:
1. Estimating the final-average (or career-
average) salary, which incorporates
assumptions about rate of salary growth
from commencement in the plan until
retirement. This salary figure is then multiplied
by the benefit percentage specified in the plan
formula (1.5 percent in the example) and then
by years of service to get the total annual retire-
ment benefit. (The expected value of benefits for
a group of participants in a plan would also be
reduced by the probabilities of preretirement
termination, disability, or mortality.)
2. Calculating the value at age 65 of all post-
retirement benefit flows. This requires a mortal-
ity assumption to estimate life span and an
interest rate assumption to discount the value
of benefit payments made over successive
years. The number thus derived represents
the total pension benefit valued at age 65 (or
whatever the retirement age).
3. Finding the present value of the number calcu-
lated in step 2. This calculation depends criti-
cally on the interest rate assumption. Because
a long period of time elapses between benefit
accrual and retirement, a small change in the
interest rate causes an inordinately large move-
ment in the valuation of plan costs and conse-
quently in the funding status of the plan.b
The plan sponsor next has to determine how to
assign the cost of funding this liability over time
within the constraints of minimum and maximum
annual funding requirements set out in the law.
Recent empirical studies have concluded
that the full-funding limitation introduced in
OBRA87 substantially reduced pension con-
tributions.6 Data gleaned from surveys of busi-
nesses sponsoring pension plans support the
conclusion that the effects of OBRA87 were
significant. Prior to the enactment of OBRA87,
the Wyatt Company concluded that 40 per-
cent of 664 defined benefit plans it examined
would have been affected by the new funding
limit in 1987; that is, under pre-OBRA87 actu-
arial assumptions, these plans could have been
expected to make contributions amounting to
more than 150 percent of termination liability.
A survey they conducted in 1987 revealed that
48 percent of the plans met or exceeded the
150 percent limit and were consequently
overfunded according to the new rule; by 1992,
that percentage had dwindled to 37 percent as
firms cut back on their contributions to avoid
being overfunded.7
Firms can only ensure the viability of their
defined benefit plans if they are permitted
flexibility to spread the costs of funding plans
over time in a manner that realistically
reflects both expected plan liabilities and
the firms’ ability to make contributions. The
full-funding limit based on termination
liability denies such flexibility and places a
disproportionate burden on firms in the later
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years of workers’ careers. CED therefore rec-
ommends that the funding limit be restored
to its pre-1987 level of 100 percent of pro-
jected plan liability. Projected plan liability
in the case of flat-benefit plans should be
calculated to include anticipated increases
in the dollar benefit level over time.
REDUCTIONS IN CONTRIBUTION
AND BENEFIT LIMITS
Over the years, Congress has enacted a
series of regulations intended to raise revenue
by reducing retirement benefits for higher-
income workers, business owners, and key
employees. These changes are in conflict with
the basic pension policy objective of encour-
aging retirement saving. Moreover, it turns
out that these rules, in combination with dis-
crimination rules, have a substantial adverse
effect on retirement saving by middle- and
lower- income workers.
Dollar Limits on Contributions and Ben-
efits. Pension plan benefits and contributions
are limited in a number of ways. There are
limits on deductible contributions for both
defined benefit and defined contribution plans,
backed up by an excise tax penalty. There is a
limit on the benefit that can be received from a
defined benefit plan, and there is an excise tax
on aggregate distributions of more than
funding pensions over time. This can be
achieved by using an actuarial cost method
geared to making sufficiently high contribu-
tions in the earlier part of a worker’s career so
that contributions do not have to rise steeply in
later years.
It should be noted that in 1987, the Financial
Accounting Standards Board mandated that
firms use the projected unit credit method for
reporting pension liabilities in financial state-
ments. This is one of the less conservative of
the six allowable funding methods because it
back-loads contributions (as a percent of com-
pensation) into the later years of an employee’s
working life. Moreover, 1987 legislation that
lowered the maximum funding limit to 150
percent of termination liability effectively de-
layed the funding of many workers’ pensions.
Since the work-force will age as the baby
boomers move toward retirement, any laws
that backload the funding of pensions will
make it particularly burdensome for firms to
finance these plans.C
a. Assuming that pension benefits are independent of Social Security benefits, the individual in the example would probably
receive a total annual retirement benefit of about $33,000, or two-thirds of preretirement earnings.
b. A 1 percent change in the interest rate assumption can alter the long-run cost of benefits for a typical plan by about 25
percent. Dan M. McGill and Donald S. Grubbs, Jr., Fundamentals of Private Pensions, 6th ed. (Philadelphia: Pension Research
Council, Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania, 1989), p. 259.
c. Many firms apparently also shifted to this method for funding their plans, away from more conservative methods, thus
reducing contributions. William G. Gale, “Public Policies and Private Pension Contributions,” Journal of Money, Credit, and
Banking, forthcoming.
Allocation of costs to each year is determined
using one of six actuarial cost methods allowed by
ERISA. The allocation for any given year is called
the normal cost of the plan for that year. The
minimum-funding requirement stipulates that
the normal cost of the plan must be funded, in
addition to amortization of unfunded liabilities,
experience gains or losses (which occur when actu-
arial assumptions such as the interest rate differ
from actual plan experience), and gains or losses
arising from changes in the actuarial assumptions
themselves.
Each of the actuarial cost methods is tailored for
different preferences. Some are designed to fund
benefits at a fairly stable percentage of payroll,
some front load contributions into the earlier
phases of a worker’s tenure, and others do the
reverse.
Because plans are usually designed so that ben-
efits rise as a worker advances in age, it frequently
makes sense (particularly for mature firms on a
solid financial footing) to smooth out the cost of
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$148,500 to any individual from one or more
plans. There is also a limit on considered com-
pensation (the compensation that can be taken
into account in a benefit or contribution for-
mula).
In 1982, TEFRA reduced by one-third and
then froze until 1986 both the maximum
annual contribution to a defined contribution
plan and the maximum annual benefit that
could be paid out by a qualified defined ben-
efit plan. The Deficit Reduction Act of 1984
(DEFRA) extended this freeze on contribu-
tions and benefits until 1988.8 The Tax Reform
Act of 1986 (TRA) effectively extended the
freeze on contributions beyond 1988. It also
reduced the contribution limit by individuals
(from after-tax dollars), although most such
plans also provide for full or partial employer
matching. The employee is typically able to
choose from a range of rates of contribution,
and the employer match is normally a uni-
form percentage of each employee’s contribu-
tion.
PROFIT-SHARING PLANS
Profit-sharing plans must meet many of the same
regulatory requirements as money purchase pen-
sion plans. The principal difference is that contri-
butions are not definitely determinable and in
fact need not be tied to profits at all. IRS regula-
tions require only that contributions be “recur-
ring and substantial.” The limit on tax-deductible
contributions is 15 percent of aggregate employee
compensation. There are three principal kinds of
profit-sharing plans:
1. Conventional profit-sharing plans. All
required contributions are made by the
employer.
2. Thrift profit-sharing plans. Employees make
contributions, and these are matched by the
employer, often using a formula based on
corporate profits.
3. Cash or deferred arrangements [CODAs,
or 401(k) plans]. Employees can choose to
receive distributions in the form of cash, or as
tax-deferred contributions by the employer to
a trust. The earliest CODAs were established
out of employer contributions that were in
excess of regular compensation, but over time
the concept came to be applied to regular
compensation, whereby employees enter into
salary-reduction agreements with employers,
MONEY PURCHASE PENSION PLANS
The important distinguishing characteristic of a
money purchase pension plan is that contribu-
tions must be definitely determinable; that is, they
are made according to a predetermined for-
mula that is independent of fluctuations in the
profits of the sponsoring employer. The contri-
bution limit on behalf of each employee is the
lesser of $30,000 or 25 percent of employee
compensation. There are several different types
of money purchase plans:
1. Traditional money purchase plans. The
plan sponsor undertakes to make periodic
contributions to employee accounts accord-
ing to a formula, usually a percentage of
employee compensation. These plans are
frequently “contributory,” meaning that
contributions are made by both employer
and employee. Except for plans established
before passage of ERISA, which were able
to convert to 401(k) plans, employee contri-
butions are made from after-tax dollars and
are not tax deductible.
2. Target benefit plans. Contributions on
behalf of each employee are based on an
actuarial estimate of the contributions
required to achieve a specific target benefit
upon retirement.
3. Negotiated contribution plans. The for-
mula for contributions usually arises
from collective bargaining and covers the
employees of more than one firm. Contribu-
tions accumulate in a single fund, rather
than individual accounts.
4. Savings, or thrift, pension plans. These
always involve employee contributions
DEFINED CONTRIBUTION PLANS
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and the amount of the reduction is placed in
a tax-deferred account by the employer on the
employee’s behalf. The limit on these contri-
butions was $9,240 in 1994. About half of
401(k) plans provide for some amount of
matching contribution by employers. The
combined limit is the same as for a money
purchase pension plan ($30,000).
STOCK BONUS PLANS
1. Traditional plans. These are similar to profit-
sharing plans, except that the benefits can be
made available in the form of stock in the
employer’s company.
2. Employee stock ownership plans (ESOPs).
These are stock bonus plans that are at least 50
percent invested in the securities of the spon-
soring employer. Most ESOPs are invested
exclusively in employer securities. A leveraged
ESOP is one in which money is borrowed in
order to purchase the stock.
INDIVIDUAL RETIREMENT PLANS
The principal kinds of individual retirement
plans are individual retirement accounts, individual
retirement annuities, and simplified employee pen-
sions. The first two are funded by the worker
and are distinguishable primarily by the type of
funding instrument. The third is an employer-
financed IRA.
1. Individual retirement accounts (IRAs). A
worker can make tax-deferred contributions
to an IRA up to an annual limit of $2,000
($2,250 for a single-earner married couple).
However, if an individual is already covered
under an employer-sponsored plan and has
an adjusted gross income in excess of
$25,000 ($40,000 for a married couple), the
tax deduction is scaled down, reaching zero
at an income level $10,000 over the thresh-
old.
2. Individual retirement annuities. This is an
annuity purchased from a life insurance
company; as with the IRA, the insurer can-
not accept more than $2,000 annually in
premiums.
3. Simplified employee pensions (SEPs). An
employer establishes and finances an IRA
for each eligible employee. The contribution
limit is much higher than for an IRA: the
lesser of $30,000 or 15 percent of employee
compensation. Compared with conventional
pension plans, SEPs are easy and inexpen-
sive to establish and are therefore favored by
many employers.
TAX-DEFERRED ANNUITIES UNDER
SECTION 403(B)
Section 403(b) plans are made available for non-
profit organizations and educational institu-
tions. They are similar to 401(k) plans in that
employees and/or employers may contribute
pretax dollars to an investment pool. There
are two limits on combined employer and
employee annual contributions: (1) the lesser
of 25 percent of taxable compensation or
$30,000, or (2) a cumulative maximum exclusion
allowance limit of 20 percent of taxable com-
pensation times years of service minus prior
contributions. There is also a limit on tax-
deferred employee contributions similar to
that of 401(k) plans ($9,500 in 1994).
for one important category of defined contri-
bution plans, 401(k) plans, from $30,000 to
$7,000 (before adjustment for inflation).
Profit-sharing plans were prohibited from
applying the unused portion of their prior-year
contribution limit to exceed the contribution
limit in another year. This reduced the degree
to which they could make higher contribu-
tions in profitable years to offset lower con-
tributions in unprofitable years. TRA also
reduced early retirement benefits from defined
benefit plans actuarially in line with the nor-
mal retirement-age benefit limit established
under TEFRA.
As a result of the changes to qualified con-
tribution and benefit limits, and after subse-
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Projected Lifetime Contributions
as a Percent of Salary for 25-Year-Old
Participant
Figure 25
 Table 6
Effects of OBRA87 Full-Funding Limits on Contribution Rates
Projected
Unit Credit
Worker Contribution
Age Pay Rate 25% 35% 45% 55%
25 $25,000 4.2% 0.9% 4.2% 4.2% 4.2%
30 32,674 4.7 1.4% 4.7% 4.7% 4.7%
35 42,704 5.3 2.6% 0.0% 5.3% 5.3%
40 55,812  5.9 4.4% 0.0% 5.9% 5.9%
45 72,944 6.7 7.4% 7.4% 0.0% 6.7%
50 95,335 7.5 12.3% 12.3% 0.0% 7.5%
55 124,599 8.4 16.2% 16.2% 16.2% 0.0%
60 162,846 9.5 11.5% 11.5% 11.5% 10.2%
64 201,737 10.4 11.1% 11.1% 11.1% 10.7%
SOURCE: The Wyatt Company.
Age When Change Implemented
Contribution Rates Under
Funding Limit of 150% of Accrued Benefit
quent indexing of these amounts in the years
since, the following annual limits applied in
1994:
• Benefits from a defined benefit plan: the
lesser of $118,800 or 100 percent of average
compensation for the three consecutive
years of highest earnings. A plan that pro-
vides for benefits in excess of this amount
is disqualified.
• Contributions for a defined benefit plan
are subject to a funding limit of 150 percent
of termination liability. Excess funding is
subject to a 10 percent excise tax.
• Contributions to a defined contribution
plan: the lesser of $30,000 or 25 percent of
the individual’s compensation. Excess con-
tributions are subject to a 10 percent excise
tax.9
• Contributions by individuals to a 401(k):
$9,240.
SOURCE: The Wyatt Company.
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• Distributions from defined contribution
plans are subject to the overall limit on
benefits from one or several plans: a 15
percent excise tax on aggregate distribu-
tions received by an individual from one
or more plans in excess of $148,500.10
The data indicate that although the vast
majority (86 percent in 1987) of 401(k) plans
are primary plans (i.e., the firm’s sole or prin-
cipal pension plan), aggregate participation in
secondary 401(k) plans is substantially higher
(49 percent of participants versus 26 percent
in primary plans).11 This suggests that small
firms are much more reliant on 401(k) plans as
their principal retirement saving plan.
The regulations described above tend to
have two effects: (1) They reduce pension con-
tributions and saving. (2) Because a substan-
tial impact is felt by managers of businesses,
who generally make the decision whether or
not firms operate a pension plan, the regula-
tions frequently lead to the abandonment of
some plans and discourage the formation of
new ones, particularly for small firms. CED
believes that there are legitimate reasons to
limit the pension tax preference received by
any one individual. But the limitations just
described, together with the limits on consid-
ered compensation, are duplicative, discour-
age investment in high-yielding assets, and
are too damaging to the basic pension policy
objective of encouraging retirement saving.
Therefore, CED urges Congress to eliminate
the excise tax on distributions above the
stated limit. Limits on benefits from quali-
fied defined benefit plans, which discour-
age retirement saving and encourage invest-
ment in lower-yielding assets, should be
increased. Contributions for qualified
defined contribution plans should also be
raised to more reasonable levels (and indexed
for inflation) in order to encourage small-
business managers to provide pension plans
for all employees.
CED also believes that individual contri-
butions to 401(k) plans that are primary pen-
sion plans should be subject to the same
limit that applies to other defined contribu-
tion plans, such that the combined employee
and employer contributions do not exceed
that limit. This will give workers in smaller
firms an opportunity to expand their retire-
ment savings and will provide a greater
incentive for managers of small firms to
offer these plans to their workers.
The contributions of all workers are also
limited by discontinuities in employment and
earnings. As we discussed in Chapter 3, pen-
sion plan participation is substantially lower
among workers who are younger and have
lower earnings (see Figures 20 and 21, page
30). Many of these workers are not offered a
pension plan by their employers. Others do
not have sufficient means to begin saving for
their retirement, or they do not give saving for
retirement a high priority because they are far
from the end of their working lives. They per-
manently lose tax benefits available for pen-
sion saving during their younger years, and
compounding of pension contributions and
interest cannot occur over a long-enough
period of years to build sufficient retirement
income. CED believes that it would be more
equitable and a stimulus to saving if the
retirement-saving tax preference were based
on accumulated lifetime income. This would
enable parents, who often must leave the
labor force temporarily to care for children,
and other individuals who undercontribute
to their pension plans early in their careers
to exceed the contribution limit in later years.
In practice, this would allow individuals to
make larger tax-deferred contributions when
they are financially better equipped to do so,
usually later in their careers.12
Reductions in Considered Compensation
Limits. In addition to the dollar limit on con-
tributions, pension contributions for both
defined benefit and defined contribution plans
have been reduced by limits on considered
compensation, which is the maximum amount
of income that may be taken into account when
calculating the eligible contributions for
a defined contribution plan or the benefits
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Considered Compensation Limits May Affect Non-Highly
Compensated Employees
Figure 26
The chart shown illustrates how the $150,000
limit on considered compensation may affect
contributions of employees with less than
$150,000 of current income but whose pro-
jected earnings exceed $150,000. The solid line
represents the lifetime projected compensation
path for the same individual as in Table 6. The
dashed line represents the OBRA93 earnings
path for purposes of calculating his pension
benefit. This line is derived by taking $150,000,
the maximum allowable, and discounting back
to year 1 at 5.5 percent a year (the same interest
rate as the salary growth assumption). This
gives a compensation figure of $18,589. Thus,
instead of a benefit based on a percentage of
$25,000, this individual’s benefit is funded as a
percentage of $18,589. The vertical distance
between the two lines at every point represents
the amount of reduction in considered com-
pensation for each age. An important qualifier
is that the $150,000 is indexed for inflation,
which will allow employers to increase contri-
butions over time and leave the ultimate ben-
efit payment to the employee unaffected.
However, as with the OBRA87 full-funding
rule, delay of funding in the early years in-
creases the burden in later years and increases
the chances that employers will be unable or
unwilling to continue to fund their pension
plans.
individuals with low incomes but whose pro-
jected earnings exceed $150,000. The easiest
way to see this is by examining Figure 26,
which illustrates how the limit on considered
compensation could affect the contributions
for employee earnings of less than $20,000.
Lowering the cap on considered compensa-
tion also affects middle- and lower-income
workers participating in defined contribution
plans, such as 401(k) plans, because it increases
the likelihood of a plan failing to comply with
nondiscrimination rules peculiar to these
plans. Plan administrators must divide par-
ticipating employees into two groups: highly
compensated and all others. A plan is consid-
under a defined benefit plan. Although the
intent may have been to limit contributions
made for highly compensated individuals,
in practice these limits are expected to have
a substantial effect on contributions for
lower-income workers. The Tax Reform Act
of 1986 reduced the maximum from $235,000
to $200,000, and the Omnibus Budget Recon-
ciliation Act of 1993 (OBRA93) reduced it
further, to $150,000.13 The most obvious effect
of the rule is to reduce the pension contribu-
tions and benefits for highly compensated
employees.14 However, the lower limit on con-
sidered compensation can also severely limit
contributions to defined benefit plans for
Compensation (dollars)
200,000
150,000
100,000
50,000
0
NOTE: Assumes individual enters service at age 25 earning
$25,000 a year and expects annual salary growth of 5.5%.
Age
OBRA93
Pre-OBRA93
Effect of Considered Compensation
Limit at Each Age for Participant in
Defined Benefit Plan
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CED also believes that the nondiscrimi-
nation tests under Sections 401(k) and 401(m)
are unnecessarily complicated and reduce
pension saving among middle-income earn-
ers as well as among more highly compen-
sated employees. These tests could be elimi-
nated and replaced by a vastly more simple
and administratively inexpensive safeguard
against discrimination. For example, employ-
ers who make contributions to 401(k)
accounts could be required to contribute the
same percentage of payroll for all partici-
pants up to the maximum contribution limit.16
REGULATIONS TO PREVENT
DISCRIMINATION IN PENSION
PLANS
The limit on considered compensation and
limits on maximum benefits and contributions
directly reduce pension saving. There are also
nondiscrimination rules that are extremely
costly to administer and have more subtle
effects on pension saving. Generally, nondis-
crimination rules provide for some rebalancing
of pension benefits and contributions between
high- and low-salary individuals. These rules
are often expressed as percentages by which
the contributions and benefits of high-salary
workers cannot exceed those of low-salary
workers. Falling into this category are the dis-
crimination tests for 401(k) plans, Social Secu-
rity integration rules, coverage rules, and
top-heavy rules. These rules are extremely
complicated, often redundant, and impose
enormous costs on pension administration.
CED believes that these rules should be
streamlined and simplified in a manner that
reduces costs. Ideally, all discrimination tests
would be replaced by a vastly more simple
and less costly safeguard against discrimina-
tion. For example, all employees who meet
nondiscriminatory age and service eligibil-
ity requirements should be covered and
receive the same ratio of contributions to
wages up to the prescribed limit. (In the case
of defined benefit plans, the same benefit
ered nondiscriminatory only if elective con-
tributions for the highly paid group do not
exceed those for the lower-paid group by an
amount determined by two alternative for-
mulas.15 For high-wage workers already con-
tributing the maximum allowable to their
401(k) plans ($9,240 in 1994), reducing the con-
sidered compensation limit automatically
increases the ratio of contributions to com-
pensation and thus increases the likelihood
that plans will fail the nondiscrimination test.
Rebalancing contributions among high-wage
employees in order to correct this problem is
expected to result in reduced contributions
for middle-income employees unfortunate
enough to be just above the cut between the
highly compensated and nonhighly compen-
sated groups.
The primary purpose of the pension limi-
tations in OBRA93 was to raise federal rev-
enue. Advocates of considered compensation
limits believed that such limits would prevent
discrimination in favor of key employees. But
clearly this objective will be undermined as
some plans are abandoned, as some plan for-
mulas are amended to negate the effects of the
provision, and as lost benefits are recouped
by other forms of payment. CED urges Con-
gress to discontinue the recent practice of
reducing considered compensation as a
means of raising federal revenue. We
believe this practice is harmful because it
can affect pension saving by reducing con-
tributions for lower-income employees. It
also reduces the willingness and ability of
sponsors to create and maintain qualified
plans.
Assuming the elimination of the excise
tax on distributions and increased limits on
benefits as recommended by CED, we
believe that some limits on considered com-
pensation should be retained. However, the
considered compensation limit should be
raised to a more reasonable level, at least to
its pre-OBRA93 level (and indexed); it should
apply only to those whose incomes actually
equal or exceed that limit, not to those whose
projected incomes equal or exceed it.
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formula should be applied.) If such a radical
reform could not be adopted in its entirety,
simplification should proceed along the lines
described in this section.
TOP-HEAVY RULES
Top-heavy rules, a product of TEFRA, are a
special set of particularly stringent nondis-
crimination standards that must be met by
plans in which 60 percent or more of accumu-
lated benefits accrue to key employees (cer-
tain officers and highly paid employees). They
include minimum benefits for nonkey employ-
ees in defined benefit plans, minimum contri-
butions for employees in defined contribution
plans, a complete prohibition against Social
Security integration, and a faster vesting sched-
ule (see the Appendix). The rules are costly to
administer because they involve annual test-
ing of all plans. They also reduce pension ben-
efits for more highly compensated employ-
ees. Consequently, many top-heavy plans
(primarily smaller ones) were abandoned af-
ter passage of the regulations.
The Tax Reform Act of 1986 subsequently
strengthened nondiscrimination rules for all
pension plans by enacting more stringent cov-
erage and participation rules and requiring
more rapid vesting of benefits. In light of these
requirements, the special rules for top-heavy
plans serve little useful purpose. CED believes
that the other nondiscrimination rules ap-
plying to all pension plans are adequate and
that it is desirable therefore to completely
eliminate top-heavy rules.
SOCIAL SECURITY INTEGRATION
Because contributions and benefits under
OASDI are greater for lower-salary workers,
it has been a common practice in private pen-
sion plans to compensate for this distribu-
tional effect by weighting pension contribu-
tions and benefits toward the higher-salaried
employees. The desired outcome was that
either the combined contributions or the com-
bined benefits accruing from Social Security
and the private pension would equal approxi-
mately the same percentage of compensation
for all employees.
The Tax Reform Act of 1986 introduced
new rules that restricted the degree to which
employers could integrate plans with Social
Security. Essentially, it stipulated percentages
by which benefits and contributions with re-
spect to compensation above the Social Secu-
rity taxable wage base could not exceed those
with respect to compensation below the Social
Security taxable base (see the Appendix for
details). Because of these limits, many firms
have had to restrict contributions to highly
compensated employees.17 CED believes that
restrictions on the integration of Social
Security and private pensions are not needed
in cases where the employer contribution for
all employees equals or exceeds an appropri-
ate minimum threshold.
COVERAGE AND VESTING RULES
The Tax Reform Act of 1986 also intro-
duced highly complicated nondiscrimination
tests relating to coverage and vesting in
defined benefit and defined contribution
plans.18 These rules are in addition to the strin-
gent participation and vesting rules for indi-
vidual employees.19 Provided they are not too
complex, rules that broaden coverage and
accelerate vesting are generally desirable be-
cause they encourage the growth of pension
saving. At present, however, these rules are
excessively complex.
There are two primary effects of the cover-
age rules: (1) They make pensions complex
and costly to administer because of the nature
of the calculations involved. (2) They tend to
redistribute benefits from high- to low-salary
employees rather than simply increasing ben-
efits for the low-salaried (and therefore total
pension saving).
CED believes the current coverage rules
are not cost-effective and should be simpli-
fied into a single test. For example, the rule
could state that all employees who meet non-
discriminatory eligibility requirements must
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be covered. Moreover, employers who pro-
vide a uniform ratio of contributions to wages
for all eligible employees should be given
safe harbor from all further discrimination
tests.
CED also recommends that minimum
vesting requirements be revised for recogni-
tion of the greater mobility of today’s labor
force. For example, vesting could be conferred
on one of the following two schedules: (1) a
three-year cliff (down from five) or (2)
five-year graded (down from seven).
PRESERVING PENSION FUNDS FOR
RETIREMENT
PRERETIREMENT LUMP-SUM
WITHDRAWALS AND BORROWING
FROM PENSIONS
As we noted in Chapter 2, many observers
are greatly concerned that lump-sum
preretirement withdrawals are often not be-
ing rolled over when participants change jobs.
There is also concern about borrowing from
pension funds. It is feared that both these prac-
tices place the economic security of future
retirees in jeopardy. It is also argued that they
are an abuse of tax preferences provided to
encourage pension saving. Other observers
fear that prohibition of these practices will
discourage participation and pension saving,
especially when applied to supplementary sav-
ing plans that typically involve voluntary em-
ployee contributions. However, CED believes
that preretirement withdrawals and borrow-
ing from pensions pose an even greater threat
to pension saving and conflict with the basic
objectives of pension policy.
CED recommends that in-service pre-
retirement withdrawals and borrowing of
employer contributions to pension plans be
prohibited. Preretirement withdrawals and
borrowing of voluntary employee contribu-
tions to pension plans should not be prohib-
ited, but existing penalties should be
retained.
PORTABILITY OF PENSIONS
Previously enacted reforms involving vest-
ing in retirement plans and proposals for fur-
ther improvements in pension coverage will
help preserve pension funds for retirement.
A needed improvement in pensions relating
to preservation of funds for retirement involves
the portability of defined benefit plans and
the rollover of pension distributions when
workers change jobs. CED recommends that
regulators investigate options for improving
the portability of vested benefits from
defined benefit plans. Individuals who
change employers should be strongly encour-
aged to roll over preretirement lump-sum
distributions into alternative retirement sav-
ing instruments such as individual retire-
ment accounts (IRAs) and defined contribu-
tion plans maintained by their new
employers.
PENSION BENEFIT GUARANTY
CORPORATION
According to the PBGC’s 1993 annual
report, its liabilities for payment of benefits to
participants of terminated plans exceeded its
assets by $2.9 billion. The six-year period that
ended in 1993 saw an alarming trend:
Although the number of plan terminations
fell sharply compared with those in the pre-
ceding six years, the net claims of these plans
on the PBGC (plan liability minus the sum of
plan assets and recoveries from employers)
rose from $1.7 billion (between 1982 and 1987)
to $2.4 billion (between 1988 and 1993).
Unfortunately, there is a strong likelihood
that the $2.9 billion is just the tip of the ice-
berg. The PBGC has developed three alterna-
tive forecasts of future losses. The most opti-
mistic of these forecasts projects a deficit of
$1.9 billion (in 1993 dollars) by the end of
2003, but it assumes a continuation of the same
average annual net losses the agency has
incurred over its entire lifetime. On the other
hand, if companies in a precarious financial
state, whose plans are classified by the PBGC
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as “reasonably possible losses,” actually ter-
minate their plans, the PBGC expects a deficit
of $13.8 billion by 2003.20 In this scenario, the
possibility of a taxpayer bailout looms omi-
nously.
Although the true financial condition of
the PBGC is reflected in a comparison of its
assets and the present value of its liabilities,
the relevant comparison for federal budgeting
is between current-year income and expenses;
in this case, the PBGC now has a surplus.
Thus, the PBGC actually contributes to reduc-
ing the budget deficit, which in turn reduces
the incentive for Congress to focus on the
underlying long-term problem. However, a
change in the way that the PBGC’s activities
are accounted for in the federal budget
from an operating-income basis to a change-
in-net-liability basis would help to get the
attention of Congress because it would then
be adding to the deficit.
There are three underlying causes of the
PBGC’s dire financial straits: (1) Premium lev-
els are not set to cover future claims
adequately. (2) Premiums are structured in a
way that creates an adverse-selection prob-
lem in the insurance pool. (3) Companies that
underfund their plans have insufficient incen-
tive to increase funding, because of weak
PBGC compliance authority. Moreover, mini-
mum- funding requirements under current law
allow companies to amortize certain kinds of
unfunded liabilities, including those that arise
because of an increase in promised benefits,
over a long period of time.21
THE PREMIUM STRUCTURE
Until passage of the Retirement Protection
Act of 1994 (incorporated in the GATT-
enabling legislation; see the Appendix), plans
paid $19 a year per participant, plus $9 for
each $1,000 of unfunded vested benefits. There
was an overall cap of $72 per plan participant.
The sum of these premiums and the income
earned from investing them, plus recoveries
from employers in the event of plan termina-
tion, were supposed to fund the PBGC’s
liabilities. The 1994 legislation phases out the
cap on the variable part of the premium over
three years. This reform still does not permit
premiums to be set in a way that satisfies
insurance market principles.
In a private insurance market, premiums
would be set for each plan according to two
criteria:
1. The statistical probability of plan failure,
which in turn is dependent on the firm’s
financial condition and future prospects.
2. The amount of the insurer’s exposure in
the event of plan termination. This is rep-
resented by the unfunded actuarial liabil-
ity minus employer liability payments.22
Although phasing out the variable pre-
mium cap is a move toward risk-based premi-
ums, the current PBGC premium structure is
still deficient in two respects:
1. It does not reflect the likelihood of plan
failure. A number of the companies whose
pension plans are most underfunded are
nevertheless in sound financial condition
and expose the PBGC to relatively little
risk.
2. Although the variable part of the premium
is now more closely related to underfund-
ing, it does not distinguish between plans
on the basis of asset risk.23
Because of these shortcomings in the pre-
mium structure, some underfunded plans are,
in effect, being subsidized by healthy ones.
Consequently, the companies that sponsor
weaker plans have an incentive to stay in the
system, and those that sponsor stronger ones
have an incentive to terminate them. More-
over, there is a clear danger that raising pre-
miums to a level that would cover the PBGC
for its expected losses would further exacer-
bate the adverse selection problem by causing
strong firms to terminate their plans and with-
draw from the insurance pool.24
63
Moreover, the PBGC now has claim to 100
percent of unfunded liabilities from plan spon-
sors. Although these changes have amelio-
rated the problem of moral hazard, they have
by no means eliminated it. Bankrupt compa-
nies frequently do not have sizable assets for
the PBGC to seize; and in any case, the PBGC
claim is not necessarily given priority above
those of other creditors. The data indicate that
liability payments from employers to the PBGC
have actually dropped slightly as a percent-
age of uncovered benefit liabilities since the
new rules were passed.
CED recommends the following reforms:
• The PBGC insurance premium should be
restructured so that it more closely
resembles what would be offered in a
private market. Such a redesign should
include a stronger linkage between the
premium level and the actual risk posed
by a pension plan to the PBGC. For ex-
ample, the premium calculation could take
into account the financial strength of the
plan sponsor, the marketability of plan
assets, and the proportion of assets tied
up in the firm’s own equities.
• The PBGC should be given more power
to influence the behavior of sponsors of
underfunded plans, including the author-
ity to prevent plans operating below a
particular funded ratio from granting ben-
efit increases to employees.26
• The amortization schedules for unfunded
liabilities should be simplified by reduc-
ing the number of categories, and the
amortization periods should be shortened
to accelerate the funding of liabilities.
• The PBGC’s benefit guaranty structure
should be revised to correlate more closely
with the minimum funding requirements
attributable to specific benefits, such as
shutdown benefits.
• The status of the PBGC’s claims in bank-
ruptcy should be reviewed and enhanced
as appropriate.
MORAL HAZARD
The PBGC does not have sufficient author-
ity to enforce responsible behavior by pension
plan sponsors whose actions expose the agency
to loss. Thus, firms in a precarious financial
position have an incentive to garner additional
resources by reducing pension contributions.
They are also likely to embark on riskier
investment strategies. Moreover, such firms
have an incentive to offer pension benefits
that are insured by the PBGC and whose fund-
ing is deferrable in lieu of wage compensa-
tion. Workers accept such arrangements
because the PBGC protects them from loss. It
is for these reasons that unfunded plan liabili-
ties tend to rise sharply in the period just prior
to plan termination (usually when the firm is
bankrupt), thus increasing the PBGC’s expo-
sure. In the words of the PBGC’s own annual
report:
The insurance program’s weakness cre-
ates incentives for financially distressed
companies to take actions that further in-
crease the program’s exposure to loss. Such
actions include:
• using pension increases as a form of com-
pensation, the costs of which can be
deferred. Workers are more willing to
agree to these promises because they are
backed by federal pension insurance. . . .
• forgoing required pension contri-
butions while in bankruptcy with judges’
approval. . . .
• allowing a pension plan to run out of
money without violating the minimum
funding standards. . . .
Lenders rarely put pressure on troubled
companies to fund their plans, believing in
the optimistic funding assumptions and
expecting the PBGC’s pension claims will have
no priority. On the contrary, creditors are more
likely to pressure distressed companies to ter-
minate plans rather than fund them.25
It is no longer possible, as it was prior to
1986, to terminate an underfunded pension
plan and pass the liability on to the PBGC
without demonstrating financial distress.
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One-Time Administrative Costs per Worker in Defined Benefit Plans, by Plan Size,
1983 to 1990 (in 1990 dollars)
Figure 27
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RISING REGULATORY COSTS
DISCOURAGE PENSION SAVING
The number of defined benefit plans
peaked at just over 175,000 in 1983 and subse-
quently declined by 24 percent in the 1984–
1989  period. Of the net 43,000 defined benefit
plans lost during that period, about 90 per-
cent were plans servicing fewer than 100 work-
ers. The Employee Benefit Research Institute
reports that 60 percent of the net terminations
between 1985 and 1989 had fewer than 10
participants.27 There is no doubt that rising
administrative costs, which are particularly
burdensome for small employers, contributed
significantly to the decimation of defined bene-
fit plans in the 1980s.
A study by Hay/Huggins Company for
the PBGC28 analyzed the impact of eleven
major regulatory changes, enacted between
1982 and 1989, on the cost of administering
defined benefit and defined contribution plans
of varying sizes. It found that real administra-
tive costs for both the smallest and the largest
defined benefit plans (covering 15 and 10,000
persons, respectively) increased at an average
annual rate of more than 10 percent between
1982 and 1991, with costs for intermediate plan
sizes increasing at a slightly lower rate. Small
plans were particularly burdened by one-time
expenditures arising from frequent changes
in regulations (Figure 27). For the smallest
plans, administrative costs per covered employee
increased from $162 to $455 (in 1990 dollars),
compared with an increase from $19 to $54 for
large plans.29 Equally telling is that by 1991,
small-plan administrative costs were equal to
about one-third of the benefits accrued in that
year. In other words, for every $3 of retire-
ment benefits accruing to participants, an
extra $1 was being spent on administrative
costs. For a large plan with 10,000 employees,
administrative costs were estimated at just 4
percent of benefits.
According to the Hay/Huggins study,
defined contribution plans fared slightly bet-
ter under the constantly changing regulatory
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regime; the increase in real administrative
costs for these plans between 1982 and 1989
was in the 6 to 7 percent range, depending on
plan size. More important, ongoing costs for
the most severely affected defined contribu-
tion plans were still only half as large as those
for small defined benefit plans. The results of
direct interviews with fifty pension service
providers, conducted for the Small Business
Administration in 1989, indicated similar
trends. Annual administrative costs for a small
defined benefit plan were 50 percent higher
than for a defined contribution plan of the
same size and 270 percent higher on a
per-participant basis than for a larger defined
benefit plan.30
SOURCES OF COST INCREASES
According to the Hay/Huggins study, con-
sulting fees for actuarial and legal services
made up the bulk of the cost increases for
small plans, whereas consulting fees and
PBGC premiums were of equal importance in
large plans. The consulting fees were paid to
actuaries and lawyers who were needed
repeatedly by plan sponsors to explain regu-
latory changes, redraw plan documents, test
plans for discrimination, and calculate maxi-
mum and minimum contribution levels. These
activities were accompanied by increases in
in-house administrative costs for such pur-
poses as collecting and preparing data and
communicating plan changes to participants.
The most costly legislative changes were iden-
tified as: Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility
Act of 1982 (TEFRA), Retirement Equity Act
of 1984 (REA), Tax Reform Act of 1986 (TRA),
Single Employer Pension Plan Amendments
Act of 1986 (SEPPAA), and Omnibus Budget
Reconciliation Act of 1987 (OBRA87). (See the
Appendix for details.)
Although each regulatory change can be
examined in isolation for the costs it imposed
on pension plans, it is important to recognize
that the sheer regularity of the changes has
made it difficult (if not impossible) for smaller
firms to stay in compliance with the law and
to have any assurance of future stability. It is
also important to note that there have been a
number of regulatory changes since 1989 (the
last year studied), which continue to impose a
heavy administrative cost burden on pension
plans.31
IMPACT OF COST INCREASES
ON PLAN TERMINATIONS AND
FORMATIONS
The costs of maintaining defined benefit
plans have become too high for many em-
ployers, a fact that has contributed to their
decision to terminate plans. In a survey con-
ducted in 1992, 50 percent of the respondents
stated that they terminated their defined ben-
efit plans because federal regulations were
“too costly or burdensome.”32 The data indi-
cate that a large number of employers who
terminated defined benefit plans did not
replace them with successor pension plans of
any kind, and most of those who did so opted
for defined contribution plans.33
These trends indicate that it is critical that
policy makers simplify and stabilize regula-
tions pertaining to defined contribution
plans in order to reduce compliance costs.
The retirement security of the 40 million par-
ticipants of defined benefit plans may depend
to a significant degree on policy makers’
actions that influence plan administrative
costs.34
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Legislation governing private pension
plans was only sporadic until passage of the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act
(ERISA) in 1974. Since then, however, pension
law has been subject to incessant revision by
Congress.
What follows is only a thumbnail sketch of
the evolution of private pension regulation.
However, it is sufficient to demonstrate how
obsessively Congress has tinkered with the
law and how complicated that law has
become.
Before ERISA
1. Revenue Act of 1921. Deferred tax (until ben-
efit disbursement) on contributions to, and
income from, stock bonus or profit-sharing
plans established for employees. The Rev-
enue Act of 1926 extended the concession to
other pension plans.
2. Revenue Act of 1938. Denied tax-exempt sta-
tus to any pension plan that revoked pen-
sion promises to its participants. This leg-
islation responded to the problem of plans
being terminated so that the funds could
be used for purposes other than meeting
pension obligations.
3. Revenue Act of 1942. Responded to concerns
about discrimination against rank-and-file
employees by establishing participation
tests.
4. Welfare and Pension Plans Disclosure Act of
1958. Required pension plan documents
and annual reports to be submitted to the
Secretary of Labor and to plan participants.
The objective was to make fraud and other
maladministration of plans more easily
detectable.
5. Self-Employed Individual Retirement Act of
1962 (Keogh Act). Expanded tax-favored
retirement plans to include unincorporated
small business and the self-employed.
Employee Retirement Income Security Act
of 1974 (ERISA)
1. Concerns addressed by legislation:
a. Plans were exclusionary, with limits on
participation and vesting of benefits.
b. Some plans were inadequately funded
to meet their obligations.
c. There were insufficient incentives for
some employers to offer pension plans.
d. Some plans were not administered
according to acceptable fiduciary standards.
e. Pension benefits for key employees were
sometimes viewed as excessive in relation
to perceived retirement needs.
f. Pensions were not always protected dur-
ing takeovers or other kinds of company
restructuring.
2. Major provisions:
a. Required more information to be provided
by employers to plan participants: an eas-
ily intelligible plan description, subsequent
plan modifications, an annual financial
report, and a statement of the participant’s
accrued benefits upon request. This
strengthened the provisions of the 1958 dis-
closure act, which was formally repealed.
APPENDIX
A Brief History of Government Regulation
of Private Pensions
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j. Established the Pension Benefit Guaranty
Corporation. Purchase of insurance was
made mandatory for most plans receiving
tax concessions. The PBGC guaranteed pay-
ment of vested benefits to a certain level.
The premium was set at $1 per plan par-
ticipant.
Revenue Act of 1978
1. Contained incentives to encourage smaller
firms to set up pension plans for their
employees.
2. Major provisions:
a. Established cash or deferred arrangements
(CODAs) by adding Section 401(k) to the
Internal Revenue Code.6
b. Established simplified employee pensions
(SEPs), in which the employer sets up and
finances IRAs for eligible employees. How-
ever, the maximum contribution limit,
$7,500, was higher than for IRAs.7
c. Created tax-credit ESOPs, or TRASOPs, a
form of employee stock ownership plan
whereby an employer could receive a tax
credit equal to contributions.
Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendments
Act of 1980 (MEPPAA)
1. This legislation was designed to address
underfunding of multiemployer pension
plans.
2. Major provisions:
a. Reduced the incentive for individual
employers to withdraw from multi-
employer plans by obliging them to con-
tinue funding the liability of workers they
had hired in the past.
b. Increased PBGC premiums for multi-
employer plans.
c. Required faster funding of unfunded
liabilities.
b. Strengthened participation rules. Required
that employees 25-years-old and over with
one year of service could not be excluded
from a plan.1
c. Established vesting rules. Employers
could choose one of three alternative for-
mulas:
i. Full vesting after ten years with no
vesting until then.
ii. Graded vesting, achieving 100 per-
cent after fifteen years of service.2
iii. The “rule of 45”: at least 50 percent
vesting when the employee’s age and
years of service add to 45, increasing by
10 percent each succeeding year until
full vesting is attained.3
d. Required that a joint and survivor annuity
be provided to an employee retiring at the
normal age unless the employee specifi-
cally waived that right.
e. Set minimum funding rules, by requiring
that the normal cost of a pension plan be
funded currently.4 Past service costs were
to be amortized over thirty or forty years.
f. Set fiduciary standards. Plan assets had to
be invested prudently and for the sole ben-
efit of plan participants. Relevant financial
and participation data must be provided
periodically to the government.
g. Allowed a person not covered by a pen-
sion plan to establish an individual retire-
ment account. IRA contributions up to the
lesser of $1,500 or 15 percent of earned
income would be tax deductible.
h. Limited contributions to profit-sharing and
money purchase plans5 to the lesser of 25
percent of annual compensation or $25,000.
i. Limited annual pension benefits that could
be paid to highly compensated employees
to the lesser of $75,000 or 100 percent of
average compensation for the three years
of highest career earnings.
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Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 (ERTA)
1. Contained further incentives to increase
pension saving:
a. Replaced TRASOPs with payroll-based
ESOPs (PAYSOPS), whereby an employer
received a tax credit equal to a percentage
of payroll.
b. Commercial lenders facilitating leveraged
ESOPs8 were allowed to deduct a portion
of their interest income on these loans. This
effectively lowered the cost of setting up
an ESOP.
c. Permitted IRAs for all workers, and raised
the contribution limit from $1,500 to $2,000.
d. Increased limit on contributions to SEPs
from $7,500 to $15,000 per participant.
Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act
of 1982 (TEFRA)
1. This legislation signaled a shift in pension
policy away from concerns about pension
security and the adequacy of retirement
income toward measures to reduce tax rev-
enue loss.
2. Major provisions:
a. Reduced contribution limits for defined con-
tribution plans to the lesser of 25 percent of
compensation or $30,000.9
b. Reduced maximum annual pensions from
defined benefit plans from $136,425, to the
lesser of 100 percent of average cash com-
pensation in the three years of highest earn-
ings or $90,000.
c. For defined contribution plans integrated
with Social Security, contributions based on
that part of income above the Social Secu-
rity taxable wage base (the so-called inte-
gration level or breakpoint) could not exceed
contributions in respect of income below
(the base contribution percentage) by more
than 5.4 percent.10
d. Introduced top-heavy rules. A top-heavy
plan was defined as one in which 60 per-
cent of accumulated benefits had accrued
to key employees (officers and highly com-
pensated employees). Top-heavy plans had
to comply with special standards for vest-
ing, contributions and benefits, and Social
Security integration.11
Deficit Reduction Act of 1984 (DEFRA)
1. Major provision:
a. Delayed indexing of contribution and ben-
efit limits until 1988.
Retirement Equity Act of 1984 (REA)
1. Major provisions:
a. Strengthened participation rules by low-
ering the minimum age a firm can require
for enrollment in a plan from 25 to 21; the
law also lowered the minimum age for vest-
ing service from 22 to 18.
b. An employee could now have a break in
service of up to five consecutive years or
the period of eligibility or vesting service
accumulated prior to the break without los-
ing that eligibility or vesting service. Ma-
ternity and paternity leaves were to be
treated as though the employee was still at
work through the period of absence.
c.  Greater survivor protection:
i. Preretirement death benefit was
extended to all vested employees.
ii. Written spousal consent was required
to exclude death benefits in order to
obtain a more generous pension.
iii. On some domestic relations orders,
private pensions could be divided upon
divorce.
Single Employer Pension Plan Amendments
Act of 1986 (SEPPAA)
1. Congress enacted SEPPAA largely because
of the moral hazard implicit in the pension
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insurance system, whereby under existing
law, it was possible for a firm to terminate
a pension plan and shift the unfunded
liabilities onto the PBGC.
2. Major provisions:
a. Raised PBGC premium.
b. Limited the circumstances under which
a voluntary plan termination could occur:
i. Standard termination: A voluntary ter-
mination in which liabilities were cov-
ered by assets.
ii. Distressed termination: Permitted at
the discretion of the PBGC. Required
the plan administrator to show that the
firm was financially unable to continue
the plan.12
Tax Reform Act of 1986 (TRA)
1. Major provisions:
a. The minimum vesting requirement was
now defined by the following two options:
i. Five-year cliff.
ii. Graded, under which participants are
20 percent vested after three years, with
an additional 20 percent each subsequent
year until full vesting is attained after
seven years.
b. Where plan vesting was 100 percent upon
enrollment, an employer could now require
only two years of service before enrolling
an employee.
c. Instituted a 10 percent tax penalty on
distributions made prior to age 59 1/2.
d. Established a 10 percent excise tax on
excess pension assets that reverted to the
employer upon termination of a pension
plan.
e.  For participants in employer-sponsored
pension plans whose adjusted gross income
was greater than $25,000 ($40,000 for a mar-
ried couple filing jointly), pretax IRA con-
tributions were phased out.
f. Limited the amount of compensation that
could be considered in contribution or ben-
efit calculations to $200,000, the same as
for top-heavy plans.
g. Temporarily capped contributions to de-
fined contribution plans at $30,000.
h. Reduced the limit on employee contri-
butions to 401(k) plans from $30,000 to
$7,000.
i. Changed rules for integration of plans
with Social Security:
i. For a defined contribution plan, con-
tributions in respect of compensation
above the integration level could not ex-
ceed the base contribution percentage
by more than the lesser of the base con-
tribution percentage or 5.7 percent.
ii. For a defined benefit excess plan,13 the
excess benefit percentage could not ex-
ceed the base percentage by more than
the lesser of the base benefit percentage
or 0.75 percent.14
iii. For a defined benefit offset plan,15 the
maximum offset could not exceed the
lesser of 50 percent of the benefit ac-
crued without regard to the offset or
0.75 percent of final-average compensa-
tion multiplied by years of service.
j. New coverage rules were introduced.
One of three tests now had to be satisfied:
i. Percentage test: The plan must cover
at least 70 percent of all non–highly
compensated employees.16
ii. Ratio test: The percentage of non–
highly compensated employees covered
under a plan must be at least 70 percent
of the percentage of highly compensated
employees covered.
iii. Average benefits percentage test:
Both of the following must be satisfied
to pass this test:
(a) The plan must cover a non–
discriminatory classification of em-
ployees.17
70
(b) The ratio of employer-provided
benefits or contributions to the
participant’s compensation for non–
highly compensated employees must
be at least 70 percent that of highly
compensated employees.
k. A new nondiscrimination rule was intro-
duced for 401(k) plans. The average ratio
of contributions to compensation of the
highly compensated group cannot exceed:
i. 125 percent of the ratio of the
rank-and-file group if the ratio for the
latter group is 8 percent or more.
ii. 200 percent of the ratio of the
rank-and-file group if the ratio for the
latter is 2 percent or less.
iii. 2 percent in all other cases.
l. Profit-sharing plans could no longer ap-
ply the unused portion of their prior-year
contribution limit (15 percent of the cash
compensation of plan participants) to ex-
ceed their contribution limit in another year.
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1986
1. Major provisions:
a. Benefit accruals could no longer be fro-
zen beyond normal retirement age.
b. Employees hired after age 60 could no
longer be excluded from participation.
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1987
(OBRA87)
1. Major provisions:
a. Increased the PBGC premium from $8.50
to $16 per participant, plus an additional
premium of $6 per $1,000 of unfunded
liability (although the premium was capped
at $50 per participant).
b. Introduced quarterly contribution require-
ments.
c. The period for amortizing experience gains
and losses was reduced from fifteen to five
years.
d. Introduced a new minimum contribution
standard for underfunded defined benefit
plans with more than 100 participants. The
minimum contribution may henceforth
include a “deficit reduction contribution”
that would effectively speed up the fund-
ing of underfunded plans.18
e. The full-funding limitation for defined ben-
efit plans was capped at 150 percent of
termination liabilities. As a consequence of
rising asset values, many firms were
unable to make further deductible contri-
butions.
Technical and Miscellaneous Revenue Act
of 1988 (TAMRA)
1. Major provision:
a. Increased the excise tax on employer
reversion of assets from 10 percent to 15
percent.
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989
(OBRA89)
1. Major provision:
a. Defined benefit plan valuations would
now be required annually instead of trien-
nially.
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990
(OBRA90)
1. Major provision:
a. Enabled employers to transfer excess pen-
sion assets tax-free to an account for the
current health benefit expenses of retirees.
Otherwise, the excise tax on asset rever-
sions increased to 20 percent or 50 percent
unless the employer transferred a portion
of the assets to a replacement plan or
increased benefits under the terminating
plan.
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Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993
(OBRA93)
1. Major provision:
a. Reduced considered compensation from
$235,840 to $150,000.
Retirement Protection Act of 1994 (RPA,
incorporated in Uruguay Round Agreements
Act)
1. The Retirement Protection Act accelerated
funding of the liabilities of underfunded
pension plans and contained other mea-
sures that strengthened the position of the
PBGC. The net effect of RPA on govern-
ment revenues is positive; consequently,
it was incorporated as part of the financing
package for the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade (GATT).
2. Major provisions:
a. Delayed indexation of dollar limits on
contributions and benefits by stipulating that
inflation adjustments be implemented in
round dollar amounts, rather than annu-
ally in step with the precise rate of infla-
tion. Indexation will now occur in the fol-
lowing increments:
i. Benefit limit for a defined benefit plan:
$5,000.
ii. Contribution limit for a defined con-
tribution plan: $5,000.
iii. Limit on elective deferrals under a
401(k) plan: $500.
b.  Strengthened minimum funding standards
for underfunded defined benefit plans:
i. Increased the required contribution for
unfunded new liability.
ii. Provided for accelerated funding of
unpredictable contingent event benefits.19
iii. Lowered the maximum interest rate
that could be used for calculating plan
liability to 105 percent of the weighted
average of thirty-year Treasury securi-
ties, for the four most recent years prior
to the plan year.20
iv. Mandated use of the 1983 Group An-
nuity Mortality Table for determination
of current plan liability.21
c. Prohibited certain underfunded plans
from changing actuarial assumptions for
determining current liability without first
gaining approval of the Secretary of the
Treasury.
d. Prohibited an employer in bankruptcy
from amending an underfunded plan to
increase benefits unless the increase
became effective after the planned date of
the firm’s reorganization.
e. Authorized the PBGC to obtain certain
information from sponsors of underfunded
plans that would assist the PBGC in deter-
mining plan assets and liabilities.
f. Gave the PBGC authority to sue plan
sponsors to enforce minimum-funding
requirements where the amount of the
deficient contributions exceeds $1 million.
g. Phased out, over three years, the cap on
the variable part of the PBGC premium.
h. Required employers who pay the vari-
able premium to notify plan participants
of the plan’s funded status and the extent
of the PBGC’s guaranty in the event of
plan termination.
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NOTES
CHAPTER 1
1. The baby-boom generation refers to the bulge in the age
distribution caused by a rise in birthrates between 1946
and 1964 and the decline thereafter. The earliest baby
boomers will reach 65 in 2011, but they will affect the
retirement-age population much earlier because many
workers retire before the age of 65.
2. B. Douglas Bernheim, “Is the Baby Boom Generation
Preparing Adequately for Retirement?” Technical Re-
port, mimeographed, 1992, and a “Summary Report”
with the same title published by Merrill Lynch, 1993.
3. The ratio is expected to remain at that level or one
slightly lower through to 2070.
4. Information supplied by the Office of Management
and Budget.
5. Hospital insurance includes only Part A of Medicare.
Under current policies, the HI program is expected to
realize a $7 billion cash-flow deficit in calendar 1994,
increasing to $1.2 trillion in 2030. See U.S. Department of
Health and Human Services, Social Security Administra-
tion, Annual Report of the Board of Trustees of the Federal
Old-Age and Survivors Insurance and Disability Insurance
Trust Funds, 1994 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government
Printing Office, 1994), and the U.S. Department of Health
and Human Services, Health Care Financing Adminis-
tration, Annual Report of the Board of Trustees of the Federal
Hospital Insurance Trust Fund, 1994 (Washington, D.C.:
U.S. Government Printing Office, 1994).
6. Although the Social Security projection includes the in-
crease in the normal retirement age enacted earlier, cur-
rently legislated benefits are assumed to be unchanged.
7. Currently, about three-quarters of SMI funding comes
from general tax revenues and one-quarter from enroll-
ees. SMI is expected to grow to be as large as HI. C.
Eugene Steuerle and Jon M. Bakija, Retooling Social Secu-
rity for the 21st Century: Right and Wrong Approaches to
Reform (Washington, D.C.: The Urban Institute Press,
1994), pp. 54-55.
8. The full commission did not accept the Kerrey-Danforth
proposals, of which the four most important in relation to
Social Security were: (1) further increasing the Social
Security retirement age, (2) reducing growth of initial
benefits relative to earnings, (3) reducing benefits for
upper-income workers, and (4) replacing part of the
Social Security program with a mandatory saving pro-
gram. The leadership of the 104th Congress has also
indicated that no changes will be made to Social Security
for the time being.
9. Defined benefit plans promise a specific benefit; de-
fined contribution plans promise a specific contribution
to a fund. The benefits provided by defined benefit plans
are normally determined by a formula relating to com-
pensation and length of service. Benefits from a defined
contribution plan depend on the annuity value of the total
accumulation.
10. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation, news release,
December 5, 1994.
11. The PBGC insures individual benefits promised by
66,000 private defined benefit plans up to $30,886 (ad-
justed annually for inflation). Although it charges plan
sponsors a premium for the insurance, the premiums do
not cover expected liability, which has risen rapidly.
Reforms enacted as part of GATT-enabling legislation
should help correct this situation over time. (See Chapter
5, page 48.) However, if underfunding of pension plans
continues to grow rapidly as some anticipate, an eventual
bailout by taxpayers cannot be ruled out.
12. Office of Management and Budget.
13. Merrill Lynch, Retirement Savings in America (Princeton,
N.J.: Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 1993).
14. Prior to OBRA93, the considered compensation limit
was $235,840.
CHAPTER 2
1. The aging of the population is, in fact, a worldwide
phenomenon; and old-age security systems, including
both community- or family-based systems and formal
retirement programs, appear to be breaking down in
many countries. International Bank for Reconstruction
and Development, Averting the Old Age Crisis: Policies to
Protect the Old and Promote Growth (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1994).
2. Employee Benefit Research Institute, Baby Boomers in
Retirement: What Are Their Prospects?, Special Report and
Issue Brief, no. 151 (Washington, D.C.: EBRI, July 1994),
Table 12, page 19.
3. About 2.6 million federal workers and 11.3 million state
and local government workers participate in these plans.
EBRI, Baby Boomers in Retirement: What Are Their Pros-
pects?, Table 12, page 19.
4. Although foreign capital inflows may provide consid-
erable support for investment, they cannot be counted on
to make up for the decline in domestic saving. Economic
studies find that saving and investment rates are highly
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11. These policy changes are described in Chapter 5.
Other factors that may have contributed to the decline in
business contributions include the rising costs of health
care programs, the growing importance of small firms
that often have no (or less generous) pension plans, and
the rising value of assets in pension portfolios.
12. This increase in the normal retirement age, enacted in
the early 1980s, was intended to compensate for the rise
in life expectancy from that time until 2025 but not the
growth in life spans before or after. C. Eugene Steuerle
and Jon M. Bakija, Retooling Social Security for the 21st
Century: Right and Wrong Approaches to Reform (Washing-
ton, D.C.: The Urban Institute Press, 1994), pp. 195-198.
13. The current Social Security offset rules are as follows:
(1) for those under 65, benefits are reduced $1 for every $2
of annual earnings in excess of $8,040; (2) for those 65 to
69 years old, benefits are reduced $1 for every $3 of
earnings in excess of $11,160; (3) for those over 69, no
benefit reduction.
14. OBRA93 increased the percentage of Social Security
benefits subject to tax for higher-income taxpayers. Social
Security benefits for individuals with incomes below
$25,000 ($32,000 for joint returns) are not taxable. For
individuals with combined incomes between $25,000
and $34,000 ($33,000 and $44,000 for those filing jointly),
50 percent of benefits are taxed. The act made 85 percent
of benefits subject to tax for those with higher incomes.
15. Merrill Lynch, Retirement Savings in America.
16. A recent survey of 1,000 adult Americans sponsored
by Merrill Lynch found that 82 percent were unable to
pass a basic financial literacy test; 55 percent were not
able to correctly answer which of stocks, bonds, savings
accounts, and CDs had generated the highest historical
returns; 29 percent could not make a simple compound
interest calculation; and 87 percent could not accurately
estimate the maximum annual Social Security benefit.
Using Merrill Lynch data,  Professor B. Douglas Bernheim
found a causal connection between substandard finan-
cial literacy and inadequate saving. See B. Douglas
Bernheim, “The Determinants and Consequences of
Financial Literacy,” (manuscript, October 1994).
CHAPTER 3
1. These projections included 5.0 million recipients of
disability in 1993; this number is expected to rise to 10.5
million by 2030. The projections assume that the fertility
rate will decline from 2.07 in 1990 to 1.9 in 2020 and hold
steady thereafter. (The fertility rate is the average number
of children that would be born to a woman in her lifetime
if she were to experience the birthrate prevailing in a
particular year.) Life expectancy at birth is assumed to
rise from about 75 years in 1990 to about 79 years in 2030.
For details, see U.S. Department of Health and Human
Services, Social Security Administration, Annual Report
correlated both across countries (which suggests that
barriers to international capital flows are still important)
and over time within individual countries. Martin S.
Feldstein and Charles Horioka. “Domestic Saving and
International Capital Flows” Economic Journal (June 1990).
It has been estimated that it would take a national saving
rate of 5 to 5.5 percent simply to maintain productivity
growth at about 1 percent annually. See Charles L.
Schultze, “Of Wolves, Termites, and Pussycats, or Why
We Should Worry about the Deficit,” The Brookings
Review (Summer 1989): 33.
5. On a current-account basis, the U.S. net foreign invest-
ment position fell from a surplus of $234 billion in 1984
to a deficit of $591 billion in 1992, the latest year for which
data are available. Economic Report of the President (Wash-
ington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, February
1994), p. 385.
6. Some have speculated that the saving rate will rise
sharply as the baby boomers age. But the decline in the
personal saving rate does not appear to have occurred
because of demographic change; therefore, the aging of
the baby boomers may not increase the overall saving
rate significantly. Martin Neil Baily, Gary Burtless, and
Robert E. Litan, Growth with Equity: Economic Policymaking
for the Next Century (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings
Institution, 1994), p. 147.
7. See Restoring Prosperity: Budget Choices for Economic
Growth, p. 6.
8. Congressional Budget Office, An Economic and Budget
Outlook Update (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government
Printing Office, August 1994), p. 8. The standardized
employment budget measure, which adjusts for the
business cycle, suggests that nearly half of the deficit
decline reflects a change in fiscal policy.
9. CBO, An Economic and Budget Outlook Update, p. 29.
10. A recent survey conducted by Merrill Lynch indi-
cated that among those who are not self-employed, only
46 percent of those in the 45- to 64-year age bracket
reported that they were saving specifically for retire-
ment; among the baby-boom generation, only 25 percent
indicated that they were currently saving for retirement.
See Merrill Lynch, Retirement Savings in America
(Princeton, N.J.: Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith,
Inc., 1993). Based on a telephone survey of workers who
are not self-employed, p. 3. Surveys conducted in 1993
and 1994 by the Gallup Organization for the Employee
Benefit Research Institute found that two-thirds of re-
spondents who had not retired had begun to save for
their retirement, although the amounts actually being
saved appear to be quite inadequate. See Employee
Benefit Research Institute, Public Attitudes on Retirement
Income, 1994, Report no. G-55 (Washington, D.C.: EBRI,
1994); and EBRI, Public Attitudes on Retirement Age and
Planning, 1993, Report no. G-46 (Washington, D.C.:
EBRI, 1993).
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GATT-enabling legislation. The maximum interest rate
that could be used to calculate pension liabilities was
lowered to 105 percent of the preceding four-year
weighted Treasury bond rate (from 110 percent). This
will cause some pension plans that were previously fully
funded to become underfunded and to have to increase
contributions.
11. The term pension coverage refers to the percentage of
workers eligible to participate in an employer- or
union-sponsored pension plan. Some eligible workers
choose not to participate. Although the absolute num-
bers of covered and participating workers differ, cover-
age and participation rates exhibit similar trends over
time.
12. Employee Benefit Research Institute, Pension Cover-
age and Participation Growth: A New Look at Primary
and Supplemental Plans, Issue Brief no. 144 (Washington,
D.C.: EBRI, December 1993), p. 4. Available data from
one source, the 1988 Current Population Survey, indicated
that coverage declined slightly between 1979 and 1988,
an event that raised some concern. Data for more recent
periods suggest that coverage has since increased or at
least leveled off. Moreover, IRS data on participation
rates did not show the decline.
13. The obligation assumed by an employer in establish-
ing a pension plan often takes one of two forms: (1) a
defined benefit plan, whereby the employer provides
specified benefits that are established in advance by
formula (usually affected by wage and years of service)
and financed by variable employer contributions to a
pension fund, and (2) a defined contribution plan, whereby
the annual employer contributions are specified (usually
a percent of the wage) but the benefits are variable,
depending on the performance of the fund. For further
description, see Dan M. McGill and Donald S. Grubbs,
Jr., Fundamentals of Private Pensions, 6th ed. (Philadelphia:
Pension Research Council, Wharton School, University
of Pennsylvania, 1989), p. 105.
14. David Kennell et al., Retirement Coverage in Small and
Large Firms, Final Report, (Paper prepared for the Office
of Advocacy, U.S. Small Business Administration,
Washington, D.C.: June 1992), p. ES.8.
15. Based on tax status determination requests to the IRS
from companies instituting new plans, it appears not
only that the total number of new plans has declined but
also that most of the new plans introduced have been of
the defined contribution type. In 1982 alone, for example,
85,000 plan sponsors applied for favorable determina-
tion status, of whom 28,000 sponsored defined benefit
plans; but in 1990, 1991, and 1992 combined, only 40,000
sponsors applied, of whom just 3,000 were of the defined
benefit type. However, this measure of recent trends is
not ideal because application for favorable determina-
tion status is not compulsory.
16. Those who favor defined benefit plans argue that
of the Board of Trustees, Federal Old-Age and Survivors
Insurance and Disability Insurance Trust Funds, 1994 (Wash-
ington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1994),
p. 59.
2. See Social Security Administration, Annual Report of the
Board of Trustees of the Federal OASDI Trust Funds, 1994,
p. 119.
3. In addition to economic and demographic factors, the
magnitude of the necessary payroll tax increase would
depend on such factors as when that tax increase would
be implemented and the size and rate of the drawdown
of the surplus. The Social Security Administration calcu-
lated that the OASDI rate would have to be raised by
2.13 percentage points beginning in 1994 in order to bring
the program into actuarial balance over the seventy-
five-year projection period (ending in 2068). (The pessi-
mistic projection suggests a much larger tax increase.)
However, it is unlikely that rates will be increased for this
purpose until much later, perhaps until the surplus be-
gins to run down. Thus, the realized increase is likely to
be substantially higher than 2.13 percentage points.
Social Security Administration, Annual Report of the Board
of Trustees of the Federal OASDI Trust Funds, 1994, p. 22.
4. It is sometimes argued that the ratio of covered work-
ers to beneficiaries overstates the burden on workers.
Robert Ball and Henry Aaron, “Social Security: It Is
Affordable,” Washington Post, February 15, 1994, p. A17.
5. Two recent estimates place the cost of supporting the
elderly at 2.5 times and 1.76 times the cost of supporting
a child dependent. See Dennis A. Ahlburg and James W.
Vaupel, “Immigration and the Dependency Burden”
(manuscript, 1993), p. 6.
6. For example, the median age of immigrants to the
United States is currently 28 years, but a 28-year-old
arriving in 1990 will be 88 by 2050 and probably retired.
Therefore, in order to maintain the worker-retiree ratio at
its 1990 level in the year 2050, additional immigrants of
working age would be needed to fill the retiree’s place.
7. Thomas Espenshade, “Can Immigration Slow U.S.
Population Aging?” Journal of Policy Analysis and Man–
agement (1994); Ahlburg and Vaupel, “Immigration and
the Dependency Burden.”
8. In 1988, the median government employee pension
was $8,049, but many federal retirees and some state and
local retirees were not eligible for Social Security ben-
efits. Joseph S. Piacentini and Jill D. Foley, EBRI Databook
on Employee Benefits, 2d ed. (Washington, D.C.: Employee
Benefit Research Institute, 1992), p. 103.
9. Increased saving out of current income increases in-
vestment resources, whereas a rise in the market value of
existing assets does not.
10. Indeed, a similar situation was engineered by one of
the pension reform measures contained in the 1994
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retirement income will be higher because fewer lump-sum
distributions are made from defined benefit plans and
because the professional investors who manage the plans
are likely to get a higher return on investment. On the
other hand, the defined contribution plans are generally
fully portable, a feature that may improve retirement
benefits for those who have several jobs during their
working years. See Richard V. Burkhauser and Dallas L.
Salisbury, eds., Pensions in a Changing Economy, (Wash-
ington, D.C., and Syracuse, N.Y.: Employee Benefit Re-
search Institute and National Academy on Aging, 1993);
and Andrew Samwick and Jonathan Skinner,
“How Will Defined Contribution Pension Plans Affect
Retirement Incomes?” (Paper prepared for conference on
“Public Policy Toward Pensions,”sponsored by the Asso-
ciation of Private Pension and Welfare Plans and the
Center for Economic Policy Research, Stanford Univer-
sity, Stanford, Calif.: October 7-8, 1993).
17. Available data on lump-sum distributions are dis-
cussed in Burkhauser and Salisbury, Pensions in a Chang-
ing Economy, pp. 27 and 43-45.
18. Employee Benefit Research Institute, “Retirement
Program Lump-Sum Distributions: Hundreds of Billions
in Hidden Pension Income” Issue Brief no. 146
(Washington, D.C.: EBRI, February 1994), p. 8.
19. Private pension funds will be drawn down as the
baby-boom generation retires. Indeed, one projection
indicates that the pension system will cease being a net
source of savings by 2024. Given the magnitude of the
shift, there is concern that this will have a depressing ef-
fect on asset prices. Sylvester Schieber and John Shoven,
“The Consequences of Population Aging on Private Pen-
sion Fund Saving and Asset Markets,” Working Paper
no. 4665 (Cambridge, Mass.: National Bureau of Eco-
nomic Research, March 1994).
20. The PBGC’s single-employer insurance fund contin-
ues to be in deficit on a net liability basis; and at the end
of 1993, PBGC liabilities ($11.3 billion) exceeded its assets
($8.4 billion) by $2.9 billion. Although ERISA states that
the United States is not liable for any obligation incurred
by the PBGC [Title IV Section 4002(g)(2)], Congress has
behaved as if the PBGC’s liabilities are the liabilities of the
federal government because it wants to avoid a default on
federally insured pensions. Consequently, many have
concluded, as the Congressional Budget Office has, that
“the federal government is almost certainly responsible
for those liabilities of the PBGC that exceed PBGC’s
assets.” CBO, Controlling Losses of the Pension Benefit Guar-
anty Corporation (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government
Printing Office, January 1993), p. 3.
21. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation, Annual Report
1992 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Of-
fice, 1992), pp. 4 and 10; and PBGC, Annual Report 1993
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office,
1993), pp. 7, 20-21.
22. A number of alternative concepts are used to estimate
pension liabilities that can significantly affect the percep-
tion of the adequacy of funding. Because of the need for
federal revenues, Congressional tax-writing committees
tend to choose less stringent standards of funding to
determine the eligibility of contributions. For example,
tax provisions of OBRA87, which had the effect of sharply
reducing business contributions to pension funds, re-
quired that the calculation of maximum eligible funding
be based on 150 percent of the termination-of-plan concept
of liabilities. This concept assumes the pension is termi-
nated at the valuation date and therefore ignores in-
creases in obligations that will arise because of future
wage increases and years of service. Broader measures of
funding adequacy, such as the concept required by the
Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB Statement
87), do include projected increases in earnings and, con-
sequently, generally show higher liabilities.
23. See Chapter 2 for recommendations for changes in the
Social Security system.
24. Those single men and women who have an average
wage and turn 65 years old in 1995 and 2010, respec-
tively, will be the first cohorts with average wages to
receive a negative return. Returns remain positive in
those years for all but the highest-income married cou-
ples. For high-wage single individuals who turn 65 in
2010, the present value of taxes paid will exceed the
annuity value of benefits by $135,000 for men and $84,000
for women. See C. Eugene Steuerle and Jon M. Bakija,
Retooling Social Security for the 21st Century (Washington,
D.C.: Urban Institute Press, 1994), p. 107.
25. The payroll tax rate for employees and employers in
1994, including Medicare, was  7.65 percent, consisting
of 5.60 for retirement (OASI), 0.60 for disability (DI),
and 1.45 for health (HI). Self-employed persons pay a
higher rate.
26. Social Security Administration, Annual Report of the
Board of Trustees, OASDI Trust Funds, 1994, pp. 5 and 177.
27. The full commission did not accept the Kerrey-
Danforth proposals, of which the four most important in
relation to Social Security were: (1) further increasing the
Social Security retirement age, (2) reducing growth of
initial benefits relative to earnings, (3) reducing benefits
for upper-income workers, and (4) replacing part of the
Social Security program with a mandatory saving pro-
gram. The leadership of the 104th Congress has also
indicated that no changes will be made to Social Security
for the time being.
28. In August 1994, the CBO projected that the total
federal deficit would be $202 billion in fiscal 1994. The
OASDI surplus was expected to total $58 billion, indicat-
ing a non–Social Security debt of $260 billion. U.S. Con-
gress, Congressional Budget Office, The Economic and
Budget Outlook: An Update (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Gov-
ernment Printing Office, August 1994), p. 29. Because of
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the fungibility of government income, strictly speaking,
it cannot be stated that the Social Security surplus is not
used to finance government investment spending
instead of consumption spending. Some would like to
see the annual surplus invested in private assets in an
attempt to ensure that pension savings are increased,
though this would not necessarily increase national sav-
ing. Others argue that the non–Social Security budget
should be in balance so that the Social Security surpluses
can be used to retire federal debt and, thereby, increase
the nation’s saving. See Rudolph G. Penner, Social Secu-
rity and National Saving (New York: Committee for Eco-
nomic Development, 1989).
29. Office of Management and Budget, “Budget Baseline,
Historical Data and Alternatives for the Future,” Budget
of the United States Government for Fiscal Year 1994 (Wash-
ington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, January
1993), pp. 187-196.
30. There have been widespread news reports about
abuses involving excessively generous pensions. For
example, local government pensions that base benefits
on earnings during the final years of work occasionally
have been manipulated by permitting workers in those
final years to work long hours of overtime and to include
overtime pay in earnings counted for retirement. Some
federal employees also qualify for very generous pen-
sions, often from legislative service or from combined
civilian and military service.
31. Pension coverage is higher in the public sector, and
benefits are sometimes more generous than in the private
sector. But it is not always the case that public-sector
pensions are a “better deal” for workers than
private-sector pensions. Most public-sector workers are
required to contribute to their defined benefit plan,
whereas most private-sector workers make contribu-
tions to Social Security only. Private-sector workers are
more likely to have a supplementary defined contribu-
tion plan, and many public-sector workers are not cov-
ered by Social Security. (New workers in the public
sector are now required to be covered by Social Security.)
A recent study of retirement income provided by defined
benefit plans and Social Security found that the initial
retirement income replacement ratio for typical newly
retired public-sector workers not covered by Social Secu-
rity was similar to or slightly better than the income
replacement ratio for private-sector workers but that the
contribution to pensions made by public-sector workers
typically exceeded contributions made by private-sector
workers. Those public-sector workers who were covered
by Social Security on average had very high ratios of
replacement income, but their contributions were simi-
larly high (Table 3).
32. About half of state and local government employees
covered by defined benefit pensions and all full-time
federal employees are in programs that provide auto-
matic cost-of-living increases. Social Security is also ad-
justed for inflation. Many private sector pensions are
adjusted to compensate for inflation, but the adjustment
is nearly always discretionary and frequently intermit-
tent. William J. Wiatrowski, “On the Disparity between
Private and Public Pensions,” Monthly Labor Review
(April 1994): 3-9.
33. It is also argued that automatic cost-of-living adjust-
ments for Social Security and other pension benefits raise
social costs by reducing the voting constituency that
supports anti-inflationary policies.
34. Elderly income has also grown relative to that of the
nonelderly as a result of economic conditions. A large
share of their income has been shielded from inflation
and unemployment; consequently, the elderly may be
relatively well off in bad times. For example, high unem-
ployment, high inflation, and high interest rates in the
1979–1984 period helped to reduce the real income of the
nonelderly by 0.3 percent while raising the income of the
elderly by 3.4 percent.
35. According to the example given in “Retirement Ben-
efits and Saving Requirements” (see page 39), if the real
return were 6 percent annually, the individual’s required
rate of saving to attain the same retirement income target
would be only 7 percent. This illustration also presents
estimates of required saving to achieve alternative
replacement ratios.
36. Many managers of defined contribution pension plans
fear that participants are too risk averse to invest in
portfolios with higher potential returns. Educating par-
ticipants about the required rate of saving and asset
returns needed to attain a desired level of retirement
income is increasingly emphasized. For example,
TIAA-CREF, a very large defined contribution plan,
encourages its members to include equities in their port-
folios. Based on its historical rates of return on a fifty-fifty
split between a traditional annuity and a common-stock
fund, TIAA-CREF reports that a contribution of 10 per-
cent of salary for thirty years yields a replacement rate of
50.7 percent of final pay. See John J. McCormack, State-
ment presented to U.S. Department of Labor, ERISA
Advisory Council, Washington, D.C., September 23, 1993.
37. Employee Benefit Research Institute, EBRI Data Book
on Employee Benefits, 2d ed. (Washington: D.C.: EBRI,
1992), pp. 28 and 36.
38. The study does concede that future retirement looks
very bleak for some groups, particularly the poorly edu-
cated and single women with few marketable skills.
Congressional Budget Office, Baby Boomers in Retirement:
An Early Perspective (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government
Printing Office, September 1993).
39. Alan J. Auerbach and Laurence J. Kotlikoff, “The
United States Fiscal and Savings Crisis and Their Impli-
cations for the Baby Boom Generation” (Paper presented
at a policy forum sponsored by the Employee Benefit
Research Institute, Washington, D.C., May 4, 1994).
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40. Hilary Williamson Hoynes and Daniel McFadden,
“The Impact of Demographics on Housing and
Non-Housing Wealth in the United States” (National
Bureau of Economic Research, Inc., Working Paper no.
4666, Cambridge, Mass., March 1994).
41. These and other arguments have led some scholars
to conclude that the CBO calculations actually present a
very pessimistic picture about the economic status of
baby boomers in retirement. B. Douglas Bernheim, “The
Adequacy of Saving for Retirement: Are the Baby Boom-
ers on Track?” (Paper presented at EBRI Policy Forum,
Washington, D.C., May 4, 1994).
42. See B. Douglas Bernheim, “Is the Baby Boom Genera-
tion Preparing Adequately for Retirement?” Technical
Report, mimeographed 1992, and a “Summary Report”
with the same title published by Merrill Lynch, 1993. The
methodology is also discussed by Bernheim and John
Karl Scholz in “Private Saving and Public Policy,” Tax
Policy and the Economy, vol. 7, ed. James M. Poterba
(Cambridge, Mass.: National Bureau of Economic Re-
search and MIT Press, 1993), pp. 76-87.
43. Karen Martin Gibler and Joseph Rabianski, “Elderly
Interest in Home Equity Conversion,” Housing Policy
Debate 4, no. 4 (1993): 565-588.
CHAPTER 4
1. Over the years, CED has sponsored critical research on
reforming the income tax, including perhaps the most
basic source on the consumed-income tax. In the 1980s,
CED commissioned a study by David Bradford, pub-
lished as Untangling the Income Tax, a Committee for
Economic Development publication, (Cambridge, Mass:
Harvard University Press, 1986). Bradford described the
U.S. income tax system as a hybrid that has sometimes
followed the comprehensive accrual-income theory, which
includes in the income tax base all consumption and
saving, and sometimes followed the consumed-income
theory, which does not include savings in the tax base.
Bradford believes that our hybrid approach produces a
muddle that is worse than would occur if we were to
follow either theory consistently. He recommended
moving from the accrual-income theory toward the con-
sumption theory.
Bradford makes clear that neither theory is the true
theory. Rather, he believes that the contending theories
present a choice. The language of the debate on particular
questions (e.g., taxation of pensions) is influenced might-
ily if one accepts one or the other theory as true. Exclud-
ing retirement savings from the tax base is described as
the grant of a subsidy or incentive from the perspective
of the comprehensive accrual-income theory, whereas
the inclusion of those savings in the tax base is described
as a penalty or disincentive from the perspective of the
consumed-income theory. On page 208, Bradford states:
There is a certain irony about the existence of saving
and investment incentives in the context of an income
tax, inasmuch as the principal reason for believing
that special incentives for these activities are needed
is the tax itself. The rules that we think of under this
heading are largely aimed not at mitigating some
inherent defect in the economy but at offsetting a
problem created by the tax system in the first place:
namely, the disincentive effect of income taxes on
saving and investing.
Describing tax-qualified savings as an incentive (under
the comprehensive accrual-income theory) may also con-
tribute to excessive and complicated regulation of what
is deemed to be a special exception. Under the consump-
tion theory, the exclusion of savings from the tax base is
treated as normal, not a special exception, and therefore
is less likely to be subject to overregulation.
2. The federal government’s classification of the deferral
of taxes on pension savings as a tax expenditure is consis-
tent with the income tax view, not the consumed-income
view. (See “Tax Expenditures and Pension Tax Prefer-
ences,” page 46.)
3. Target savers are likely to be low-income individuals
who save the minimum needed for a specific purpose,
such as a down payment on an automobile or an appli-
ance, whereas those who increase savings in response to
a higher return are likely to be higher-income earners
who have discretion to save for more than minimum
future consumption.
4. See, for example, Stephen F. Venti and David A. Wise,
“IRAs and Saving,” in The Effects of Taxation on Capital
Accumulation, ed. Martin Feldstein (Chicago: University
of Chicago Press, 1987), pp. 7-40; and James Poterba,
Steven F. Venti, and David A. Wise, “401(k) Plans and
Tax-Deferred Saving,” National Bureau of Economic
Research, Working Paper no. 4181 (Cambridge, Mass.:
NBER, October 1992).
5. Poterba, Venti and Wise, “401(k) Plans and
Tax-Deferred Saving.”
6. This is because the positive impact on savings result-
ing from the increased return will dominate over the
shifting of savings as funds available for shifting decline.
See Eric M. Engen, William G. Gale, and John Karl Scholz,
“Do Saving Incentives Work?” in Brookings Papers on
Economic Activity, vol 1., ed. William C. Brainard and
George L. Perry (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institu-
tion, 1994), pp. 85-152.
7. To promote household saving, Bernheim and Scholz
proposed premium saving accounts (PSAs) as an alterna-
tive to IRAs. A PSA would require each taxpayer to save
in total some fixed amount before becoming eligible to
make contributions to a tax-preferred account. The
amount of eligible contributions would vary with ad-
justed gross income. B. Douglas Bernheim and John Karl
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Scholz, “Private Saving and Public Policy,” in Tax Policy
and the Economy, ed. James Poterba (Cambridge, Mass.:
NBER, 1993), p. 98.
8. B. Douglas Bernheim and John Karl Scholz, “Private
Saving and Public Policy,” National Bureau of Economic
Research, Working Paper no. 4215 (Cambridge, Mass.:
NBER, November 1992), p. 24.
9. Alicia Munnell, “It’s Time to Tax Employee Benefits,”
New England Economic Review (July-August 1989): 49-63.
10. Some researchers have also found that policies that
reduce pension tax benefits are likely to increase inequal-
ity in the distribution of wealth. See Robert L. Clark and
Elisa Wolper, “Pension Tax Expenditures: Magnitude
Distribution and Economic Effect,” (Paper prepared for
conference on “Public Policy Toward Pensions,” spon-
sored by the Association for Private Pension and Welfare
Plans and the Center for Economic Policy Research,
Stanford University, October 1993).
11. The advantages and disadvantages of compulsory
saving plans are discussed in William G. Gale and Robert
E. Litan, “Saving Our Way Out of the Deficit Dilemma,”
The Brookings Review (Fall 1993): 7-11.
12. This has occurred yet again in the 1994 legislation
enabling GATT. For example, one measure effectively
delays indexation of pension benefit and contribution
limits purely as a revenue-raising measure. (See  Retire-
ment Protection Act of 1994, Title VII, Section 732).
13. For the most recent CED statement on the budget
deficit, see Restoring Prosperity: Budget Choices for Eco-
nomic Growth (1992), p. 2.
14. See Restoring Prosperity: Budget Choices for Economic
Growth, pp. 6-7.
CHAPTER 5
1. Pension plans for public-sector employees are not
covered under the federal laws governing private plans.
2. Employee Benefit Research Institute, Pension Funding
and Taxation: Implications for Tomorrow (Washington, DC:
EBRI, 1994), p. 44.
3. Many propose that the United States abandon the
current practice of taxing income and adopt a
consumption-based tax system, which would exempt all
saving from taxation. In such a system the limits on tax
preferences would not be necessary. (See Chapter 4.)
4. American Council of Life Insurance, The Pension Legacy:
The Case for Preserving the Private Pension System (Wash-
ington, D.C.: 1993), p. 6.
5. A forfeiture is a situation whereby an individual ceases
employment before being vested with the pension ben-
efits.
6. See William G. Gale, “Public Policies and Private
Pension Contributions,” Journal of Money, Credit, and
Banking, forthcoming; and Scott B. Smart and Joel
Waldfogel, “Tax Policy, Saving, and Pension Funding”
(manuscript, Indiana University, October 1992).
7. Sylvester J. Schieber and John B. Shoven, The Con-
sequences of Population Aging on Private Pension Fund
Saving and Asset Markets, CEPR Technical Paper no. 363
(Stanford, Calif.: Center for Economic Policy Research,
Stanford University, September 1993), p. 12. A 1989 sur-
vey by Mercer-Meidinger-Hansen found comparable
results. See William M. Mercer-Meidinger-Hansen, The
Effect of OBRA on Pension Plans: A Survey (New York:
William M. Mercer-Meidinger-Hansen, 1989).
8. Contributions to defined contribution plans were
capped at $30,000 until the indexed benefit limit for
defined benefit plans reaches $120,000. Contributions
have also been reduced by limits on considered compen-
sation.
9. If an employee participates in a defined benefit and a
defined contribution plan, a special overall limitation on
contributions and benefits is applied. This limit uses a
complicated formula based on the limits for individual
plans. Thus, if the individual-plan limits are changed, the
multiple-plan limit also changes.
10. This limit applies to annuities; if a lump sum is
involved, the limit is $742,000.
11. Emily S. Andrews, “The Growth and Distribution of
401(k) Plans,” in U.S. Department of Labor, Pension and
Welfare Benefits Administration, Trends in Pensions 1992
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office,
1992), p. 164.
12. Section 403(b) plans (see “Defined Contribution Plans,
pp. 54-55) already include a catch-up provision that
allows additional employer and employee deferrals for
individuals who have been with an employer fifteen
years. However, these plans are available only to non-
profit organizations and educational institutions.
13. There is also a family aggregation rule, which stipu-
lates a combined $150,000 limit for a married couple if
they both work for the same employer and one spouse is
in the top group of highly compensated employees.
14. For example, in a defined benefit plan, an individual
earning $175,000 and participating in a plan that specifies
a pension benefit of 40 percent of salary would be cred-
ited with only 40 percent of $150,000 under the new rule,
a $10,000 reduction in retirement benefit. Of course,
because the contributions are limited, benefits are re-
duced accordingly.
15. They are referred to as the actual deferral percentage
tests: (1) The average percentage of compensation de-
ferred (i.e., contributed to the plan) for the highly com-
pensated group cannot exceed 125 percent of the average
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deferral percentage for the low-paid group. (2) The aver-
age deferral percentage for the highly compensated group
cannot be more than two times that of the other group,
and the difference between the percentages cannot be
more than 2 percent. Matching employer contributions
are subject to similar tests under Section 401(m) of the
Internal Revenue Code.
16. In the case of saving plans with matching
employer-employee contributions, nondiscrimination
rules would require that the employer contribution be a
uniform percent of the contribution made by individual
employees. Retention of a ceiling on contributions to
secondary 401(k) plans would prevent highly compen-
sated employees from gaining an inordinately large ben-
efit from this arrangement
17. John Trutko and John Gibson et al. Cost and Impact of
Federal Regulation on Small Versus Large Business Retire-
ment Plans, Final Report (submitted to the Office of the
Chief Counsel for Advocacy, Small Business Administra-
tion, June 1990), p. 66.
18. A pension plan had to satisfy one of these tests in order
to be in compliance:
1. Percentage test: The plan must cover at least 70 percent
of all non–highly compensated employees.
2. Ratio test: The percentage of non–highly compensated
employees covered under a plan must be at least 70
percent of the percentage of highly compensated
employees covered.
3. Average benefits percentage test: Both of the follow
ing must be satisfied to pass this test:
a. The plan must cover a nondiscriminatory classifi-
cation of employees.
b. The ratio of employer-provided benefits or contri-
butions to the participant’s compensation for non–
highly compensated employees must be at least 70
percent that of highly compensated employees.
19. The participation rule requires that no individual who
has reached the age of 21 and has one year of service can
be excluded from a plan. Employees must, at a minimum,
be vested according to one of two schedules: (1) five-year
cliff or (2) 20 percent after three years and an additional
20 percent for each of the next four years.
20. Independent projections by the Office of Manage-
ment and Budget put the PBGC’s exposure at about $24
billion over the next thirty to forty years.
21. Changes in a plan’s unfunded liability arising from an
increase in plan benefits can be amortized over thirty
years. Losses or gains resulting from changes in actuarial
assumptions can be amortized over ten years; experience
losses or gains can be amortized over five years. There are
a number of other amortization schedules that apply to
other categories of gains and losses. The Retirement
Protection Act of 1994 speeds up amortization of differ-
ent kinds of unfunded liabilities but also further compli-
cates the amortization schedules.
22. McGill and Grubbs, Fundamentals of Private Pensions,
p. 611.
23. Carolyn L. Weaver, “Government Guarantees of
Private Pension Benefits: Current Problems and Likely
Future Prospects” (Paper prepared for conference on
“Public Policy Towards Pensions,” sponsored by the
Association of Private Pension and Welfare Plans and
the Center for Economic Policy Research, Stanford Uni-
versity, September 1993), pp. 13-14.
24. Weaver, “Government Guarantees of Private Pen-
sion Benefits: Current Problems and Likely Future Pros-
pects,” pp. 14-15.
25. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation, Annual Re-
port 1992 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing
Office, 1992), p. 11.
26. The Retirement Protection Act of 1994 gives the
PBGC authority to sue plan sponsors to enforce mini-
mum-funding standards where contributions are defi-
cient by more than $1 million.
27. Celia Silverman and Paul Yakoboski, “Public and
Private Pensions Today: An Overview of the System,” in
Pension Funding and Taxation: Implications for Tomorrow,
ed. Dallas L. Salisbury and Nora Super Jones (Washing-
ton, D.C.: EBRI, 1994), p. 19.
28. Hay/Huggins Company, Inc., Pension Plan Expense
Study for the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (Wash-
ington, D.C.: Hay/Huggins, September 1990).
29. Small plans are at a significant cost disadvantage in
trying to comply with constantly changing regulations
because the variable costs of plan administration are not
closely linked to the number of participants. Pension
plan service providers typically charge a fixed fee plus a
per-participant fee; however, the latter may be reduced
if the number of plan participants exceeds a threshold.
See Trutko and Gibson et al., Cost and Impact of Federal
Regulation on Small Versus Large Business Retirement Plans,
p. 74.
30. The two plan sizes considered were 25 and 200
participants. Trutko and Gibson et al., p. 80.
31. These changes include OBRA93, which further re-
duced considered compensation, and requires compli-
cated calculations for compliance. See pages  57-59 of this
document.
32. Another 7 percent cited limitations on benefits to
owners resulting from regulations governing maximum
benefits, considered compensation, and nondiscrimina-
tion. Other major reasons were plant shutdowns or un-
certainty of employer income (22 percent) and employer/
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employee preferences (17 percent). David Kennell et al.
Retirement Plan Coverage in Small and Large Firms, Final
Report (submitted to Office of Advocacy, U.S. Small Busi-
ness Administration, June 1992), Table III-19. See also
Trutko and Gibson et al., pp. 60-61.
33. Although many workers were left without coverage
because of the failure of employers to form successor
plans, the rapid decline in pension coverage under de-
fined benefit plans cannot be attributed exclusively to
regulation. In addition to administrative costs, research-
ers believe that labor market shifts have been a crucial
factor: A decreasing number of workers are in industries
dominated by large, unionized firms that traditionally
sponsor defined benefit plans. Daniel J. Beller and Helen
H. Lawrence, “Trends in Private Pension Plan Coverage”
in U.S. Department of Labor, Pension and Welfare Ben-
efits Administration, Trends in Pensions 1992 (Washing-
ton, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1992), p. 70.
34. The impact of regulatory reform on the formation of
defined benefit plans by very small firms may be less
critical. Many smaller firms still do not offer their employ-
ees any pension plan. Evidently, economic factors such as
uncertainty about income have much to do with this.
Smaller firms also tend to have a greater percentage of
employees who are young, part-time, and/or not likely to
stay for a long period in their job. See Kennell et al.,
Retirement Plan Coverage in Small and Large Firms, Final
Report, p. ES.8.
APPENDIX
1. Where the plan provides for full immediate vesting, the
employer can require three years of service. Also, em-
ployees who begin service before age 25 can have three
years of that service credited toward vesting when they
attain 25.
2. The vesting grades were now as follows: at least 25
percent after five years, increasing by 5 percent in each of
the following five years and 10 percent annually in the
third five-year tranche.
3. However, an employee with ten years of service must
be 50 percent vested even if the sum of age and service
does not exceed 45.
4. The normal cost of a pension plan in a particular year
is the cost of benefits accrued in that year.
5. A money purchase plan is a defined contribution plan
whereby periodic contributions are made according to a
formula, usually a percent of salary. Some plans may
require contributions by the employee as well as the
employer. A profit-sharing plan is another type of defined
contribution plan, with the distinctive characteristic that
contributions are likely to be variable because they are
tied to a firm’s profits.
6. The most common type of 401(k) plan entails an em-
ployee salary reduction, the amount of which is placed in
a tax-deferred account. About half of these plans involve
some amount of matching employer contribution.
7. The contribution limit for SEPs is now the lesser of
$30,000 or 15 percent of compensation.
8. Under a leveraged ESOP, the plan’s trustee takes out a
loan and uses it to purchase employer stock, which itself
is pledged as collateral for the loan. As repayments of
principal are made on the loan, stock can be released as
collateral and allocated to employee accounts.
9. Down from $45,475.
10. Previously 7 percent.
11. The major rules are as follows:
a. Vesting: Either three-year cliff or graded to achieve
full vesting after six years.
b. Minimum benefits: For nonkey employees, the mini-
mum annual benefit from a defined benefit plan was
set at the lesser of 20 percent of average compensation
or 2 percent of average compensation multiplied by
the number of years of service.
c. Minimum contributions: For nonkey employees, the
minimum contribution to a defined contribution plan
was set at the lesser of 3 percent of cash compensation
or the highest contribution rate for a key employee.
d. Considered compensation: Only the first $200,000 of
compensation could be taken into account when cal-
culating benefits.
e. Social Security integration: Neither Social Security
benefits nor taxes could be counted against minimum
pension benefits.
f. Aggregate benefit and contribution limits on multiple
plans: Normally, if an employer operates a plan of
each type (i.e., one defined contribution and one de-
fined benefit), the total benefits and contributions
cannot exceed 140 percent of the limit governing one
plan if the percentage of compensation limit applies or
125 percent of the limit if the dollar limit applies. For
top-heavy plans that would otherwise come under the
125 percent rule, benefits and contributions from
multiple plans were reduced to 100 percent unless
minimum benefits and contributions for nonkey em-
ployees are increased 1 percentage point and no more
than 90 percent of benefits and account balances is
designated to key employees.
12. However, the plan was made liable to the PBGC for
the sum of total unfunded benefits up to 30 percent of net
worth and the excess (if any) of 75 percent of all unfunded
benefits minus 30 percent of net worth.
13. An integrated defined benefit excess plan is one that
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provides a higher percentage of benefits for earnings
above the integration level than for earnings below the
integration level. Under prior law, it was possible to
design a plan so that there was no benefit below the
integration level.
14. Here the integration level is defined as covered compen-
sation. Covered compensation is the average Social Secu-
rity taxable earnings base for the thirty-five years imme-
diately preceding the participant’s normal retirement
age.
15. Defined as a plan in which the benefit attributable to
employer contributions is reduced by a specified amount.
16. TRA also introduced a definition of highly compen-
sated employee that differed from that in the top-heavy
rules contained in TEFRA.
17. This is a subjective test administered by the IRS.
18. The deficit reduction contribution consisted of two
parts: (1) the amount necessary to amortize unfunded old
liability in equal annual installments over eighteen years
and (2) a percentage of unfunded liability relating to the
current plan year.
19. Unpredictable contingent event benefits are benefits
promised in the event of the closure of a facility or some
other occurrence that cannot be reliably anticipated.
20. Reduced from 10 percent above the same average.
21. Amortization of increases in current liability as a
result of the new rules regarding the allowable interest
rates and mortality table had to be amortized in equal
annual installments over a twelve-year period beginning
in 1995.
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Page 14, JAMES Q. RIORDAN
The report is excellent and timely. The U.S.
retirement system is indeed underfunded,
overpromised, and overregulated. As a result
we have less savings for retirement than we
need. This is, however, a special case of the
more general problem that government policy
generally discourages savings and encourages
consumption. CED has long warned about the
lack of savings and the consequences of gov-
ernment dissaving (deficits). The deficit has, at
times, shown a year-to-year decline in the last
decade; but in the best of years it has been too
large, and the outlook is bleak.
If net saving is to increase, it will need to
come from increased private saving — includ-
ing increased retirement savings.
The report makes many excellent incremen-
tal suggestions to improve the tax and regula-
tory scheme governing retirement savings. I
wish, however, that we had recommended a
more fundamental cure for our problem. The
MEMORANDUM OF COMMENT, RESERVATION, OR DISSENT
report properly puts the retirement savings
issue in the context of the debate now going
forward on whether savings of any kind
should be included in the income tax base.
Indeed it briefly states the case for moving to
a tax system that does not include private
saving in the income tax base. Unfortunately,
it does not carry the discussion to its logical
conclusion and instead makes the assumption
that the government will persist in accepting
as revealed wisdom the comprehensive ac-
crual-income theory that treats every instance
of deferred taxation on savings as a prefer-
ence. The assumption has led the report to
accept continuing limits and regulatory com-
plications that will limit the increase in sav-
ings. It inevitably leads to the use of language
that distorts the dialogue. I wish that we had
grasped the nettle and recommended taxing
consumption and not savings.
Nevertheless, this is a fine report, and I
hope that all of the improvements recom-
mended will be adopted.
For more than 50 years, the Committee for
Economic Development has been a respected
influence on the formation of business and
public policy. CED is devoted to these two
objectives:
To develop, through objective research and
informed discussion, findings and recommenda-
tions for private and public policy that will contrib-
ute to preserving and strengthening our free soci-
ety, achieving steady economic growth at high
employment and reasonably stable prices, increas-
ing productivity and living standards, providing
greater and more equal opportunity for every citi-
zen, and improving the quality of life for all.
To bring about increasing understanding by
present and future leaders in business, govern-
ment, and education, and among concerned citi-
zens, of the importance of these objectives and the
ways in which they can be achieved.
CED’s work is supported by private
voluntary contributions from business and
industry, foundations, and individuals. It is
independent, nonprofit, nonpartisan, and
nonpolitical.
Through this business-academic partner-
ship, CED endeavors to develop policy state-
ments and other research materials that
commend themselves as guides to public and
business policy; that can be used as texts in
college economics and political science courses
and in management training courses; that will
be considered and discussed by newspaper
and magazine editors, columnists, and com-
mentators; and that are distributed abroad to
promote better understanding of the Ameri-
can economic system.
CED believes that by enabling business
leaders to demonstrate constructively their con-
cern for the general welfare, it is helping busi-
ness to earn and maintain the national and
community respect essential to the successful
functioning of the free enterprise capitalist
system.
OBJECTIVES OF THE COMMITTEE FOR
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
83
*Life Trustee
Chairman
JOHN L. CLENDENIN, Chairman and
Chief Executive Officer
BellSouth Corporation
Vice Chairmen
PHILIP J. CARROLL, President and Chief
Executive Officer
Shell Oil Company
ROBERT CIZIK, Chairman and Chief
Executive Officer
Cooper Industries Inc.
A.W. CLAUSEN, Retired Chairman and
Chief Executive Officer
BankAmerica Corporation
ALFRED C. DECRANE, JR., Chairman of the
Board and Chief Executive Officer
Texaco Inc.
MATINA S. HORNER, Executive Vice President
TIAA-CREF
JAMES J. RENIER
Renier & Associates
Treasurer
JOHN B. CAVE, Principal
Avenir Group, Inc.
REX D. ADAMS, Vice President - Administration
Mobil Corporation
PAUL A. ALLAIRE, Chairman and
Chief Executive Officer
Xerox Corporation
IAN ARNOF, President and
Chief Executive Officer
First Commerce Corporation
EDWIN L. ARTZT, Chairman of the Board and
Chief Executive
The Procter & Gamble Company
WILLIAM F. BAKER, President and
Chief Executive Officer
WNET/Channel 13
RICHARD BARTH, Chairman, President and
Chief Executive Officer
Ciba-Geigy Corporation
BERNARD B. BEAL, Chief Executive Officer
M. R. Beal & Co.
HANS W. BECHERER, Chairman and
Chief Executive Officer
Deere & Company
HENRY P. BECTON, JR., President and
General Manager
WGBH Educational Foundation
ALAN BELZER, Retired President and
Chief Operating Officer
AlliedSignal Inc.
PETER A. BENOLIEL, Chairman of the Board
Quaker Chemical Corporation
MICHEL L. BESSON, President and
Chief Executive Officer
Saint-Gobain Corporation
ROY J. BOSTOCK, Chairman and
Chief Executive Officer
D’Arcy, Masius, Benton & Bowles, Inc.
CED BOARD OF TRUSTEES
DENNIS C. BOTTORFF, President and
Chief Executive Officer
First American Corporation & First American
National Bank
C. L. BOWERMAN, Executive Vice President
and Chief Information Officer
Phillips Petroleum Company
MIKE R. BOWLIN, President and
Chief Executive Officer
ARCO
DICK W. BOYCE, Chief Executive Officer
FTD
ERNEST L. BOYER, President
Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement
of Teaching
RICHARD J. BOYLE, Vice Chairman
Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A.
JOHN BRADEMAS, President Emeritus
New York University
EDWARD A. BRENNAN, Chairman and
Chief Executive Officer
Sears, Roebuck & Co.
ELI BROAD, Chairman, President and
Chief Executive Officer
SunAmerica Inc.
STEPHEN L. BROWN, Chairman and
Chief Executive Officer
John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Company
JOHN H. BRYAN, Chairman and
Chief Executive Officer
Sara Lee Corporation
J. GARY BURKHEAD, President
Fidelity Management and Research Company
THEODORE A. BURTIS, Retired Chairman
of the Board
Sun Company, Inc.
*OWEN B. BUTLER, Retired Chairman of the Board
The Procter & Gamble Company
JEAN B. BUTTNER, Chairman and
Chief Executive Officer
Value Line Inc.
*FLETCHER L. BYROM, Chairman
Adience, Inc.
DONALD R. CALDWELL, Executive Vice
President
Safeguard Scientifics, Inc.
FRANK C. CARLUCCI, Chairman
The Carlyle Group
PHILIP J. CARROLL, President and
Chief Executive Officer
Shell Oil Company
EDWARD M. CARSON, Chairman
First Interstate Bancorp
ROBERT B. CATELL, President and
Chief Executive Officer
Brooklyn Union Gas Company
JOHN B. CAVE, Principal
Avenir Group, Inc.
JOHN S. CHALSTY, President and
Chief Executive Officer
Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette, Inc.
RAYMOND G. CHAMBERS, Chairman
of the Board
Amelior Foundation
FOREST J. FARMER
Rochester Hills, Michigan
KATHLEEN FELDSTEIN, President
Economics Studies, Inc.
RONALD E. FERGUSON, Chairman, President and
Chief Executive Officer
General RE Corporation
WILLIAM C. FERGUSON, Chairman and
Chief Executive Officer
NYNEX Corporation
RICHARD B. FISHER, Chairman
Morgan Stanley Group, Inc.
*EDMUND B. FITZGERALD, Managing Director
Woodmont Associates
*WILLIAM H. FRANKLIN, Retired Chairman
of the Board
Caterpillar Inc.
HARRY L. FREEMAN, President
The Freeman Company
ELLEN V. FUTTER, President
American Museum of Natural History
JOHN W. GALIARDO, Vice Chairman and General Counsel
Becton Dickinson and Company
ALBERT R. GAMPER, JR., President and
Chief Executive Officer
The CIT Group, Inc.
RICHARD L. GELB, Chairman of the Board
Bristol-Myers Squibb Company
JOHN A. GEORGES, Chairman and
Chief Executive Officer
International Paper Company
RAYMOND V. GILMARTIN
President and Chief Executive Officer
Merck & Company, Inc.
BOYD E. GIVAN, Senior Vice President and
Chief Financial Officer
The Boeing Company
CAROL R. GOLDBERG, President
The AVCAR Group, Ltd.
ELLEN R. GORDON, President and
Chief Operating Officer
Tootsie Roll Industries, Inc.
JOSEPH T. GORMAN, Chairman and
Chief Executive Officer
TRW Inc.
DENNIS J. GORMLEY, Chairman and
Chief Executive Officer
Federal-Mogul Corporation
EARL G. GRAVES, SR., Publisher and
Chief Executive Officer
Black Enterprise Magazine
HANNA H. GRAY, President Emeritus and Harry Pratt
Judson Distinguished Service Professor of History
The University of Chicago
WILLIAM H. GRAY, III, President and
Chief Executive Officer
United Negro College Fund
ROSEMARIE B. GRECO, President and
Chief Executive Officer
CoreStates Bank
GERALD GREENWALD
Greenwald & Freeman Associates
BARBARA B. GROGAN, President
Western Industrial Contractors
CLIFFORD J. GRUM, Chairman of the Board
and Chief Executive Officer
Temple-Inland Inc.
JOHN H. GUTFREUND
New York, New York
ROBERT CIZIK, Chairman and
Chief Executive Officer
Cooper Industries Inc.
RICHARD A. CLARKE, Chairman of the Board
Pacific Gas and Electric Company
A. W. CLAUSEN, Retired Chairman and
Chief Executive Officer
BankAmerica Corporation
JOHN L. CLENDENIN, Chairman and
Chief Executive Officer
BellSouth Corporation
NANCY S. COLE, President
Educational Testing Services
*EMILIO G. COLLADO
Palm Beach Gardens, Florida
KATHLEEN COOPER, Chief Economist
Exxon Corporation
GARY L. COUNTRYMAN, Chairman and
Chief Executive Officer
Liberty Mutual Insurance Company
ROBERT L. CRANDALL, Chairman, President
and Chief Executive Officer
AMR/American Airlines
RONALD R. DAVENPORT, Chairman
of the Board
Sheridan Broadcasting Corp.
ROBERT J. DAYTON, Chief Executive Officer
Okabena Company
ALFRED C. DECRANE, JR., Chairman of the
Board and Chief Executive Officer
Texaco Inc.
LINNET F. DEILY, Chairman, President and
Chief Executive Officer
First Interstate Bank of Texas
JERRY E. DEMPSEY, Chairman and
Chief Executive Officer
PPG Industries, Inc.
JOHN DIEBOLD, Chairman
John Diebold Incorporated
WILLIAM H. DONALDSON, Chairman and
Chief Executive Officer
New York Stock Exchange
JOSEPH L. DOWNEY, Director
The Dow Chemical Company
FRANK P. DOYLE, Executive Vice President
GE
E. LINN DRAPER, JR., Chairman, President
and Chief Executive Officer
American Electric Power Company
GEORGE C. EADS, Vice President,
Worldwide Economic & Market Analysis
General Motors Corporation
W.D. EBERLE, Chairman
Manchester Associates, Ltd.
WILLIAM S. EDGERLY, Chairman
Foundation for Partnerships
WALTER Y. ELISHA, Chairman and
Chief Executive Officer
Springs Industries, Inc.
JAMES D. ERICSON, President and
Chief Executive Officer
Northwestern Mutual Life Insurance Company
WILLIAM T. ESREY, Chairman and
Chief Executive Officer
Sprint
JANE EVANS, Vice President and General
Manager, Home and Personal Services Division
U.S. West Communications, Inc.
*Life Trustee
JOHN R. HALL, Chairman and
Chief Executive Officer
Ashland Oil Inc.
JUDITH H. HAMILTON, President and
Chief Executive Officer
Dataquest
RICHARD W. HANSELMAN, Retired Chairman
Genesco Inc.
JOHN T. HARTLEY, Chairman and
Chief Executive Officer
Harris Corporation
LANCE H. HERNDON, Managing Consultant
Access, Inc.
EDWIN J. HESS, Senior Vice President
Exxon Corporation
RODERICK M. HILLS, Partner
Mudge Rose Guthrie Alexander & Ferdon
DONALD P. HILTY
Economic Strategy Institute
HAYNE HIPP, President and
Chief Executive Officer
The Liberty Corporation
DELWIN D. HOCK, Chairman and Chief
Executive Officer
Public Service Company of Colorado
HARRY G. HOHN, Chairman and
Chief Executive Officer
New York Life Insurance Company
LEON C. HOLT, JR., Retired Vice Chairman
Air Products and Chemicals, Inc.
MATINA S. HORNER, Executive Vice President
TIAA-CREF
AMOS B. HOSTETTER, Chairman and
Chief Executive Officer
Continental Cablevision, Inc.
JAMES R. HOUGHTON, Chairman and
Chief Executive Officer
Corning Incorporated
BILL HOWELL, President
Howell Petroleum Products, Inc.
WILLIAM R. HOWELL, Chairman of the Board
J.C. Penney Company, Inc.
CORDELL W. HULL, Executive Vice President
and Director
Bechtel Group, Inc.
ROBERT J. HURST, General Partner
Goldman, Sachs & Co.
SOL HURWITZ, President
Committee for Economic Development
ALICE STONE ILCHMAN, President
Sarah Lawrence College
GEORGE B. JAMES, Senior Vice President and
Chief Financial Officer
Levi Strauss & Co.
ERIC G. JOHNSON, President and Chief
Executive Officer
Tri-Star Associates, Inc.
JAMES A. JOHNSON, Chairman and
Chief Executive Officer
Fannie Mae
ROBBIN S. JOHNSON, Corporate Vice President,
Public Affairs
Cargill, Incorporated
THOMAS W. JONES, President and
Chief Operating Officer
TIAA-CREF
PRES KABACOFF, President and
Co-Chairman
Historic Restoration, Inc.
HARRY P. KAMEN, Chairman and
Chief Executive Officer
Metropolitan Life Insurance Company
EDWARD A. KANGAS, Chairman and
Chief Executive Officer
Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu International
HELENE L. KAPLAN, Esq., Of Counsel
Skadden Arps Slate Meagher & Flom
JOSEPH E. KASPUTYS, Chairman, President
and Chief Executive Officer
Primark Corporation
JULIUS KATZ, President
Hills & Company
EAMON M. KELLY, President
Tulane University
THOMAS J. KLUTZNICK, President
Thomas J. Klutznick Company
CHARLES F. KNIGHT, Chairman and
Chief Executive Officer
Emerson Electric Co.
ALLEN J. KROWE, Vice Chairman and
Chief Financial Officer
Texaco Inc.
RICHARD J. KRUIZENGA, Senior Fellow
ISEM
CHARLES R. LEE, Chairman and
Chief Executive Officer
GTE Corporation
FRANKLIN A. LINDSAY, Retired Chairman
Itek Corporation
EDWARD E. LUCENTE, Executive In Residence, GSIA
Carnegie Mellon University
EDWIN LUPBERGER, Chairman and
Chief Executive Officer
Entergy Corporation
BRUCE K. MACLAURY, President
The Brookings Institution
COLETTE MAHONEY, RSHM, Chair
Educational Consulting Associates, Ltd.
MICHAEL P. MALLARDI, President, Broadcast
Group and Senior Vice President
Capital Cities/ABC, Inc.
DERYCK C. MAUGHAN, Chairman and
Chief Executive Officer
Salomon Brothers Inc.
WILLIAM F. MAY, Chairman and
Chief Executive Officer
Statue of Liberty - Ellis Island Foundation, Inc.
JEWELL JACKSON MCCABE, President
Jewell Jackson McCabe Associates, Inc.
R. MICHAEL MCCULLOUGH, Senior Chairman
Booz Allen & Hamilton Inc.
ALONZO L. MCDONALD, Chairman and
Chief Executive Officer
Avenir Group, Inc.
JAMES L. MCDONALD, Co-Chairman
Price Waterhouse
JOHN F. MCGILLICUDDY, Retired Chairman of
the Board and Chief Executive Officer
Chemical Banking Corporation
EUGENE R. MCGRATH, Chairman, President and
Chief Executive Officer
Consolidated Edison Company of New York, Inc.
HENRY A. MCKINNELL, Executive Vice President
and Chief Financial Officer
Pfizer Inc.
DAVID E. MCKINNEY
Westport, Connecticut
*Life Trustee
R. CLAYTON MCWHORTER, Chairman,
President and Chief Executive Officer
Healthtrust Inc.
JEAN C. MONTY, President and
Chief Executive Officer
Northern Telecom Limited
J. RICHARD MUNRO, Chairman,
Executive Committee
Time Warner Inc.
GARY L. NEALE, Chairman, President
and Chief Executive Officer
Nipsco Industries
KENT C. NELSON, Chairman and
Chief Executive Officer
United Parcel Service of America, Inc.
MARILYN CARLSON NELSON, Vice Chairman
Carlson Holdings, Inc.
JOSEPH NEUBAUER, Chairman and
Chief Executive Officer
ARAMARK Corp.
BARBARA W. NEWELL, Regents Professor
Florida State University
PATRICK F. NOONAN, Chairman and
Chief Executive Officer
The Conservation Fund
RICHARD C. NOTEBAERT, Chairman and
Chief Executive Officer
Ameritech Corporation
JAMES J. O’CONNOR, Chairman and
Chief Executive Officer
Commonwealth Edison Company
DEAN R. O’HARE, Chairman and
Chief Executive Officer
Chubb Corporation
JOHN D. ONG, Chairman of the Board, President
and Chief Executive Officer
The BFGoodrich Company
ANTHONY J.F. O’REILLY, Chairman, President
and Chief Executive Officer
H.J. Heinz Company
JAMES F. ORR III, Chairman and
Chief Executive Officer
UNUM Corporation
ROBERT J. O'TOOLE, Chairman and
Chief Executive Officer
A. O. Smith Corporation
WILLIAM R. PEARCE, President and
Chief Executive Officer
IDS Mutual Fund Group
JERRY K. PEARLMAN, Chairman and
Chief Executive Officer
Zenith Electronics Corporation
VICTOR A. PELSON, Executive Vice President,
Chairman-Global Operations Team
AT&T Corp.
PETER G. PETERSON, Chairman
The Blackstone Group
DEAN P. PHYPERS
New Canaan, Connecticut
S. LAWRENCE PRENDERGAST, Vice President
and Treasurer
AT&T Corp.
WESLEY D. RATCLIFF, President and
Chief Executive Officer
Advanced Technological Solutions, Inc.
ALLAN L. RAYFIELD
Lowell, Massachusetts
JAMES J. RENIER
Renier & Associates
WILLIAM R. RHODES, Vice Chairman
Citicorp/Citibank, N.A.
WILLIAM C. RICHARDSON, President
The Johns Hopkins University
JAMES Q. RIORDAN
Stuart, Florida
JOHN D. ROACH, Chairman, President and
Chief Executive Officer
Fibreboard Corporation
VIRGIL ROBERTS, President
Dick Griffey Productions/Solar Records
DAVID ROCKEFELLER, JR., Chairman
Rockefeller Financial Services, Inc.
JUDITH S. RODIN, President
University of Pennsylvania
IAN M. ROLLAND, Chairman and
Chief Executive Officer
Lincoln National Corporation
DANIEL ROSE, President
Rose Associates, Inc.
CHARLES O. ROSSOTTI, Chairman
American Management Systems
LANDON H. ROWLAND, President and
Chief Executive Officer
Kansas City Southern Industries, Inc.
NEIL L. RUDENSTINE, President
Harvard University
GEORGE E. RUPP, President
Columbia University
GEORGE F. RUSSELL, JR., Chairman
Frank Russell Company
VINCENT A. SARNI, Retired Chairman
and Chief Executive Officer
PPG Industries, Inc.
JOHN C. SAWHILL, President and
Chief Executive Officer
The Nature Conservancy
HENRY B. SCHACHT, Chairman of the
Executive Committee
Cummins Engine Company, Inc.
THOMAS SCHICK, Executive Vice President,
Corporate Affairs and Communications
American Express Company
JONATHAN M. SCHOFIELD, Chairman and
Chief Executive Officer
Airbus Industrie of North America, Inc.
DONALD J. SCHUENKE, Chairman
Northern Telecom Limited
ROBERT G. SCHWARTZ
New York, New York
J. L. SCOTT
Salt Lake City, Utah
ERVIN R. SHAMES
Wilton, Connecticut
WALTER V. SHIPLEY, Chairman and
Chief Executive Officer
Chemical Banking Corporation
C. R. SHOEMATE, Chairman, President and
Chief Executive Officer
CPC International Inc.
WALTER H. SHORENSTEIN, Chairman of the Board
The Shorenstein Company
*GEORGE P. SHULTZ, Distinguished Fellow
The Hoover Institution
ROCCO C. SICILIANO
Beverly Hills, California
L. PENDLETON SIEGEL, President and
Chief Operating Officer
Potlach Corporation
*Life Trustee
*Life Trustee
ANDREW C. SIGLER, Chairman and
Chief Executive Officer
Champion International Corporation
IRBY C. SIMPKINS, JR., Publisher and
Chief Executive Officer
Nashville Banner
FREDERICK W. SMITH, Chairman, President
and Chief Executive Officer
Federal Express Corporation
RAYMOND W. SMITH, Chairman of the Board
and Chief Executive Officer
Bell Atlantic Corporation
SHERWOOD H. SMITH, JR., Chairman of the
Board and Chief Executive Officer
Carolina Power & Light Company
WILLIAM D. SMITHBURG, Chairman and
Chief Executive Officer
The Quaker Oats Company
TIMOTHY P. SMUCKER, Chairman
The J.M. Smucker Company
ALAN G. SPOON, President
The Washington Post Company
ELMER B. STAATS, Former Comptroller
General of the United States
JOHN R. STAFFORD, Chairman, President
and Chief Executive Officer
American Home Products Corporation
STEPHEN STAMAS, Chairman
New York Philharmonic
JOHN L. STEFFENS, Executive Vice President
Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc.
RICHARD J. STEGEMEIER, Chairman of the Board
Unocal Corporation
W. THOMAS STEPHENS, Chairman,
President and Chief Executive Officer
Manville Corporation
PAUL G. STERN
Potomac, Maryland
PAULA STERN, Senior Fellow
Progressive Policy Institute
DONALD M. STEWART, President
The College Board
WILLIAM P. STIRITZ, Chairman of the Board
Ralston Purina Company
ROGER W. STONE, Chairman, President and
Chief Executive Officer
Stone Container Corporation
MATTHEW J. STOVER, President and
Chief Executive Officer
NYNEX Information Resources Company
CARROLL W. SUGGS, Chairman of the Board and
Chief Executive Officer
Petroleum Helicopters, Inc.
JAMES N. SULLIVAN, Vice Chairman of the Board
Chevron Corporation
RICHARD F. SYRON, Chairman and
Chief Executive Officer
American Stock Exchange
ALISON TAUNTON-RIGBY
Lincoln, Massachusetts
ANTHONY P. TERRACCIANO, Chairman, President
and Chief Executive Officer
First Fidelity Bancorporation
RICHARD L. THOMAS, Chairman and
Chief Executive Officer
First Chicago Corporation
JAMES A. THOMSON, President and
Chief Executive Officer
RAND
CHANG-LIN TIEN, Chancellor
University of California, Berkeley
RANDALL L. TOBIAS, Chairman of the Board and
Chief Executive Officer
Eli Lilly and Company
ALEXANDER J. TROTMAN, Chairman, President
and Chief Executive Officer
Ford Motor Company
RICHARD A. VOELL, President and
Chief Executive Officer
The Rockefeller Group
HAROLD A. WAGNER., Chairman, President and
Chief Executive Officer
Air Products & Chemicals, Inc.
ADMIRAL JAMES D. WATKINS, USN (Ret.),
President
Joint Oceanographic Institutions, Inc.
ARNOLD R. WEBER, Chancellor
Northwestern University
LAWRENCE A. WEINBACH, Managing Partner–
Chief Executive
Arthur Andersen & Co, SC
HARVEY A. WEINBERG, Consultant
HSSI, Inc.
ROBERT E. WEISSMAN, President and
Chief Executive Officer
Dun & Bradstreet Corporation
JOHN F. WELCH, JR., Chairman and
Chief Executive Officer
GE
VIRGINIA V. WELDON, M.D., Senior Vice President,
Public Policy
Monsanto Company
JOSH S. WESTON, Chairman and
Chief Executive Officer
Automatic Data Processing, Inc.
CLIFTON R. WHARTON, JR., Former Chairman
TIAA-CREF
DOLORES D. WHARTON, Chairman and
Chief Executive Officer
The Fund for Corporate Initiatives, Inc.
EDWARD E. WHITACRE, JR., Chairman and
Chief Executive Officer
SBC Communications, Inc.
GORDON L. WILLIAMS, Corporate Vice President
and General Manager for the Commercial
Aircraft Division
Northrop Grumman Corporation
HAROLD M. WILLIAMS, President
The J. Paul Getty Trust
J. KELLEY WILLIAMS, Chairman and
Chief Executive Officer
First Mississippi Corporation
MARGARET S. WILSON, Chairman of the Board
Scarbroughs
WILLIAM S. WOODSIDE, Vice Chairman
LSG Sky Chefs
MARTIN B. ZIMMERMAN, Executive Director,
Governmental Relations and Corporate Economics
Ford Motor Company
CHARLES J. ZWICK
Coral Gables, Florida
RAY C. ADAM
New York, New York
*O. KELLEY ANDERSON
Boston, Massachusetts
ROBERT O. ANDERSON, Chairman
Hondo Oil & Gas Company
ROY L. ASH
Los Angeles, California
SANFORD S. ATWOOD, President Emeritus
Emory University
ROBERT H. B. BALDWIN, Retired Chairman
Morgan Stanley Group Inc.
JOSEPH W. BARR
Hume, Virginia
GEORGE F. BENNETT, Chairman Emeritus
State Street Investment Trust
HAROLD H. BENNETT
Salt Lake City, Utah
JACK F. BENNETT
Greenwich, Connecticut
HOWARD W. BLAUVELT
Charlottesville, Virginia
FRED J. BORCH
New Canaan, Connecticut
MARVIN BOWER, Director
McKinsey & Company, Inc.
ALAN S. BOYD
Washington, D.C.
ANDREW F. BRIMMER, President
Brimmer & Company, Inc.
HARRY G. BUBB, Chairman Emeritus
Pacific Mutual Life Insurance
JOHN L. BURNS
Greenwich, Connecticut
THOMAS D. CABOT, Honorary
Chairman of the Board
Cabot Corporation
PHILIP CALDWELL, Senior Managing Director
Lehman Brothers Inc.
EDWARD W. CARTER, Chairman Emeritus
Carter Hawley Hale Stores, Inc.
EVERETT N. CASE
Van Hornesville, New York
HUGH M. CHAPMAN, Chairman
NationsBank South
E. H. CLARK, JR., Chairman and Chief
Executive Officer
The Friendship Group
GEORGE S. CRAFT
Atlanta, Georgia
DOUGLAS D. DANFORTH, Retired Chairman
Westinghouse Electric Corporation
JOHN H. DANIELS, Retired Chairman
and Chief Executive Officer
Archer-Daniels Midland Co.
RALPH P. DAVIDSON
Washington, D.C.
ARCHIE K. DAVIS, Chairman of the
Board (Retired)
Wachovia Bank and Trust Company, N.A.
DOUGLAS DILLON
New York, New York
ROBERT R. DOCKSON, Chairman Emeritus
CalFed, Inc.
CED HONORARY TRUSTEES
LYLE EVERINGHAM, Retired Chairman
The Kroger Co.
THOMAS J. EYERMAN, President
Delphi Associates Limited
JOHN T. FEY
Jamestown, Rhode Island
JOHN M. FOX
Sapphire, North Carolina
DON C. FRISBEE, Chairman Emeritus
PacifiCorp
W. H. KROME GEORGE, Retired Chairman
Aluminum Company of America
WALTER B. GERKEN, Chairman,
Executive Committee
Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Company
PAUL S. GEROT
Delray Beach, Florida
LINCOLN GORDON, Guest Scholar
The Brookings Institution
KATHARINE GRAHAM, Chairman of
the Executive Committee
The Washington Post Company
JOHN D. GRAY, Chairman Emeritus
Hartmarx Corporation
WALTER A. HAAS, JR., Honorary Chairman
of the Board
Levi Strauss & Co.
ROBERT A. HANSON, Retired Chairman
Deere & Company
ROBERT S. HATFIELD, Retired Chairman
The Continental Group, Inc.
ARTHUR HAUSPURG, Member, Board
of Trustees
Consolidated Edison Company of New York, Inc.
PHILIP M. HAWLEY, Retired Chairman
of the Board
Carter Hawley Hale Stores, Inc.
WILLIAM A. HEWITT
Chadds Ford, Pennsylvania
OVETA CULP HOBBY, Chairman
H&C Communications, Inc.
ROBERT C. HOLLAND, Senior Economic
Consultant
Committee for Economic Development
GEORGE F. JAMES
South Bristol, Maine
HENRY R. JOHNSTON
Ponte Vedra Beach, Florida
GILBERT E. JONES, Retired Vice Chairman
IBM Corporation
CHARLES KELLER, JR.
Keller Family Foundation
GEORGE M. KELLER, Chairman of the
Board, Retired
Chevron Corporation
DAVID M. KENNEDY
Salt Lake City, Utah
JAMES R. KENNEDY
Essex Falls, New Jersey
TOM KILLEFER, Chairman Emeritus
United States Trust Company of New York
CHARLES M. KITTRELL
Bartlesville, Oklahoma
PHILIP M. KLUTZNICK, Senior Partner
Klutznick Investments
*Life Trustee
HARRY W. KNIGHT
New York, New York
ROY G. LUCKS
San Francisco, California
ROBERT W. LUNDEEN, Retired Chairman
The Dow Chemical Company
RAY W. MACDONALD, Honorary Chairman
of the Board
Burroughs Corporation
IAN MACGREGOR, Retired Chairman
AMAX Inc.
RICHARD B. MADDEN, Retired Chairman
and Chief Executive Officer
Potlatch Corporation
FRANK L. MAGEE
Stahlstown, Pennsylvania
STANLEY MARCUS, Consultant
Stanley Marcus Consultancy
AUGUSTINE R. MARUSI
Red Bank, New Jersey
OSCAR G. MAYER, Retired Chairman
Oscar Mayer & Co.
GEORGE C. MCGHEE, Former U.S.
Ambassador and Under Secretary of State
Washington, D.C.
JAMES W. MCKEE, JR., Retired Chairman
CPC International, Inc.
CHAMPNEY A. MCNAIR, Retired Vice Chairman
Trust Company of Georgia
J. W. MCSWINEY, Retired Chairman of the Board
The Mead Corporation
CHAUNCEY J. MEDBERRY, III, Retired Chairman
BankAmerica Corporation and Bank of America
N.T. and  S.A.
ROBERT E. MERCER, Retired Chairman
The Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.
RUBEN F. METTLER, Retired Chairman and
Chief Executive Officer
TRW Inc.
LEE L. MORGAN, Former Chairman of the Board
Caterpillar, Inc.
ROBERT R. NATHAN, Chairman
Nathan Associates, Inc.
ALFRED C. NEAL
Harrison, New York
J. WILSON NEWMAN, Retired Chairman
Dun & Bradstreet Corporation
LEIF H. OLSEN, President
Leif H. Olsen Investments, Inc.
NORMA PACE, Senior Advisor
The WEFA Group
CHARLES W. PARRY, Retired Chairman
Aluminum Company of America
JOHN H. PERKINS, Former President
Continental Illinois National Bank and Trust Company
HOWARD C. PETERSEN
Radnor, Pennsylvania
C. WREDE PETERSMEYER
Vero Beach, Florida
RUDOLPH A. PETERSON, President and
Chief Executive Officer (Emeritus)
BankAmerica Corporation
EDMUND T. PRATT, JR., Chairman Emeritus
Pfizer Inc.
ROBERT M. PRICE, Retired Chairman and
Chief Executive Officer
Control Data Corporation
R. STEWART RAUCH, Former Chairman
The Philadelphia Savings Fund Society
AXEL G. ROSIN, Retired Chairman
Book-of-the-Month Club, Inc.
WILLIAM M. ROTH
San Francisco, California
GEORGE RUSSELL
Bloomfield, Michigan
JOHN SAGAN, President
John Sagan Associates
RALPH S. SAUL, Former Chairman of the Board
CIGNA Companies
GEORGE A. SCHAEFER, Retired Chairman
of the Board
Caterpillar, Inc.
MARK SHEPHERD, JR., Retired Chairman
Texas Instruments, Inc.
RICHARD R. SHINN, Retired Chairman
and Chief Executive Officer
Metropolitan Life Insurance Co.
NEIL D. SKINNER
Indianapolis, Indiana
ELLIS D. SLATER
Landrum, South Carolina
DAVIDSON SOMMERS
Washington, D.C.
ELVIS J. STAHR, JR.
Chickering & Gregory, P.C.
FRANK STANTON, President Emeritus
CBS, Inc.
EDGAR B. STERN, JR., Chairman of the Board
Royal Street Corporation
J. PAUL STICHT, Retired Chairman
RJR Nabisco, Inc.
ALEXANDER L. STOTT
Fairfield, Connecticut
WAYNE E. THOMPSON, Past Chairman
Merritt Peralta Medical Center
CHARLES C. TILLINGHAST, JR.
Providence, Rhode Island
HOWARD S. TURNER, Retired Chairman
Turner Construction Company
L. S. TURNER, JR.
Dallas, Texas
THOMAS A. VANDERSLICE, Chairman, President
and Chief Executive Officer
M/A-Com, Inc.
ROBERT C. WEAVER
New York, New York
JAMES E. WEBB
Washington, D.C.
SIDNEY J. WEINBERG, JR., Limited Partner
The Goldman Sachs Group, L.P.
GEORGE WEISSMAN, Retired Chairman
Philip Morris Companies Inc.
ARTHUR M. WOOD
Chicago, Illinois
RICHARD D. WOOD, Director
Eli Lilly and Company
CED RESEARCH ADVISORY BOARD
Chairman
JOHN P. WHITE
Director, Center for Business and
Government
John F. Kennedy School of Government
Harvard University
DOUGLAS J. BESHAROV
Resident Scholar
American Enterprise Institute for
Public Policy Research
SUSAN M. COLLINS
Senior Fellow, Economic Studies
     Program
The Brookings Institution
SOL HURWITZ
President
CED PROFESSIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE STAFF
JUNE E. O‘NEILL
Director, Center for the Study of
Business and Government
Baruch College, City University
of New York
PETER PASSELL
The New York Times
CHRISTINA D. ROMER
Professor of Economics
University of California, Berkeley
BERNARD SAFFRAN
Franklin & Betty Barr Professor
of Economics
Swarthmore College
SANDRA KESSLER HAMBURG
Vice President and Director of
   Education Studies
TIMOTHY J. MUENCH
Vice President and Director of
   Finance and Administration
EVA POPPER
Vice President, Secretary of the
Board of Trustees and Director
of Development
NATHANIEL M. SEMPLE
Vice President, Secretary of
the Research and Policy
Committee, and Director of
Business-Government Relations
Senior Economic Consultant
ROBERT C. HOLLAND
Advisor on International
Economic Policy
ISAIAH FRANK
William L. Clayton Professor
of International Economics
The Johns Hopkins University
Administration
DOROTHY M. STEFANSKI
Deputy Comptroller
KAREN CASTRO
Assistant Comptroller
ARLENE  M. MURPHY
Administrative Assistant to
   the President
SHIRLEY R.  SHERMAN
Office Manager, Washington
Development
JULIA R. HICKS
Assistant Director
MICHAEL BORNHEIMER
Staff Associate
ANA SOMOHANO
Campaign Coordinator
WILFORD V. MALCOLM
Campaign Production Administrator
VAN DOORN OOMS
Senior Vice President and
Director of Research
WILLIAM J. BEEMAN
Vice President and Director
of Economic Studies
ANTHONY P. CARNEVALE
Vice President and
Director of Human Resource
Studies
CLAUDIA P. FEUREY
Vice President for
Communications and
Corporate Affairs
Research
MICHAEL K. BAKER
Economist
JESSE W. ELLIS
Policy Analyst
LORRAINE MACKEY
Research Administrator
MARIA L. LUIS
Publications Coordinator
Conferences
VALERIE MENDELSOHN
Manager
FRANK LEVY
Daniel Rose Professor of Urban
Economics
Department of Urban Studies and
Planning
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
REBECCA MAYNARD
Trustee Professor of Education
Policy
University of Pennsylvania
JANET L. NORWOOD
Senior Fellow
Urban Institute
SHARON O'CONNELL
Director of Special Projects
THOMAS R. FLAHERTY
Comptroller and Director of
Operations
MARK FRANCIS
Director of Information
STATEMENTS ON NATIONAL POLICY ISSUED BY THE
COMMITTEE FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
SELECTED PUBLICATIONS:
Putting Learning First: Governing and Managing the Schools for High Achievement (1994)
Prescription for Progress: The Uruguay Round in the New Global Economy (1994)
*From Promise to Progress: Towards a New Stage in U.S.-Japan Economic Relations (1994)
U.S. Trade Policy Beyond The Uruguay Round (1994)
In Our Best Interest: NAFTA and the New American Economy (1993)
What Price Clean Air? A Market Approach to Energy and Environmental Policy (1993)
Why Child Care Matters? Preparing Young Children For A More Productive America (1993)
Restoring Prosperity: Budget Choices for Economic Growth (1992)
The United States in the New Global Economy: A Rallier of Nations (1992)
The Economy and National Defense: Adjusting to Cutbacks in the Post-Cold War Era (1991)
Politics, Tax Cuts and the Peace Dividend (1991)
The Unfinished Agenda: A New Vision for Child Development and Education (1991)
Foreign Investment in the United States: What Does It Signal? (1990)
An America That Works: The Life-Cycle Approach to a Competitive Work Force (1990)
Breaking New Ground in U.S. Trade Policy (1990)
Battling America's Budget Deficits (1989)
*Strengthening U.S.-Japan Economic Relations (1989)
Who Should Be Liable? A Guide to Policy for Dealing with Risk (1989)
Investing in America's Future: Challenges and Opportunities for Public Sector Economic Policies (1988)
Children in Need: Investment Strategies for the Educationally Disadvantaged (1987)
Finance and Third World Economic Growth (1987)
Toll of the Twin Deficits (1987)
Reforming Health Care: A Market Prescription (1987)
Work and Change: Labor Market Adjustment Policies in a Competitive World (1987)
Leadership for Dynamic State Economies (1986)
Investing in Our Children: Business and the Public Schools (1985)
Fighting Federal Deficits: The Time for Hard Choices (1985)
Strategy for U.S. Industrial Competitiveness (1984)
Strengthening the Federal Budget Process: A Requirement for Effective Fiscal Control (1983)
Productivity Policy: Key to the Nation's Economic Future (1983)
*Statements issued in association with CED counterpart organizations in foreign countries.
Energy Prices and Public Policy (1982)
Public-Private Partnership: An Opportunity for Urban Communities (1982)
Reforming Retirement Policies (1981)
Transnational Corporations and Developing Countries: New Policies for a Changing World Economy
(1981)
Fighting Inflation and Rebuilding a Sound Economy (1980)
Stimulating Technological Progress (1980)
Helping Insure Our Energy Future: A Program for Developing Synthetic Fuel Redefining
    Government's Role in the Market System (1979)
Improving Management of the Public Work Force: The Challenge to State and Local Government (1978)
Jobs for the Hard-to-Employ: New Directions for a Public-Private Partnership (1978)
An Approach to Federal Urban Policy (1977)
Key Elements of a National Energy Strategy (1977)
Nuclear Energy and National Security (1976)
Fighting Inflation and Promoting Growth (1976)
Improving Productivity in State and Local Government (1976)
*International Economic Consequences of High-Priced Energy (1975)
Broadcasting and Cable Television: Policies for Diversity and Change (1975)
Achieving Energy Independence (1974)
A New U.S. Farm Policy for Changing World Food Needs (1974)
Congressional Decision Making for National Security (1974)
*Toward a New International Economic System: A Joint Japanese-American View (1974)
More Effective Programs for a Cleaner Environment (1974)
The Management and Financing of Colleges (1973)
Financing the Nation's Housing Needs (1973)
Building a National Health-Care System (1973)
High Employment Without Inflation: A Positive Program for Economic Stabilization (1972)
Reducing Crime and Assuring Justice (1972)
Military Manpower and National Security (1972)
The United States and the European Community: Policies for a Changing World Economy (1971)
Social Responsibilities of Business Corporations (1971)
CE Circulo de Empresarios
Madrid, Spain
CEDA Committee for Economic Development of Australia
Sydney, Australia
EVA Centre for Finnish Business and Policy Studies
Helsinki, Finland
FAE Forum de Administradores de Empresas
Lisbon, Portugal
IDW Institut der Deutschen Wirtschaft
Cologne,  Germany
IE Institut de l’Entreprise
Brussels, Belgium
IE Institut de l’Entreprise
Paris, France
Keizai Doyukai
Tokyo, Japan
SMO Stichting Maatschappij en Onderneming
The Netherlands
SNS Studieförbundet Naringsliv och Samhälle
Stockholm, Sweden
CED COUNTERPART ORGANIZATIONS
Close relations exist between the Committee for Economic Development and
independent, nonpolitical research organizations in other countries. Such counter-
part groups are composed of business executives and scholars and have objec-
tives similar to those of CED, which they pursue by similarly objective methods.
CED cooperates with these organizations on research and study projects of
common interest to the various countries concerned. This program has resulted
in a number of joint policy statements involving such international matters as
energy, East-West trade, assistance to developing countries, and the reduction
of nontariff barriers to trade.
